Case law

McKinnon v. Brooke

District Court, D. Maryland · Nov 25, 2024

See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427–28 (providing that qualifying a prosecutor’s immunity would “prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor’s duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal … Because the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred at trial and after probable cause had been established, Defendants in the instant case enjoy absolute prosecutorial immunity from McKinnon’s allegations regarding

United States v. Ratti

365 F. Supp. 2d 649 · District Court, D. Maryland · Feb 1, 2005

Does that establish November 15, 2000 as the date of Italy’s “final action?” … Beyond the foreseeable difficulties of establishing at a hearing that the grand jurors, when they decided to indict, did not improperly use the immunized testimony or leads or evidence derived from it, for us to condone the

Strong v. Dyar

573 F. Supp. 2d 880 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jul 23, 2008

When a governmental entity is sued and Congress has not waived sovereign immunity for the claim, sovereign immunity deprives the court of jurisdiction to hear the case. See Global Mail Ltd. v. … The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 , et seq., provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, see Suter v.

In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litigation

268 F. Supp. 3d 778 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jul 19, 2017

At all times pertinent to Plaintiffs’ claims, this Court held that the military was “clearly engaged in combat activities” in Iraq and Afghanistan. Id. at 770 . … Rather, Plaintiffs argued, the LOGCAP contracts were managed “consistent with well-established federal rules and regulations,” under which all contractual direction was required to go through established contracting channels

Vick El v. Carmean

District Court, D. Maryland · Jun 30, 2021

“Qualified immunity shields police officers who commit constitutional violations from liability when, based on ‘clearly established law,’ they ‘could reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.’” … Qualified immunity analysis requires courts to conduct a two-step inquiry, asking, in either order: “(1) whether a constitutional violation occurred; and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the

Germain v. Gilpin

District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 29, 2021

First, the Defendants argue that they have not violated any clearly established constitutional right and are therefore entitled to qualified immunity for all of the claims. … of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’”

Schafer v. Maryland

555 F. Supp. 2d 572 · District Court, D. Maryland · May 27, 2008

It may be assumed that plaintiff has established a prima facie case, inasmuch as: (1) he is a member of a protected group, i.e., male and white; (2) he was, indisputably, qualified for the job for which the employer was seeking … was “best qualified.”

Sherrill v. Cunningham

District Court, D. Maryland · Nov 15, 2019

Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability “unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). … To determine whether an official is covered by qualified immunity, the Court asks (1) “whether a constitutional violation occurred” and (2) “whether the right violated was clearly established.” Melgar ex rel.

Ryan v. United States

331 F. Supp. 2d 371 · District Court, D. Maryland · Aug 17, 2004

“[WJhere undisputed facts reveal that a maritime worker has a clearly inadequate temporal connection to vessels in navigation, the court may take the question from the jury by granting summary judgment or a directed verdict … For the reasons stated above, defendants Chesapeake and Noesis have not established as a matter of law that Ryan fails to marshal sufficient evidence to establish his status as a seaman under the Jones Act.

Peterson v. Davis

551 F. Supp. 137 · District Court, D. Maryland · Nov 26, 1982

Defendants further contend that even if their acts were unlawful, they are protected from liability in this case by the doctrine of qualified immunity because the acts in question were performed in the course of defendants … In any event, defendants in this case have met their burden of proving their entitlement to qualified immunity from liability, as recognized in Procunier v.

Murrill v. Hough

District Court, D. Maryland · Nov 6, 2020

Qualified immunity “protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which … right at issue was [not] clearly established at the time of” its alleged violation.

Canter v. Shoppert

District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 7, 2022

Qualified Immunity Qualified immunity shields government officials “who commit constitutional violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably … Accordingly, at this time, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. IV.

Brock v. Commercial Index Bureau, Inc.

642 F. Supp. 1140 · District Court, D. Maryland · Sep 8, 1986

The Secretary’s interpretive regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 779.318 , clearly sets forth the characteristics of a retail or service establishment. … An employer who asserts that he is exempt from the Act has the burden of establishing the exemption affirmatively and clearly.

Ozah v. Fretwell

District Court, D. Maryland · Aug 28, 2019

The second inquiry is whether the right was “clearly established” at the time of the events at issue. /d. … If the right was not clearly established, the qualified immunity doctrine shields a defendant officer from liability.

Am. Acad. Pediatrics v. Food & Drug Admin.

379 F. Supp. 3d 461 · District Court, D. Maryland · May 15, 2019

The Philip Morris Court observed that, while "[n]on-legislative agency statements of the type at issue...generally do not qualify as a final agency action[,]... … Thus, the issue is whether the August 2017 Guidance qualifies as a legislative rule or an interpretive rule.

Delavega v. Burns

District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 31, 2021

If the officer demonstrates that the conduct in question did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, then the officer has qualified immunity from liability in the civil suit. Id. … Thus, even if the common nuisance statute were interpreted as plaintiffs argue, such an interpretation was not clearly established at the time of plaintiffs’ arrests, and defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Chang-Williams v. United States

965 F. Supp. 2d 673 · District Court, D. Maryland · Aug 15, 2013

But the waiver of sovereign immunity established by the FTCA is narrow in scope, see Gould v. U.S. … Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738 , 741 (4th Cir.1990), and is qualified by a number of express exceptions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680 . Relevant here, the FTCA’s waiver of immunity “shall not apply to ...

Niewenhous v. Burns

District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 31, 2021

If the officer demonstrates that the conduct in question did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, then the officer has qualified immunity from liability in the civil suit. Id. … Thus, even if the common nuisance statute were interpreted as plaintiffs argue, such an interpretation was not clearly established at the time of plaintiffs’ arrests, and defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Rhodes v. MCIC, Inc.

210 F. Supp. 3d 778 · District Court, D. Maryland · Sep 29, 2016

Crane Co. is clearly anticipating that the course of discovery may flesh out what are now, at best, Plaintiffs’ conclu-sional allegations. … Thus, they are clearly keeping in play a claim against Defendants who could legitimately assert the federal officer defense. See Despres v.

Bozarth v. Maryland State Department of Education

District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 31, 2021

The two-part test asks: (1) whether the entity qualifies for sovereign immunity, and (2) if it does, whether the legislature waived the immunity. Id. (citing Stern, 846 A.2d at 1001). … “The similarity between comparators . . . must be clearly established in order to be meaningful.” Lightner v. City of Wilmington, N.C., 545 F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 2008); Swaso, 698 F. App’x at 748.