Case law

Loving Helicopters v. Kaufman

13 Md. App. 418 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Nov 17, 1971

If WWDC had expressed dissatisfaction with Kaufman, Loving could have supplied any other qualified pilot to WWDC. … Here, there was evidence which, if believed, established that Loving had the right to control and direct Kaufman in the performance of his work.

Advin Electric, Inc. v. Reliance Surety Co.

41 Cont. Cas. Fed. 76,990 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Sep 25, 1996

whether the case should be extended beyond its precise holding, i.e., whether a project not owned by the Government can be considered a “public building or public work of the United States” in the absence of a similar statute clearly … On the other hand, it is clear and well established that, where the Government is neither the owner nor a contracting party, the project is not subject to the Miller Act merely because it is financed with Federal funds.

Nelson v. State

187 Md. App. 1 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jul 7, 2009

To that end, Article 27, § 286 established “benchmarks” for ' the imposition of enhanced penalties. Taylor, 175 Md.App. at 168 , 926 A.2d 805 . It provided, in part: (a) Prohibited conduct. … Nor may we read a meaning into the statute that is not expressly stated or clearly implied, so as to expand its meaning.

Ali v. State

67 Md. App. 339 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · May 7, 1986

It has failed to appreciate that: “If B asserts that A asserted x, the admissibility of x will depend upon qualifying not only A’s assertion but B’s assertion as well.” … That the State was permitted to offer a plausible alternative explanation clearly helped to keep the jury from being led astray.

Montgomery v. State

17 Md. App. 119 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Feb 21, 1973

Whatever its restricted reach, however, Kucharczyk is clearly distinguishable from this case, where the State’s witness told but one consistent story at the trial. … The “immunity” conferred, of course; was no more than a prosecutor’s promise not to prosecute. Bowie v. State, 14 Md. App. 567, 575-78 , 287 A. 2d 782 (1972). 2 . See e.g., State v.

State v. Philip Morris Inc.

179 Md. App. 140 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Mar 27, 2008

Accordingly, if a state has a “qualifying statute” in full force and effect and diligently enforces that statute, the auditor must reallocate that state’s share of the NPM Adjustment among the other states that do not qualify … More importantly, the Independent Auditor is not qualified to make the legal determination as to *149 whether any particular Settling State has ‘diligently enforced’ its Qualifying Statute.”

Mack & Cheeks v. State

244 Md. App. 546 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jan 31, 2020

As we have been laboring herein to establish, the focus should always have been on the difference between a lay opinion and an expert opinion and not on the difference between a qualified witness and an unqualified witness … Even if, as we have established at length, Ragland v.

City of Frederick v. Quinn

35 Md. App. 626 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Apr 13, 1977

The court below followed the strict contract theory, holding that when the pension rights vested upon employment or adoption of the plan those rights were immune from prospective legislative impairment. … The widow was denied recovery It is difficult to see where the City draws sustenance from this case since the Court clearly stated that it was not argued that the prior provisions were applicable to Saxton. Id. at 693 .

Comptroller of the Treasury v. Armco Export Sales Corp.

82 Md. App. 429 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · May 1, 1990

because it buys goods from its parent company and then resells the goods to an actual overseas customer; a commission DISC earns its income by a contractual agreement with its parent company giving it a percentage of each qualifying … Art. 81, sec. 280A(c)(7), therefore, clearly expresses a legislative intent to tax income received by a DISC.

Giant Food, Inc. v. Scherry

51 Md. App. 586 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · May 7, 1982

In this appeal, appellant raises three issues: (1) is appellant immune from liability to appellees because Joyner had a right to use deadly force in attempting to capture the fleeing felon, (2) was the damage award based … These inferences are clearly ones of negligence.

Queen v. State

26 Md. App. 222 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · May 8, 1975

As its ultimate effort the State now argues that Queen’s appearance in court served as sufficient identification: “ . . . the identity of the individual at trial was established prior to the taking of any testimony when appellant … A witness called to the stand and qualified, after records have been put into evidence, may testify as to his conclusion therefrom. Smith v. Jones, 236 Md. 305 .

Caples v. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · May 1, 2026

Vol.), section 5-609 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), provided them with immunity from suit. … Sinai clearly had knowledge as to where Caples was headed and, minimally, at least two people with whom he would interact.

Blood v. Columbus US, Inc.

237 Md. App. 179 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Apr 30, 2018

Establishing lien. … A lien for unpaid wages is established: (1) after a circuit court issues an order to establish a lien for unpaid wages; or (2) if no complaint disputing the lien for unpaid wages is filed, within 30

Ford v. State

73 Md. App. 391 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jan 6, 1988

In other words, the defendant has the right to establish a foundation for a negative evidence closing argument. He is not, however, required, to offer any particular evidence to establish such foundation. … In the case sub judice, appellant contends that the State failed to prove a qualifying conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

Lyles v. State

10 Md. App. 265 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Oct 5, 1970

He contends that the judgment of the lower court as to each conviction was clearly erroneous and must be set aside. … this allegation was not attacked below nor is it questioned on appeal, but in any event to have the power to arrest as a police officer appellant would either have to have been ap *270 pointed; by the Governor and have qualified

Christian v. State

65 Md. App. 303 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Feb 26, 1986

He avers that the State failed to establish a sufficient foundation to qualify the owner to express such an opinion. … Clearly, the intent to break and enter is different from an intent to destroy, injure, deface or molest the property of another. C.

Econolo v. Div. of Reimbursement

137 Md. App. 639 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Apr 2, 2001

The motion to dismiss was based on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment precluded the action, and with respect to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, on the ground that the defendants enjoyed qualified immunity. … The court concluded that, because the law did not clearly proscribe the actions of the defendants, the defense of qualified immunity barred the claims. Id. In Fetterusso v.

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Sybert

51 Md. App. 74 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Mar 2, 1982

, Atlantic Richfield Company (hereinafter Arco), a Pennsylvania corporation duly qualified to do business in the State of Maryland. … of proof in establishing that the appellees were the procuring cause of the sale of the Belvoir property.

Prince George's County Health Department v. Briscoe

79 Md. App. 325 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Apr 28, 1989

Moreover, the testimony presented at the grievance hearing did not establish, nor was it meant to establish, an entitlement for the entire social worker series. … Thus, establishing classifications, like establishing a pay plan, is subject to gubernatorial approval.

Winebrenner v. State

6 Md. App. 440 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Mar 26, 1969

On the evidence before the court, its finding that there was probable cause for the arrest was clearly erroneous. … As the existence of probable cause for the warrantless arrest was not established, we must hold that the arrest was invalid.