Case law

Poirier v. City of Saco

529 A.2d 329 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 31, 1987

Beginning in 1979 or 1980 Poirier lived in a rough cabin he had built on property in Ward 2 on which he had established a sawmill and lumber company. … At the time in December 1985 when he was to take office, Poirier very clearly intended to return to 52 Cumberland Avenue when the renovations on that house were completed on the anticipated schedule in the fall of 1986.

State v. Navarro

621 A.2d 408 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Mar 2, 1993

The court’s finding of probable cause will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. State v. Fogg, 410 A.2d 548, 550 (Me.1980). … Navarro filed a timely motion to have the State produce a qualified witness. The statutory language is clear.

Austin W. Jones Co. v. State

122 Me. 214 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Feb 9, 1923

Two questions were presented in the case, one of which was the construction of an act in regard to the establishment of a general land office and the other was whether, under a given statute, the plaintiff's were qualified … Damages were also claimed for loss of profits in connection with an established milk route.

State v. Jobin

510 A.2d 527 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · May 29, 1986

Here, the State has steadfastly denied that Gilbert was given immunity from prosecution in exchange for furnishing evidence of narcotics trafficking. … The record clearly reflects that the jury was aware of the discrepancy, so the chemist’s testimony was not needed to establish its existence. M.R.Evid. 702; VII J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1923 (Chadbourne ed. 1978).

Myrick v. James

444 A.2d 987 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · May 4, 1982

In construing statutes, courts expound the law; they cannot extend their application, nor amend them by the insertion of qualifying conditions. See State v. Standard Oil Co., 131 Me. 63, 64 , 159 A. 116 (1932). … I view the doctrines of sovereign immunity, municipal immunity, parental immunity, in-terspousal immunity, attractive nuisance, the common law status distinctions between licensees and invitees, as wholly created by the court

State v. Weinschenk

868 A.2d 200 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Feb 15, 2005

Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only when no compe *205 tent evidence supporting the finding exists in the record. … P. 13(d), finding that sovereign immunity had not been waived. We need not address whether the Superior Court properly concluded that the counterclaim was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

State v. Hathaway

161 Me. 255 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jun 25, 1965

In the judgment of that doctor a qualified psychiatrist the defendant had understood the instruction as to his rights and immunities. The defendant was a lad of some 13 years of age. … Defendant enjoyed an immunity from so doing. The defendant could have remained mute. He had been so advised by a lawyer, by the County Attorney and by the doctor.

First Auburn Trust Co.

135 Me. 277 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Nov 13, 1937

Joseph Baker qualified as surviving partner and administered the partnership estate. … tends to establish it.”

American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Quinn

437 A.2d 623 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Dec 1, 1981

Our Commerce Clause analysis of section 246-A is controlled by the clearly established rule that a state tax on interstate commerce will pass constitutional muster only if the tax “[1] is applied to an activity with a substantial … We need not address the Superior Court’s alternative holding that the tax also violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause.

Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. City of South Portland

121 Me. 128 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Feb 11, 1922

The importer can only deal with the goods as a whole, as an entity, if he wishes them to retain immunity. … This situation brings the case at bar clearly within the rule established by the Federal Court that while the payment of import duties gives the importer the right to bring his goods into this country, to sell them in the

Union Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Emerson

345 A.2d 504 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Oct 8, 1975

The common denominator of these establishments is the use of the elevators therein by the general public, the legislative concern being that such use be as safe as possible. … All parties have agreed that this person is a qualified “plant engineer” as that term is used in Section 439.

Dunston v. Town of York

590 A.2d 526 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Apr 29, 1991

In this case the action authorized by the 1989 vote, the issuing of bonds for the construction of the school, clearly had been taken by the time the petition was submitted to the Town Clerk. … person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, or any State ... subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

Charles W. Palian v. Department of Health and Human Services

242 A.3d 164 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Nov 10, 2020

P. 12(a)(2) (“A qualified Justice may participate in a decision even though not present at oral argument.”). 2 [¶2] We reject the bulk of Dr. … The Manual’s repeated references to “post-payment review” make clear that the mere payment of claims does not immunize payments from later review.10 Id. §§ 1.16, 1.18.

Harold MacQuinn, Inc. v. Halperin

415 A.2d 818 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jun 11, 1980

It is not absurd to suggest that if lending qualifies as a kind of “use” that is subject to use taxation, it qualifies also as a use within the scope of the exemption provisions. … not clearly coming within the scope of the exemption provisions.

Guardianship of Hailey M.

140 A.3d 478 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · May 26, 2016

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if there is no competent evidence in the record to support it, see Guardianship of Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶ 19, 98 A.3d 1023; if “the fact-finder clearly misapprehends the meaning … Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to establish a transitional arrangement. 14 c.

Shaw v. Berry

31 Me. 478 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 1, 1850

Proof that there was no negligence in the innkeeper or his servants, is not sufficient for his immunity. And herein no question arises in regard to the burden of proof. … If a lady were to leave a valuable shawl in her room, the innkeeper (though unacquainted with its value) would clearly be responsible for it, if lost. Richmond v.

Harding v. Murray

623 A.2d 172 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Apr 13, 1993

The Code, however, does not clearly establish when a right to payment arises. See In re Cumbustion Assocs. Inc., 67 B.R. 709, 712 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing In re M. … Murray specifically argues that the judgment clearly contravenes “the well established proposition that alimony must be reasonable in amount and in the method of payment giving regard for the situation, both at present and

State v. Cookson

837 A.2d 101 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Dec 1, 2003

In addition, Cookson has not proven clearly and convincingly that the discovery of the murder weapon would have changed the outcome of the trial. … In some of our cases reviewing a trial court’s determination that an expert witness is or is not qualified, we have said that the standard of review is whether the court clearly erred. See, e.g., Marchesseault v.

Seider v. Board of Examiners of Psychologists

762 A.2d 551 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Nov 29, 2000

The duty of maintaining confidentiality is established at the very start of a relationship. … Second, the Board found that Seider violated Section 5.03 because she discussed confidential information with persons who were not persons clearly concerned with the limited relationship between Seider and the mother. [¶

E. Perry Iron & Metal Co., Inc. v. City of Portland

896 A.2d 956 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · May 8, 2006

The City’s argument that the two counts are “clearly separate and independent” misses the point of the final judgment rule. … Third, the judicial economy exception is not applicable because this appeal would not “establish a final, or practically final, disposition of the entire litigation,” Norton v.