Case law

Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland

974 A.2d 286 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 7, 2009

The court granted the Bishop’s motion, holding that the Bishop qualifies as a charitable organization and has not waived its charitable immunity pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 158 because it has no insurance coverage for the claims … In 1961, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld a statute establishing charitable immunity for hospitals, but it stated that “[t]he question of whether such immunity as a matter of public policy is sound or otherwise may be

Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston

997 A.2d 84 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jun 3, 2010

Only the governmental entity can have “ownership” of qualifying equipment. 4 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(1). … City has established that there is no available insurance coverage apart from the Maine Municipal Association self-insured risk pool, which is available only if the City is not immune pursuant to the MTCA.

Geary v. Stanley Medical Research Institute

939 A.2d 86 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jan 15, 2008

Reviewing these concerns, we conclude that the rationales mandating qualified immunity for public officials are not applicable to private parties.” Wyatt v. … Id. at 168 , 112 S.Ct. 1827 . [¶ 18] The good faith clause of the UAGA does not explicitly provide immunity from suit, nor is there any suggestion that qualified immunity is involved in this dispute between private parties

Lightfoot v. School Administrative District No. 35

816 A.2d 63 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Feb 28, 2003

No. 35 is not immune from liability for its negligent acts. … No. 35’s allowing the wrestling team to run through the High School’s hallways does not qualify as the operation of a public budding. The Superior Court correctly concluded that S.A.D.

Marcoux v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Division

881 A.2d 1138 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Sep 19, 2005

S-1173 (1995). [¶ 12] Hence, the legislative history of section 104 establishes that the Legislature intended that a 3rd party em *1143 ployer’s immunity from suit by a temporary employee is subject to the requirement that … measures in order to establish a breach of duty.

Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison

655 A.2d 876 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Mar 7, 1995

They all have the opportunity to qualify for an exemption by choosing to dispense the majority of their charity locally. … Furthermore, the burden on interstate commerce does not clearly exceed the local benefits.

Bartashevich v. City of Portland

308 A.2d 551 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 31, 1973

to liability because of the sovereign immunity doctrine. … Clearly, Section 145 does not purport to authorize an action against a municipality by the third party beneficiary under a contract between the municipality and another person.

New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Department of Transportation

728 A.2d 673 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Apr 28, 1999

is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed. … Accordingly, I would find that bridge leaf machinery qualifies as “other machinery or equipment, whether mobile or stationary” for which the DOT can be held liable for its negligent operation.

Clark v. Benton, LLC

189 A.3d 761 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 17, 2018

DISCUSSION [¶ 8] Benton, LLC, contends that the Act's definition of "employer" is ambiguous and does not resolve the issue of whether it may qualify for immunity as an employer pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 104. 39-A M.R.S. § … Even if all of the above facts were undisputed, Benton, LLC, cannot establish its claim to immunity under any applicable doctrine.

Chauncey W. Clark v. Benton, LLC

2018 ME 99 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 17, 2018

DISCUSSION [¶8] Benton, LLC, contends that the Act’s definition of “employer” is ambiguous and does not resolve the issue of whether it may qualify for immunity as an employer pursuant … Even if all of the above facts were undisputed, Benton, LLC, cannot establish its claim to immunity under any applicable doctrine.

Scott v. Androscoggin County Jail

866 A.2d 88 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Nov 29, 2004

Thus, to recover pursuant to the ADA or the MHRA, Scott must establish that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was excluded from participating in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services … Because we determine that Scott has not established an actionable claim for liability, we do not reach the issue of whether Scott’s claims may be barred by sovereign immunity. [¶ 24] In the absence of an immunity bar, federal

Pattangall v. Mooers

113 Me. 412 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 6, 1915

Whatever may have been the nature of the editorial it was clearly incompetent as evidence on the question of the plaintiff’s general reputation. Nor was it admissible to rebut malice. 2. … And we think the jury must have clearly understood that if they did not find that the words were spoken of the plaintiff in respect to his professional conduct, then he could not recover.

Winston v. Maine Technical College System

631 A.2d 70 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Sep 1, 1993

Contrary to plaintiffs contention, Conrath is shielded by qualified immunity from personal liability for his discretionary acts, including the termination of plaintiffs employment. See Anderson v. … Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). That is not the case here.

Bradbury v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC

58 A.3d 1054 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Nov 29, 2012

However, because the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure establish that affidavits are not pleadings, the defective affidavits executed by Jeffrey Stephan do not qualify for the protection of that privilege. See M.R. Civ. … The privilege does not immunize a party from liability simply because a statement is made in the context of a judicial proceeding. See Vahlsing Christina Corp. v.

Cohen v. Bowdoin

288 A.2d 106 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Mar 2, 1972

We present those portions of the complaint which most clearly state its fundamental import. “1. … The absolute immunity recognized by Richards v. Ellis, Me., 233 A.2d 37 (1967) and Rodway v.

Morgan v. Kooistra

941 A.2d 447 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Feb 5, 2008

Kooistra and Walsh argue that: (1) they each are entitled to discretionary function immunity pursuant to the Maine Tort Claims Act (the MTCA), 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(C) (2007); (2) they each qualify for intentional act immunity … Co., 2001 ME 8, ¶ 6 , 764 A.2d 258, 263 (holding that the “immunity” exception to the final judgment rule applies when the basis for the motion for summary judgment is complete or qualified immunity). See also, Webb v.

Neal L. Weinstein v. Old Orchard Beach Family Dentistry, LLC

271 A.3d 758 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Mar 8, 2022

Me. 1993), her statements to the Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar, the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, and the USPS are entitled to only qualified immunity, see Truman, 2001 ME 182, ¶ 15, 788 A.2d 168. … Furthermore, because I believe that Narowetz’s statements made to the Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar, the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, and the USPS were entitled only to qualified immunity, Counts 1, 3, 4

Child v. Central Maine Medical Center

575 A.2d 318 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jun 8, 1990

In considering the merits of the hospital’s charitable immunity defense, we reaffirmed our requirement that “in order to qualify for charitable immunity, an institution must, inter alia, derive its funds ‘mainly from public … We therefore conclude that CMMC has failed to meet its burden of establishing that it is entitled to charitable immunity.

Nancy J. McCandless v. John Ramsey

211 A.3d 1157 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 11, 2019

P. 12(a)(2) (“A qualified justice may participate in a decision even though not present at oral argument.”). 2 [¶2] Nancy J. … the summary judgment record to determine whether there is no genuine issue of material fact and the Ramseys have established the applicability of the immunity provision as a matter of law, see M.R.

Rogers v. Sylvester

570 A.2d 311 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Feb 9, 1990

The Superior Court (Kennebec County, Brody, J.) granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that all of the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate Rogers’ clearly … established rights.