Case law

Graney v. Metropolitan District Commission

13 Mass. L. Rptr. 492 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 28, 2001

In fact, the record appears to establish the contrary, that the MBTA owns the land. … Apr. 19, 2001), 2001 WL 393722 , the Court of Appeals of Ohio, on facts bearing some resemblance to this case, held that no immunity was available to a city.

Phone Recovery Services, LLC v. Verizon of New England, Inc.

33 Mass. L. Rptr. 102 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 27, 2015

It argues that the 911 surcharges qualify as fees based on the three-factor analysis discussed below and, thus, its MFCA claim in Count I properly states a claim upon which relief can be granted. … The Legislature clearly intended for the monies collected from the 911 charges to be used for the implementation and administration of 911 services in the Commonwealth to benefit the general welfare.

Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Duffy

3 Mass. L. Rptr. 350 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 2, 1995

Having produced the notes, and established the genuineness of the signatures, Shawmut cast on Duffy and Doucette the burden of establishing a defense. See G.L. c. 106, §3-307(2); Coupounas v. … Shawmut apparently made an additional concession from its original bargaining position, although the precise nature of that concession is not clearly set forth.

Kuong v. Wong

31 Mass. L. Rptr. 548 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 13, 2013

Each of the Plaintiffs did so, investing among them hundreds of thousands of dollars, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that each of the two leases clearly provided that “improvements” would become property of the lessor … The code violations here do not stand alone, and I need not consider whether they would stand alone to establish a statutory violation. 7.

Yeshiva Achei Tmimim Lubavitz of Worcester, Inc. v. Baylis

18 Mass. L. Rptr. 616 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 29, 2004

For Federal Tax purposes, it is qualified under §501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code as a charitable organization. … This Court finds that any serving Rabbi who is also an officer of Yeshiva does qualify to serve as a trustee, but that Rabbi’s immediate family member does not. ORDER (1) Thomas F.

Aberjona Nursing Center, Inc. v. Porter

11 Mass. L. Rptr. 132 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 19, 1999

Once the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts establishing the existence of genuine issues of material fact. Id. at 17 . … Porter is a private paying patient until she might become qualified as a Medicaid participant; and (3) further acknowledges, as evidenced by the $20,000 check he signed and sent in March 1996 as well as by the promissory

Andrew Robinson International, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance

21 Mass. L. Rptr. 60 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 6, 2006

However, the Coverage Form also indicates that a cloud of fine particulate matter, i.e. dust or smoke, that contains lead may qualify as a “Specified Causef ] of Loss.” … In light of the well established rule that ambiguities in insurance contracts are to be construed against the insurer, see Cody v. Connecticut Gen. Life. Ins.

Gagne v. O'Donoghue

8 Mass. L. Rptr. 648 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 14, 1998

As a result of this alleged misconduct, plaintiff seeks an order of default judgment, or in the alternative, the striking of affirmative defenses of defendants, including statute of limitations and charitable immunity defenses … Plaintiff complains that, by its answer, the Diocese clearly implied that the caller did not identify himself, since the interrogatory had specifically asked for the identity of any such informant, but that subsequently,

Bennett v. Milford Water Co.

30 Mass. L. Rptr. 466 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 1, 2012

The defendant asserts that regulatory violations, without more, do not qualify as violations of c. 93A. … Nor has the defendant established their irrelevance.

Commonwealth v. Chiero

24 Mass. L. Rptr. 376 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 24, 2008

Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 236 (1996) (“In order to perform that vital protective function, the grand juiy cannot be denied access to evidence that is credible, material, and so clearly exculpatory as to induce a rational grand … In order for the defendant to qualify for relief under this standard, the Commonwealth must knowingly present false or deceptive testimony, and it must be significant.

Rodden v. Savin Hill Enterprises, LLC

33 Mass. L. Rptr. 442 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 21, 2016

In the present case, the Complaint does not allege that Rodden was denied clearly identifiable earned compensation for past services to Savin Hill. … The established elements of a tortious interference claim are as follows.

Mig Corporation, Inc. and Sps New England, Inc.; Utility Contractors Association of New England, Inc. and Associated Builders and Contractors, Massachusetts Chapter, Inc. v. Massachusetts Department of Transportation

Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 8, 2021

MassDOT determined that the bid of the second lowest bidder, MIG, was a qualified bid and that it would award the contract to MIG. … L. c. 30, § 39M is to ensure that the awarding authority obtains the lowest price among reasonable contractors and to establish an open and honest procedure for competition with all bidders on an equal footing.

Peterson v. Eder

14 Mass. L. Rptr. 478 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 27, 2001

Thus, clearly covered are private disputes between property owners which are the subject of a “governmental proceeding.” G.L.c. 231, §59H. … The board observed that after the appellants’ standing had been challenged, Attorney Kirk made no effort to establish that any of the appellants have aggrieved-person status, but rather argued that standing is an issue to

Mullin v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance

1 Mass. L. Rptr. 265 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 28, 1993

The benefit plan must clearly grant discretionary authority to the administrator to determine the eligibility for benefits. Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 986 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1993); Allen v. … Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, supra at 1568. *267 If a conflict of interest is established by the plan beneficiary, the burden shifts to the administrator “to prove that its interpretation of plan provisions committed

Biele v. City of Boston Zoning Board of Appeals

27 Mass. L. Rptr. 348 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 25, 2010

In his letter Zagorianakos states: The data clearly indicates that this is NOT A SURFACE RELEASE that originated from the 902 East Second Street property. … The audio tape of the hearing clearly establishes that the proviso was agreed-upon, though it was not included in the written decision.

Hays v. Ellrich

26 Mass. L. Rptr. 27 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 13, 2009

Bank, the qualified custodian for CMF. The Rydex and Profunds accounts were liquidated and transferred on January 8, 2001 and January 11, 2001, respectively. … Hays describes this experience as routine personal finance matters, such as preparing annual tax returns and depositing money into an established IRA account.

North American Assurance Co. of America v. Payzant

27 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 5, 2010

Ciiy of Brockton violated both a statutory provision, M.G.L.c. 93A, §2, under which government entities are exposed to liability only when they are engaged in trade or commerce, and “fundamental principles of sovereign immunity … This statutory scheme clearly evidences an intention by the legislature to protect insureds from unfair insurance practices.

Regan v. Falmouth Conservation Commission

25 Mass. L. Rptr. 562 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 5, 2008

The record clearly supports the conclusion that the property contains a peat shelf and shellfish. (See, e.g., A.R., Ex. 7 at p. 1.) … The record does not establish when the Plaintiffs filed this request. “S.A.R.”

Rubenstein v. Liberty Mutual Insurance

4 Mass. L. Rptr. 272 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 23, 1995

On reflection, I hesitate to do so, however, because the court’s brief discussion of the issue is clearly confined to the question whether Tufts or its wholly owned subsidiary was the prior owner. … The court concluded that subsurface groundwater did not qualify as being owned by the state, and thus was not third-party property.

P. Gioioso & Sons, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance

33 Mass. L. Rptr. 511 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 27, 2016

Clearly, if Liberty believed that an appeal would likely be successful, it would be to its advantage to pursue the appeal. … Gioioso argues that the actuarial calculation exceeded the amount of reserves established on all open claims.