Case law

Doe v. Lyons

6 Mass. L. Rptr. 274 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 15, 1996

Public inspection clearly is distinguishable from inspection by defendants in a lawsuit containing serious allegations of personal injuries and seeking substantial damages. … Instead there is a common law privilege encompassing “communications made to a prosecutor for the purpose of securing law enforcement,” qualified by the public records statute that creates a presumption of access to all public

Zero Stage Capital, Inc. v. Harvard Clinical Technology, Inc.

14 Mass. L. Rptr. 690 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 16, 2002

He reduced his role to that of treasurer; and established Gargano as the effective chief operating officer and president. The Venture Capital Negotiations of 1996 8. … His opening paragraph summarized the position of MTDC and Zero Stage through the subsequent communication and in the present litigation. *694 I received your letter of August 12 and agree that you clearly do not understand

Vasquez v. Community Health Care, Inc.

32 Mass. L. Rptr. 250 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 7, 2014

Once the moving party “establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts which would establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” … The fundamental issue presented by CSAC’s summary judgment motion is whether the duty of reasonable care that CSAC clearly owed to Doe in its care and treatment of him extends to the plaintiffs as non-patient third parties

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Conte

13 Mass. L. Rptr. 355 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 19, 2001

Once the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. … Rather, the key is the qualifying datawhat information plaintiff seeks to correlate against the docket numbers.

Klein v. Fireman's Fund Insurance

6 Mass. L. Rptr. 295 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 20, 1996

The issue here is whether the dumptruck qualifies as a “temporary substitute motor vehicle." The court finds the “temporary substitute motor vehicle" clause unambiguous. … The policy clearly states that a “temporary substitute motor vehicle” is one which substitutes for an “insured motor vehicle.”

Liquor Liability Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Great American Insurance

16 Mass. L. Rptr. 268 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 14, 2003

Ass’n, 417 Mass. 48 (1994) (the Massachusetts Medical Professional Insurance Association (MMPIA) does not engage in “trade or commerce,” and, therefore, is immune to suit under G.L.c. 93A) when it amended G.L.c. 176D so as … Statutorily established joint underwriting associations were not specifically included in the 1992 version of G.L.c. 176D.

Galvin v. Excel Switching Corp.

21 Mass. L. Rptr. 233 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 31, 2006

Each of the plaintiffs signed a Non-Qualified Stock Option Agreement (“Option Agreement”), granting them stock options. … Id. at 850 (no recoveiy on promissoiy estoppel theoiy where it was unreasonable, as a matter of law, for business persons to rely on alleged oral promise to make $43 million loan, where parties clearly intended written agreement

Catholic Relief Insurance Co. of America v. Liquor Liability Joint Underwriting Ass'n

8 Mass. L. Rptr. 80 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 22, 1997

As an experienced trial attorney, Flynn was well-qualified to defend the Diocese. His retention commenced on October 13, 1989. 36. … Moreover, the court held that no showing of prejudice was required because “the record clearly established] that Augat’s breach of the voluntary payments provision undermined [the insurer’s ability to protect its interests

C&I Steel, LLC v. Peabody Construction Co.

22 Mass. L. Rptr. 402 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 28, 2007

The statements that Peabody “will welcome a meeting” and that Continental is “urged” to “become involved” with C&I are not clearly and unequivocally a demand for performance. … Given the standards of the commercial marketplace, conduct does not qualify as unethical or unscrupulous “unless it attains a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble world

Haase v. James Galvin Electric Co.

8 Mass. L. Rptr. 1 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 9, 1998

Clearly service was properly made in this case. … Attorneys fees as well as interest and costs, also claimed by Haase, do not qualify as damages. Accordingly, there was no occasion for Haase to move for assessment of damages.

Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group v. City of Boston

1 Mass. L. Rptr. 370 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 15, 1993

In any event, I do not reach those issues because the statute, M.G.L.c. 272, §§92, 98A, clearly applies here. … It must be emphasized that this finding in no way immunizes the City against a different result should it undertake (or resume) greater participation in the Parade.

Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co.

22 Mass. L. Rptr. 91 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 7, 2007

Matters of common knowledge or observation within the community may be judicially noticed because they so qualify.” Nantucket v. Beinecke, 379 Mass. 345, 352 (1979). … Lorillard seeks to dismiss this claim because the Plaintiff cannot establish the essential elements of the claim.

Rule v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance

33 Mass. L. Rptr. 277 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 8, 2015

To establish a breach of fiduciary duty, there must be a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant and injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach. Estate of Moulton v. Puopolo, 467 Mass. 478, 492 (2014). … Plaintiff clearly does not. 4 But that disagreement does not a cause of action make. Rule also takes issue with the fact that the Board approved the amendment to the By-laws after a fifteen minute conference call.

Dujon v. Williams

5 Mass. L. Rptr. 456 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 26, 1996

The facts established here place this case firmly in the first category of cases described in the just-quoted passage. … Here, factors that without more would be neutral— common ownership, pervasive control — were clearly established, and they were joined by factors that point more directly to injurious conduct: confused intermingling of assets

Utica Mutual Insurance v. Cohen

32 Mass. L. Rptr. 393 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 4, 2014

“A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land.” Id. at 233. … In the present case, the plaintiffs claims are asserted in the Complaint with sufficient particularity, as they clearly *400 identify both the defendant and the factual circumstances surrounding her purportedly fraudulent

Commonwealth v. Martin

7 Mass. L. Rptr. 295 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 30, 1997

They were all qualified in their field. The defendant’s experts, Brian E. Pape, PhD 3 and David Benjamin, PhD 4 were toxicologists: Richard Carleston, MD, 5 was qualified in the field of cardiology. … As such, it was clearly material. In People v.

MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Worcester New Bond LLC

25 Mass. L. Rptr. 364 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 6, 2009

Once the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond with evidence of specific facts that establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. … It does not say “including but not limited to” those items, which would clearly signal that other items might be included as well, but it also does not explicitly identify the list as exhaustive, as the landlord’s subsequent

Town of Randolph v. Town of Stoughton

7 Mass. L. Rptr. 73 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 23, 1997

These documents contemplate the establishment of retail businesses, personal service establishments, banks, professional offices, hotels, and light industrial and research and development uses in the Center. … For a planning board, the determination whether a perimeter plan qualifies for an endorsement that approval under the subdivision control law is not required is a routine and ministerial exercise. Smalley v.

City of Springfield v. Dreison Investments, Inc.

11 Mass. L. Rptr. 379 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 25, 2000

The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that the City acted in bad faith when it exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire title to the Northgate, Conefam, and Dreison parcels. … This would establish a fair market value.

Slawsby v. Cifrino

16 Mass. L. Rptr. 405 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 13, 2003

German is highly qualified and provided competent testimony on issues relating to the United States supermarket industry, including its history and evolution from shortly after WWII to the present. Prof. … There was, however, a clearly discernable difference in the mix of products at the Allston store from that at South Bay.