Case law

Brooks v. Housing Authority

411 Md. 603 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Nov 17, 2009

Brooks adds as a final argument the threshold contention that the HABC is not immune from suit *616 because, as a “landlord” operating a housing project that “only benefits a specially qualified group of low income tenants … To answer that question, we examined the statute, by reference to the two-pronged Katz test. 7 We concluded that the first prong of the Katz test— requiring specific legislative authority to sue the agency — was “clearly

Hastings v. Mechalske

336 Md. 663 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Dec 9, 1994

It was in consideration of the above-mentioned facts that we determined that the supervisors qualified for employer immunity under the Act. … Clearly something extra is needed over and beyond the duty owed the employer.” (Emphasis added)); Hoeverman v.

Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp.

378 Md. 509 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Nov 26, 2003

Good-wich produced sufficient evidence of the existence of a genuine dispute as to the material fact of whether Sinai was entitled to the qualified immunity prescribed by the HCQIA.” … We held that, under the federal immunity statute, the physician had the burden to produce “sufficient evidence of the existence of a genuine dispute as to the material fact of whether [the hospital] was entitled to the qualified

Brawner Builders v. State Highway Admin.

476 Md. 15 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Aug 25, 2021

After securing and reviewing qualifying bids and obtaining any approval required by law, the procurement officer may award the procurement contract to a qualified bidder. See SF §§ 13-103 through 13-113. … and Procurement Article, as such enactment established a process for resolving procurement disputes between contractors and State agencies.

Stracke v. Estate of Butler

465 Md. 407 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Aug 16, 2019

The language in § 5-604(a) clearly differs from the language in § 5- 603(b)(3) because the former section omits the word “volunteer” from its language of which entities are afforded immunity. … Given those facts, it clearly was a jury issue as to whether, after being consistently told by Ms.

Duncan v. Koustenis

260 Md. 98 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Dec 11, 1970

In any event, it seems apparent that once the immunity of the School Board is established, the depletion of the public treasury rationale would have no relevance to the question of whether its immunity extends to public school … In applying the above tests, it seems clear that a public school teacher would not qualify as a public official.

Bradshaw v. Prince George's County

284 Md. 294 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jan 18, 1979

If, however, the words are susceptible of more than one construction, they should be given the meaning intended by the legislature, and courts may resort to well-established rules of statutory construction as aids in determining … As a “public official,” a police officer is protected by a qualified immunity against civil liability for non-malicious acts performed within the scope of his authority. Robinson, id.; Harris, id.; Cocking v.

Tadjer v. Montgomery County

300 Md. 539 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Aug 22, 1984

The petition for certiorari is limited to the issue of governmental immunity. … When the County issued building permits it was clearly engaged in a governmental function. Spriggs v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 267 Md. 679, 685-86 , 298 A.2d 442, 445 (1973); Irvine v.

Tamara A. v. Montgomery County Dept. of Health & Human Services

407 Md. 180 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jan 14, 2009

In Artis and in Shoemaker we dismissed an appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. … official immunity, statutory immunity, or any other type of immunity, are not appealable under the Maryland collateral order doctrine.”

Gohari v. Darvish

363 Md. 42 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Feb 23, 2001

Communications arising out of the employer-employee relationship “clearly enjoy a qualified privilege.” McDermott, 317 Md. at 28 , 561 A.2d at 1046 (citing General Motors Corp. v. … Concomitantly, the jury was not instructed regarding the defense of qualified immunity, or what conduct might defeat such a defense, let alone the standard of proof applicable to such an analysis.

Silverman v. Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund Corp.

317 Md. 306 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Nov 15, 1989

Alternatively United Wire says that appellees acted beyond *324 their authority, that sovereign immunity does not apply to protect ultra vires activity and that the statute conferring qualified immunity on the Director of … The special statutory statement of public official, qualified immunity for any MDIF Director is concerned with personal financial liability and does not prevent suit seeking nonstatutory judicial review.

Marshall v. State

415 Md. 399 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Aug 23, 2010

We evaluate a related question in qualified immunity cases under essentially the same standard. See Hope v. … Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 , 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2516 , 153 L.Ed.2d 666, 679 (2002) (holding that the relevant part of a qualified immunity inquiry is whether the appropriate law is clearly established in legal conclusions, not

Miller v. State

174 Md. 362 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Apr 21, 1938

The mere fact that the preliminary motion was inconsistent with the established practice in this state did not prevent its indicating the ground of defendant’s objection. Sugarman v. … In other words, the question is not whether he waived an immunity, but whether he had an immunity to waive. The validity of Code Pub. Gen.

Allstate Insurance v. Kyong Ho Kim

376 Md. 276 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jul 31, 2003

Unless, as in Dua , the statute clearly fails one of those tests, both must be considered. … Riverdale Heights Fire Co., supra, 308 Md. 556, 560 , 520 A.2d 1319, 1321 , we held that the granting of immunity effects more than “mere change of practice, procedure, or remedy” and instead “establishes a rule of substantive

Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore

286 Md. 51 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Sep 13, 1979

Austin urges that if we do not abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity, we should, nonetheless, “establish a new standard to determine if a given activity is governmental or proprietary in nature.” … The Department’s activities here involved were clearly within its powers and authority.

Simond v. State

127 Md. 29 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Nov 11, 1915

the witness stand, he is immune.” … The eighth, ninth and tenth show conduct of traverser which clearly reflected on his guilt. The eleventh is similar to the sixth.

Mahnke v. Moore

197 Md. 61 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Oct 1, 1972

The law is now established in Maryland, in accordance with the modern trend of the descisions, that “a plaintiff can sustain an action for damages for nervous shock or injury caused, without physical impact, by fright arising … directly from defendant’s negligent act or omission, and resulting in some clearly apparent and substantial physical injury as manifested by an external condition or by symptoms clearly indicative of a resultant pathological

DiPino v. Davis

354 Md. 18 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · May 11, 1999

damages if she acted without malice; (2) the test for immunity on the § 1983 claim was whether it was objectively reasonable for DiPino to believe that her conduct did not violate a clearly established statutory or Constitutional … Once it is established that the individual is a public official and the tort was committed while performing a duty which involves the exercise of discretion, a qualified *49 immunity attaches; namely, in the absence of malice

State Tax Commission v. Baltimore National Bank

169 Md. 65 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jun 18, 1935

Fifty thousand shares of common stock of a par value of ten dollars each were issued, all except the directors’ qualifying shares being held in escrow subject to options of purchase offered in furtherance of the liquidation … The fact that the State has power to undertake such enterprises, and that they are undertaken for *75 what the State conceives to be the public benefit, does not establish immunity. * * * The necessary protection of the independence

Tinsley v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

429 Md. 217 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Oct 26, 2012

In considering whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents a court from exercising jurisdiction in a given suit, we ask “ ‘(1) whether the entity asserting immunity qualifies for the protection; and, if so, (2) whether … Tinsley countered that she established the existence of a mandatory policy that stations were to be cleaned only after peak travel times, noting that because a policy existed, WMA-TA was not immune from suit.