Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Tinsley v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

    429 Md. 217 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Oct 26, 2012

    In considering whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents a court from exercising jurisdiction in a given suit, we ask “ ‘(1) whether the entity asserting immunity qualifies for the protection; and, if so, (2) whether … Tinsley countered that she established the existence of a mandatory policy that stations were to be cleaned only after peak travel times, noting that because a policy existed, WMA-TA was not immune from suit.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • De Bleecker v. Montgomery County

    292 Md. 498 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jan 8, 1982

    This qualified immunity will not be available to them if "the constitutional right allegedly infringed by them was clearly established at the time of their challenged conduct, if they knew or should have known of that right … Unlike municipalities, the State and its agencies are immune from suit under § 1983, unless the immunity is waived. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 , 99 S. Ct. 1139 , 59 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1979); Highfield Water Co. v.

    Cited 47 timesPublished
  • Board of Child Care of the Baltimore Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, Inc. v. Harker

    316 Md. 683 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jul 28, 1989

    The site selected by the Methodist Board for this facility was within the Resource Conservation zone established by the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations (BCZR). … Specifically, we there said that “[i]n view of such a clearly established legislative policy, evidence of a countervailing legislative purpose to prohibit local zoning control ... must be strong indeed.”

    Cited 24 timesPublished
  • Verzi v. Baltimore County

    333 Md. 411 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jan 17, 1994

    A statutory classification reviewed under the rational basis standard enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality and will be invalidated only if the classification is clearly arbitrary. … gender, discrimination against illegal aliens with regard, to a free public education, and a classification under which certain persons were denied the right to practice for compensation the profession for which they were qualified

    Cited 33 timesPublished
  • Keller-Bee v. State

    448 Md. 300 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jun 22, 2016

    The only exception to the broad grant of absolute immunity is if an act is performed when “there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter” and “the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge.” … We see no difference in this context between the body attachment issued here and an arrest warrant, the issuance of which our cases have established constitutes a judicial act. E.g., D’Aoust v.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Houston v. Safeway Stores, Inc.

    346 Md. 503 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jul 30, 1997

    Safeway argued that it was immune from civil liability pursuant to § 5-378. That section, entitled “[Immunity]—Customer use of employee toilet facility in retail establishment,” states: *507 “(a) Definition. … Section 5-378 grants limited immunity to Maryland retail establishments whose customers are injured using the establishments’ non-public restrooms.

    Cited 28 timesPublished
  • Montgomery County v. Valk Manufacturing Co.

    317 Md. 185 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Sep 6, 1989

    “It was not until 1894 that the question was even raised in England in a case of concurrent negligence, and the better English view, even before their statute, appears clearly to have been that contribution is not denied … These comments clearly reflect the Act’s assumption that contribution from a third party defendant is predicated on his or her direct liability to the plaintiff. 8 We have since described that case as holding “that there

    Cited 43 timesPublished
  • Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission

    284 Md. 503 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Mar 21, 1979

    So it is established that neither in *509 contract nor tort can a suit be maintained against a government agency, first, where specific legislative authority has not been given, second, even though such authority is given … When read as a whole, § 1-3 clearly expresses a legislative intent to waive the WSSC’s sovereign immunity.

    Cited 101 timesPublished
  • Bushey v. Northern Assurance Co. of America

    362 Md. 626 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Feb 8, 2001

    In § VI “ ‘Insured’ means any person or organization qualifying as an insured in the Who Is an Insured provision of the applicable coverage.” … In the case before us we decline, once again, to accept the invitation totally to abrogate this well established doctrine.

    Cited 85 timesPublished
  • Jackson v. Housing Opportunities Commission

    289 Md. 118 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Dec 9, 1980

    Our different analysis produces a different result. *124 The first prong of an effective waiver of sovereign immunity is clearly satisfied in this case. A housing authority has power "[t]o sue and be sued.” § 8 (a). … However, the express inclusion of insurance relating to operations clearly manifests the legislative contemplation that liability insurance would be purchased as well.

    Overruled in part by Brooks v. Housing Authority, 411 Md. 603 (2009)Cited 20 timesPublished
  • University of Maryland v. Maas

    173 Md. 554 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Feb 3, 1938

    Coale, 165 Md. 224 , 167 A. 54 , further establish this beyond question, as well as the character of the governmental functions of this institution of learning. … The manner in which payments, for the use or benefit of the University, were *562 made was clearly stated, as above. Even the tuitions received are paid into the state treasury and disbursed like other state funds.

    Cited 52 timesPublished
  • Appeal Tax Court v. Regents of the University of Maryland

    50 Md. 457 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Feb 28, 1879

    With respect to the lot and improvements on the southwest corner of Lombard and Greene streets, and the furniture and equipments thereof, these appear to he clearly within the exemption contained in the second section of … Now the 18th section of the Act of 1812 extended the same immunity to the appellees.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Maryland State Board of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn

    270 Md. 496 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Dec 5, 1973

    In sum, he testified that the training in haircutting received by cosmetologists does not qualify them to cut men’s hair. … That case, however, is clearly distinguishable.

    Cited 44 timesPublished
  • Cox v. Prince George's County

    296 Md. 162 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jun 3, 1983

    Once this first step is established, then the plaintiff must show that the offending conduct occurred within the scope of the employment of the servant or under the express or implied authorization of the master. … The italicized clause clearly and unmistakably makes this point.

    Cited 68 timesPublished
  • Allstate v. Kim

    376 Md. 275 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jul 31, 2003

    Unless, as in Dua , the statute clearly fails one of those tests, both must be considered. … Riverdale Heights Fire Co., supra, 308 Md. 556, 560 , 520 A.2d 1319, 1321 , we held that the granting of immunity effects more than "mere change of practice, procedure, or *623 remedy" and instead "establishes a rule of substantive

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Board of Trustees, Community College of Baltimore County v. Patient First Corp.

    444 Md. 452 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Aug 18, 2015

    Whether the Circuit Court’s Findings as to Negligence are Clearly Erroneous CCBC contends that, even if the burden of proof was properly placed on it to establish Patient First’s negligence as an affirmative defense … In sum, the Circuit Court was not clearly erroneous in finding that CCBC failed to present sufficient evidence establishing the scope and nature of Patient First’s duty with regard to the supervision of the CCBC intern.

    Cited 26 timesPublished
  • Seley-Radtke v. Hosmane

    450 Md. 468 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Nov 22, 2016

    Danielczyk, 400 Md. 98, 117 , 928 A.2d 795, 806 (2007), we explained that “[a]n absolute privilege is distinguished from a qualified privilege in that the former provides immunity regardless of the purpose or motive of the … We explained that the difference between an absolute privilege and a qualified privilege is that the former provides immunity regardless of the purpose or motive of the defendant, or the reasonableness of his conduct, while

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Brown v. State

    233 Md. 288 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jan 13, 1964

    Nor do subsequent Supreme Court decisions establish a total amnesty rule. The reference to “full and complete immunity against prosecution” in United States v. Murdock, 284 U. … Lauder, 82 Mich. 119 , also clearly supports the view that the privilege is available to a witness' called to testify before a grand jury.

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • Callan v. State

    156 Md. 459 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jan 17, 1929

    It would clearly be not admissible in the trial -of the case to- allow evidence of the failure of the ninety-nine juries- to- indict. … This is. clearly an erroneous statement and you gentlemen must not be in any manner affected by it.”

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Odyniec v. Schneider

    322 Md. 520 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Apr 15, 1991

    of the judicial process that those who participate in such adjudication *529 should also be immune from suits for damages.” … We think that the arbitration machinery established by the legislature for health care malpractice cases falls well within the principle, as first articulated in Gersh v.

    Cited 36 timesPublished

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