Case law

Thrift v. Towers

127 Md. 54 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Nov 11, 1915

Towers, was appointed on May the 4th, 1914, a member of the Public Service Commission of Maryland for the term of six years, and on the same day qualified and entered immediately upon the discharge of his duties as such commissioner … The ground of the attack must be plainly and clearly established.

Gray v. Peter Gray Orphans' Home & Mechanical Institute

128 Md. 592 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · May 4, 1916

If there be a manifest design to establish a trust then a trust will be declared though no apt technical words are employed; and if there be an equally manifest design not to establish a trust, then no trust will be declared … Undoubtedly, by the language used in that paragraph the testator expressed an intention that'a certain defined class of white orphan children should be eligible or qualified to be admitted to said Home and Institute.

Stop Slots MD 2008 v. State Board of Elections

424 Md. 163 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jan 6, 2012

The standards governing the resolution of this issue are clearly set forth in the Constitution, the Maryland Election Law Article, and firmly addressed and established by our precedents. … By indicating that the legislation establishes exceptions to the parental notification provision, the ballot language ‘concisely and intelligently’ summarized that portion of the legislation.”

Melton v. State

379 Md. 471 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Feb 12, 2004

If we were to inteypret the statute to establish separate offenses for each separate status, we would, in effect, be criminalizing the status itself. … While this may *502 appear to be insignificant, it puts the emphasis of the statute clearly on the prohibited act, the possession, and not the prior conviction.

Duvall v. Miller

94 Md. 697 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Mar 7, 1902

Here there is nothing to qualify the words used in the provisions we have cited. … We have cited this case among many others of the same class to illustrate more clearly our meaning in the case at bar.

Lopez v. State

433 Md. 652 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Aug 20, 2013

illegality, (10) laches, (11) payment, (12) release, (13) res judicata, (14) statute of frauds, (15) statute of limitations, (16) ultra vires, (17) usury, (18) waiver, (19) privilege, and (20) total or partial charitable immunity … Since the 19th century, the laches doctrine has become more “rule-like” while statutes of limitations have been qualified by concepts such as the "discovery rule” that customize the rule to the circumstances of a particular

State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc.

315 Md. 254 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Mar 8, 1989

In short, Burning Tree has not established that it qualifies for the intimate associational rights described in Roberts and Rotary Club . … Clearly, Ch. 384 as applied increases Burning Tree’s tax burden.

Brinsfield v. Howeth

110 Md. 520 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · May 20, 1909

It is to be observed that he was not called to establish her general reputation for chastity. … The defendant’s fourth prayer was bad in that it did not require the jury to find the facts which in law would amount to a qualified privilege.

Poole v. State

295 Md. 167 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jan 7, 1983

Clearly, Poole’s conviction for the murder of Horad cannot stand. … In our opinion in Poole I, supra, we clearly expressed our views with respect to counsel’s argument to the jury concerning appellate review of a death sentence.

Prince George's County v. White

275 Md. 314 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jul 16, 1975

The recordation tax was first established as part of the General Taxation Act of 1937, enacted as Chapter 11 at a special session of the General Assembly that year. … In short, while Chapter 452 technically may qualify as the “latest one enacted,” if only because it was signed later, the General Assembly clearly anticipated its passage while enacting Chapter 301.

Tofani v. State

297 Md. 165 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Sep 16, 1983

Neither [the reporter nor the source] is immune, on First Amendment grounds, from testifying against the other, before the grand jury or at a criminal trial. … Thus, Tofani’s *186 assertion that the trial court misread Branzburg and erred in not upholding a qualified First Amendment privilege is simply incorrect.

Williams v. MORAN, ETC.

248 Md. 279 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Dec 12, 1967

Moran qualified as her Committee. On April 6, 1965 there was instituted by Mr. Moran the Bill of Complaint which gave rise to the decree below, from which this appeal was taken. … The tests applied in cases based on undue influence and lack of mental capacity are clearly set forth in Judge Horney’s opinion for the Court in Arbogast v. MacMillan, 221 Md. 516 , 158 A. 2d 97 (1960). Dr.

Layton v. Howard County Board of Appeals

399 Md. 36 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · May 9, 2007

First, it must be noted that Riverdale clearly did not concern a land use or zoning issue. The case involved a *62 statute pertaining to fire companies’ immunity from civil liability in tort actions. … The Circuit Court upheld the Board’s decision based upon a finding that the landowner had established a vested right.

Evening News Co. v. Bowie

154 Md. 604 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Apr 4, 1928

In some jurisdictions it is held that when the justification is not fully established the circumstances may be considered in mitigation of damages.” … If Judge Moss had made the charge or hint of corruption, the appellant would have been protected by its qualified privilege.

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ucheomumu

450 Md. 675 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Dec 15, 2016

The agent wanted to interview Jackson, but [R]espondent, on Jackson’s behalf, requested transactional immunity from federal prosecution. … Clearly, as of June 6, 2011, [R]espondent knew that Jackson once again was under federal criminal investigation for fraud.

Snowden v. Anne Arundel County

295 Md. 429 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Feb 23, 1983

the reasons which prompted it if the *433 language of § 5 (S) of Art. 25A were not to be construed as a broad grant of power to legislate on matters not specifically enumerated in Art. 25A and the language of that section clearly … Chillum-Adelphi, 275 Md. 374 , 340 A.2d 265 (1975), and waive sovereign immunity, Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294 , 396 A.2d 255 (1979).

Peoples Life Insurance v. Medairy

255 Md. 534 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Nov 11, 1969

After describing in detail the various entries made by him, he testified over objection that, in his opinion, the applicant “was insurable,” but immediately qualified his answer as follows: “But I would like to qualify that … She did not purport to qualify as an expert witness in any regard.

Pennsylvania Railroad v. State Ex Rel. Brewer

188 Md. 646 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jun 11, 1947

Moreover, the rules, taken together seem clearly designed to afford protection, in the shape of a flagman, against the danger from other trains or engines as well as from switching movements. … Where an oral charge is given, we have indicated that qualifying language in one portion of the charge may be taken to avoid the possibly misleading effect of other portions. Mitchell v.

Worthington v. State

56 L.R.A. 353 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jan 16, 1901

Indeed, it is this comparative immunity from danger to the woman which has doubtless led to the great increase of the crime to the establishment of a class of educated professional abortionists, and to the enactment of the … Any expressed or clearly visible hope of recovery will render the declaration inadmissible. But the declarant’s own belief at the time is the criterion of admissibility. 1st Greenleaf's Ev., sec. 158.

Comptroller of Treasury v. Taylor

465 Md. 76 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jul 29, 2019

Qualified-Terminable-Interest Property, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). … Taylor to Maryland clearly cannot constitute the quid pro quo sufficient to justify the imposition of the estate tax.” Resp. Br. at 18.