Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
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Rauseo ex rel. Suffolk/Medford Realty Trust v. Massachusetts Port Authority
16 Mass. L. Rptr. 770 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 7, 2003
In response to this suggestion, I want to affirm Massport’s position, which was clearly stated in the June 20 letter. … There is nothing in the summary judgment record establishing that Massport, in any way, conveyed to CZM a position on the Trust’s petition other than as described in the June 20, 2001, letter.
Cited 0 timesPublishedAbel v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board
17 Mass. L. Rptr. 215 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 17, 2003
Abel for her work as the Director of the Inter-generational Music Program qualifies as “regular compensation” as defined by ch. 32, §1. There is no question that Ms. … TRB emphatically states and quotes in its memorandum that “the statutory intent is clearly to exempt irregular payments of compensation from the retirement base.” Hallett v. CRAB, 431 Mass, 66, 70 (2000).
Cited 0 timesPublishedLexington Insurance v. CareCore National, LLC
32 Mass. L. Rptr. 445 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 18, 2014
Moreover, Lexington was clearly aware of the issues of “relatedness” at the time since that issue was specifically flagged in its the reservation of rights letter it issued back in 2006 following CareCore’s notice to Lexington … Indeed, much of what Count v. seeks to recover is not for indemnity against liability but for defense costs, and it is well established that the duty to defend is much broader than the duty to indemnify.
Cited 0 timesPublishedSaposnik v. Babcock Borsig Power, Inc.
19 Mass. L. Rptr. 611 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 5, 2005
Saposnik was sixty years old when he was terminated in November 2002, clearly a member of the protected class. … Clearly, the evidence evinces that conclusion when one compares Hatch and Hinkley, each of whom scored “4" in their evaluations overall.
Cited 0 timesPublishedJustice-Hughes v. Quaside, Inc.
29 Mass. L. Rptr. 112 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 27, 2011
Justice-Hughes a duty to warn against dangerous conditions, and that GF/Health Systems qualifies, under M.G.L.c. 231, §85K, for limitation of tort liability afforded to certain charitable organizations. … Systems is a Georgia corporation conducting business in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under a Foreign Corporation Certificate. 9 While the articles of incorporation under which GF/Health Systems operates in Georgia clearly
Cited 0 timesPublished23 Mass. L. Rptr. 295 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 26, 2007
At the time, Erickson was qualified under HUD, Section 8 housing and was re-approved for an amount to cover her rent on the New Braintree cottage. … Clearly, the parties in the instant action are identical to those in the prior cases. The second question then is whether the claims in the two actions are the same. I conclude that they are.
Cited 0 timesPublishedSea Heights Resident Ass'n v. Tringale
8 Mass. L. Rptr. 358 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 31, 1997
This clearly falls within the constitutional right to petition. … Tringale argues to the contrary that this litigation does not qualify for protection under the Act.
Cited 0 timesPublished23 Mass. L. Rptr. 200 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 14, 2007
Clearly, an express contract for legal services was not consummated between Kuiy and Calechman. Kuiy argues sufficient factual circumstances exist to support an implied attorney-client relationship. … To qualify for the foreseeable reliance exception, two requirements must be met. First, a duty is only owed to non-clients “who the attorney knows will reasonably rely on the services rendered.” Robertson v.
Cited 0 timesPublishedCampanile v. Suffolk Construction Co.
1 Mass. L. Rptr. 486 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 4, 1994
The plaintiffs would have this court establish different accrual dates for each of the complained-of defects. … These six defects, then, are clearly barred by the three-year limitation period found in G.L.c. 160, §2B.
Cited 1 timesPublishedEldridge v. Provident Companies
11 Mass. L. Rptr. 413 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 15, 2000
In such circumstances, Allison clearly suggests that class certification should not fail merely because incidental damages were included in plaintiffs’ demand for judgment. … Furthermore, counsel for the prospective class are experienced and qualified in class litigation and, as defendants conceded in oral argument upon the instant motion, there is no suggestion that said counsel will not fairly
Cited 0 timesPublishedCity of Boston School Committee v. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66
22 Mass. L. Rptr. 15 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 30, 2006
General Laws c. 71, §37 mandates that the School Committee “establish educational goals and policies ... consistent with the requirements of law and statewide goals and standards established by the board of education.” … Further, the School Committee has failed to demonstrate that its alleged policy of withholding student names from student witness statements is an exclusive management prerogative, immune from arbitration.
Cited 0 timesPublished33 Mass. L. Rptr. 658 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 10, 2016
Under Section 3, the moving party is required to point to specific information demonstrating that he meets the qualifying criteria of Section 3(b), and submit an affidavit of factual innocence as required by Section 3(d). … The paradigmatic case, and the one that Chapter 278A was clearly designed to address, arises where the articles sought to be tested (e.g., a rape kit, murder weapon, etc.) could directly call into question the actual identity
Cited 0 timesPublishedGranada House, Inc. v. City of Boston
6 Mass. L. Rptr. 466 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 15, 1997
“If the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts which would establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat … Article 2A, Section 2A-1. *468 Article 2A of the Code further establishes two use classifications for group homes.
Cited 0 timesPublishedOne to One Interactive, LLC v. Landrith
18 Mass. L. Rptr. 85 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 8, 2004
In the term sheet, the parties clearly stated all the material contractual commitments to which they were binding themselves and, just as clearly, they eachfor a time at least followed those commitments. … The parties mutually acknowledge that their agreement is qualified and that they, therefore, contemplate the drafting and execution of a more detailed agreement.
Cited 0 timesPublished29 Mass. L. Rptr. 490 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 6, 2012
Later, on May 2, 2011, Tewhey, himself, recorded a declaration of homestead with respect to the Property, noting that he qualified as an elderly person under the homestead statute. … Testimony at trial in this case established that the default judgment was obtained upon claims of legal malpractice and violations of G.L.c. 93A.
Cited 0 timesPublishedJimenez v. Health Alliance Hospitals, Inc.
25 Mass. L. Rptr. 173 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 13, 2009
The jury’s determination that the defendant’s employee was not negligent is clearly against the weight of the evidence. … Evangelista, a clear picture emerges that points clearly in the direction of Tracy Snowden’s negligence.
Cited 0 timesPublishedMassachusetts Superior Court · Apr 27, 2020
The fact that the challenged orders were issued under the Governor's broad emergency powers does not mean that they are immune from judicial review. … Commissioner of Revenue, 453 Mass. 1, 10 , cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 287 (2009). -16- against out-of-state economic interests are unconstitutional only if they impose "a burden on interstate commerce that 'is clearly excessive
Cited 0 timesPublishedMassachusetts Superior Court · Jun 26, 2024
structing their employment compensation to be part salary (based on oral agreements) and part profit distributions from the two project (as defined in the written Participation Agreements); and (ii) Gerhardt and Seaverns would qualify … “Waiver must be shown clearly, unmistakably, and unequivocally.” Id., quoting Boston v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 169, 174 (1999).
Cited 0 timesPublished17 Mass. L. Rptr. 279 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 18, 2004
This is sufficient to establish that actual force was used. See Commonwealth v. … “In our opinion this was clearly sufficient, particularly in the circumstances of an ongoing robbeiy, to cause the victim reasonable apprehension with respect to his physical security.” Id. at 437 .
Cited 0 timesPublishedBirnbrich v. New England Business Service, Inc.
16 Mass. L. Rptr. 557 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 21, 2003
FACTS The record establishes the following facts, which are either undisputed or viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. … She does not appear, in her brief, to maintain that either comment constituted direct evidence of discriminatory animus, and clearly, neither did.
Cited 0 timesPublished
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