Case law

In Re Marcial O.

728 A.2d 158 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Apr 26, 1999

A commitment order is reviewed on questions of law, and the District Court’s findings of fact are not set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. … A *163 commitment order is reviewed on questions of law, and the District Court’s findings of fact are not set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.

Grindle v. Bunker

115 Me. 108 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jun 7, 1916

Under the established rules, “words and phrases shall be construed according to the common meaning of the language. … Clearly that meant a vacancy in fact. In the revision of 1841, the words “death, resignation or removal” were omitted without any intervening amendatory acts, and the word vacancy stands alone, R.

In Re Shannon R.

461 A.2d 707 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · May 26, 1983

It cannot be said that Linda’s contact with the Pennsylvania Department clearly did not qualify as contact with the Maine Department. 9 The June, 1980 report received by the Maine Department from the Pennsylvania Department … Testimony from a child psychologist and a Department social worker established that both children have a good relationship with their foster families and are developing well.

Palmer v. Inhabitants of Sumner

133 Me. 337 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Mar 11, 1935

Redding was the duly appointed and qualified Road Commissioner for the Town of Sumner. “2. That the said John F. … Not assenting, however, he has no statutory right of action, “unless the language employed clearly indicates such an intention.”

Waterville Industries, Inc. v. Finance Authority

758 A.2d 986 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Sep 27, 2000

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY [¶ 21] FAME also contends that Waterville’s claim against FAME is barred because of sovereign immunity. … See 10 M.R.S.A. § 1005(4) (Supp.1983), repealed by P.L.1983, ch. 519, § 6 (effective Sep. 23, 1983). 11 That provision clearly subjected the MGA to suits for breach of contract.

Church v. McKee

387 A.2d 754 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jun 23, 1978

The employer and his insurance carrier appeal from a decree of the Industrial Accident Commission denying their request that a portion of the employee’s disability payments be made from the Second Injury Fund established … The legislature clearly intended to expand the kinds of pre-existing conditions which an employee could have and still be eligible for compensation from the Second Injury Fund.

State v. Metzger

999 A.2d 947 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 20, 2010

The court’s ruling will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. … The result here is the same: on these facts the District Court did not clearly err in finding that the victim’s statements qualified as excited utterances. 2.

Hottentot v. Mid-Maine Medical Center

549 A.2d 365 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Oct 21, 1988

Section 1820 grants the Department “power to establish reasonable standards ... which it finds to be necessary and in the public interest.” … Instead the Legislature has clearly enumerated the sanctions: license conditions and suspensions and criminal penalties. Accordingly, if there has been any violation of the licensing standards, Dr.

City of Auburn v. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc.

630 A.2d 227 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Aug 5, 1993

Accordingly, the City and MMWAC are shielded from the federal antitrust laws by state action immunity. IV. … Then, the statute will be upheld unless the burden on commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits. 16 Id.

State v. Doucette

398 A.2d 36 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Nov 28, 1978

Again, the issue was not properly preserved for appeal: the defendant not only failed to request another interpreter but also agreed that Cutler was qualified. … Clearly, no error, manifest or otherwise, was committed.

Kennedy v. State

730 A.2d 1252 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · May 28, 1999

CASA was established within the Judicial Department "to provide volunteer lay persons to serve as court appointed special advocates or guardians ad litem under Title 22, section 4005, subsection 1, in child abuse and neglect … As director of CASA, Kennedy was appointed by the Chief Judge of the District Court, id. § 1502, to "recruit the services of qualified persons to serve as volunteer court appointed special advocates.” id. § 1503.

Dunsmore v. Pratt

116 Me. 22 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jan 27, 1917

Seavey, 28 Maine, 45; the oath must state that debtor is about to establish a residence outside of the State, in affiant’s belief, and a defective oath cannot be supplied by supplemental oath. Whiting v. … Jewell, 34 Maine, 543; “omission of pronoun ‘his’ or analogous expression to qualify ‘support’ fatal,” Proctor v. Lathrop, 68 Maine, 256.

State v. Fantastic Fair & Karmil Merchandising Corp.

158 Me. 450 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Nov 30, 1961

It follows for this reason alone that neither establishment was a drug store. This is not to say that a department in a department store may not qualify as a drug store. … So likewise the drug department, if there were compliance with the statutes, supra, would qualify as a drug store.

Maine v. Boston & Maine Railroad

123 Me. 48 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jun 21, 1923

Such a conclusion would lead to the utmost confusion, and tend to unsettle established law and business dependent thereon. … The established rule of construction is that rights, privileges and immunities not expressly granted are reserved. There is no safety in public interests in any - other rule.

Guardianship of Jewel M.

2 A.3d 301 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Aug 17, 2010

We held that “[t]he power of the court to adjudicate such disputes and to enforce its own orders constitutes state involvement in a way that clearly implicates parents’ fundamental liberty interests in the care and custody … The record of the April 2010 hearing unequivocally establishes that, by her action, the grandmother prevented the counseling transition from occurring. [¶ 49] The grandmother cannot prevail on her burden of proof to establish

Fleming v. Gardner

658 A.2d 1074 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · May 25, 1995

complaint and moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for the failure of Fleming to state a claim for which relief could be granted and on the further ground that as court-appointed counsel they were immune … Although the court stated it was satisfied that the record of the *1077 M.R.Crim.P. 11 proceedings conducted on May 7, 1992, at which Fleming had entered guilty pleas, clearly reflected he had done so knowingly and voluntarily

State v. Cates

99 Me. 68 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · May 24, 1904

S., c. 128, § 13,) does not establish numerous independent offenses, — it established but one offense. It declares ‘every lottery, scheme or device of chance’ to be a nuisance. … In the case at bar “the statute does not establish numerous independent offenses.”

State v. Cosgro

945 A.2d 1221 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Apr 3, 2008

Haskell, 2001 ME 154 , 784 A.2d 4 , “does not declare for all time that SORNA is immune from an ex post facto challenge,” we cannot find based on the record before us that the court erred in denying Cosgro’s motion to dismiss … erroneous, given that "undisputed evidence established] that Diecidue had registered as required under SORNA in 2002.”

Barry v. Austin

118 Me. 51 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Mar 7, 1919

On the other hand such a rule, if it clearly overrides the real purpose of the testator, is to be applied cautiously, and is not to be forced. Hopkins v. Keazer, 89 Maine, 347-353; Holcomb v. … The effect of this depends upon whether it is a qualified or an unqualified power.

Harold D. Smith & Sons, Inc. v. Finance Authority

543 A.2d 814 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jun 29, 1988

After careful examination of the record, we conclude that although there is evidence that would support a contrary conclusion, the Authority’s findings are not clearly erroneous. … Consequently, Smith urges us to establish a policy exception to the general rule for cases demonstrating an unfairness to the parties.