Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

659 results

0.74s

  • Rauseo ex rel. Suffolk/Medford Realty Trust v. Massachusetts Port Authority

    16 Mass. L. Rptr. 770 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 7, 2003

    In response to this suggestion, I want to affirm Massport’s position, which was clearly stated in the June 20 letter. … There is nothing in the summary judgment record establishing that Massport, in any way, conveyed to CZM a position on the Trust’s petition other than as described in the June 20, 2001, letter.

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  • Abel v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board

    17 Mass. L. Rptr. 215 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 17, 2003

    Abel for her work as the Director of the Inter-generational Music Program qualifies as “regular compensation” as defined by ch. 32, §1. There is no question that Ms. … TRB emphatically states and quotes in its memorandum that “the statutory intent is clearly to exempt irregular payments of compensation from the retirement base.” Hallett v. CRAB, 431 Mass, 66, 70 (2000).

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  • Lexington Insurance v. CareCore National, LLC

    32 Mass. L. Rptr. 445 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 18, 2014

    Moreover, Lexington was clearly aware of the issues of “relatedness” at the time since that issue was specifically flagged in its the reservation of rights letter it issued back in 2006 following CareCore’s notice to Lexington … Indeed, much of what Count v. seeks to recover is not for indemnity against liability but for defense costs, and it is well established that the duty to defend is much broader than the duty to indemnify.

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  • Saposnik v. Babcock Borsig Power, Inc.

    19 Mass. L. Rptr. 611 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 5, 2005

    Saposnik was sixty years old when he was terminated in November 2002, clearly a member of the protected class. … Clearly, the evidence evinces that conclusion when one compares Hatch and Hinkley, each of whom scored “4" in their evaluations overall.

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  • Justice-Hughes v. Quaside, Inc.

    29 Mass. L. Rptr. 112 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 27, 2011

    Justice-Hughes a duty to warn against dangerous conditions, and that GF/Health Systems qualifies, under M.G.L.c. 231, §85K, for limitation of tort liability afforded to certain charitable organizations. … Systems is a Georgia corporation conducting business in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under a Foreign Corporation Certificate. 9 While the articles of incorporation under which GF/Health Systems operates in Georgia clearly

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  • Erickson v. Thomas

    23 Mass. L. Rptr. 295 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 26, 2007

    At the time, Erickson was qualified under HUD, Section 8 housing and was re-approved for an amount to cover her rent on the New Braintree cottage. … Clearly, the parties in the instant action are identical to those in the prior cases. The second question then is whether the claims in the two actions are the same. I conclude that they are.

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  • Sea Heights Resident Ass'n v. Tringale

    8 Mass. L. Rptr. 358 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 31, 1997

    This clearly falls within the constitutional right to petition. … Tringale argues to the contrary that this litigation does not qualify for protection under the Act.

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  • Kury v. Calechman

    23 Mass. L. Rptr. 200 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 14, 2007

    Clearly, an express contract for legal services was not consummated between Kuiy and Calechman. Kuiy argues sufficient factual circumstances exist to support an implied attorney-client relationship. … To qualify for the foreseeable reliance exception, two requirements must be met. First, a duty is only owed to non-clients “who the attorney knows will reasonably rely on the services rendered.” Robertson v.

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  • Campanile v. Suffolk Construction Co.

    1 Mass. L. Rptr. 486 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 4, 1994

    The plaintiffs would have this court establish different accrual dates for each of the complained-of defects. … These six defects, then, are clearly barred by the three-year limitation period found in G.L.c. 160, §2B.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Eldridge v. Provident Companies

    11 Mass. L. Rptr. 413 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 15, 2000

    In such circumstances, Allison clearly suggests that class certification should not fail merely because incidental damages were included in plaintiffs’ demand for judgment. … Furthermore, counsel for the prospective class are experienced and qualified in class litigation and, as defendants conceded in oral argument upon the instant motion, there is no suggestion that said counsel will not fairly

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  • City of Boston School Committee v. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66

    22 Mass. L. Rptr. 15 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 30, 2006

    General Laws c. 71, §37 mandates that the School Committee “establish educational goals and policies ... consistent with the requirements of law and statewide goals and standards established by the board of education.” … Further, the School Committee has failed to demonstrate that its alleged policy of withholding student names from student witness statements is an exclusive management prerogative, immune from arbitration.

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  • Commonwealth v. Powell

    33 Mass. L. Rptr. 658 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 10, 2016

    Under Section 3, the moving party is required to point to specific information demonstrating that he meets the qualifying criteria of Section 3(b), and submit an affidavit of factual innocence as required by Section 3(d). … The paradigmatic case, and the one that Chapter 278A was clearly designed to address, arises where the articles sought to be tested (e.g., a rape kit, murder weapon, etc.) could directly call into question the actual identity

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  • Granada House, Inc. v. City of Boston

    6 Mass. L. Rptr. 466 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 15, 1997

    “If the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts which would establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat … Article 2A, Section 2A-1. *468 Article 2A of the Code further establishes two use classifications for group homes.

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  • One to One Interactive, LLC v. Landrith

    18 Mass. L. Rptr. 85 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 8, 2004

    In the term sheet, the parties clearly stated all the material contractual commitments to which they were binding themselves and, just as clearly, they eachfor a time at least followed those commitments. … The parties mutually acknowledge that their agreement is qualified and that they, therefore, contemplate the drafting and execution of a more detailed agreement.

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  • Tewhey v. Bodkins

    29 Mass. L. Rptr. 490 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 6, 2012

    Later, on May 2, 2011, Tewhey, himself, recorded a declaration of homestead with respect to the Property, noting that he qualified as an elderly person under the homestead statute. … Testimony at trial in this case established that the default judgment was obtained upon claims of legal malpractice and violations of G.L.c. 93A.

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  • Jimenez v. Health Alliance Hospitals, Inc.

    25 Mass. L. Rptr. 173 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 13, 2009

    The jury’s determination that the defendant’s employee was not negligent is clearly against the weight of the evidence. … Evangelista, a clear picture emerges that points clearly in the direction of Tracy Snowden’s negligence.

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  • Commcan, Inc., and Others v. Charlie Baker, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

    Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 27, 2020

    The fact that the challenged orders were issued under the Governor's broad emergency powers does not mean that they are immune from judicial review. … Commissioner of Revenue, 453 Mass. 1, 10 , cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 287 (2009). -16- against out-of-state economic interests are unconstitutional only if they impose "a burden on interstate commerce that 'is clearly excessive

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  • Michael Gerhardt and Lauren Seaverns v. Robert S. Burr; College Street Partners, LLC; 140 Commonwealth Avenue – Danvers, LLC; And Hawthorne Hill Development LLC

    Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 26, 2024

    structing their employment compensation to be part salary (based on oral agreements) and part profit distributions from the two project (as defined in the written Participation Agreements); and (ii) Gerhardt and Seaverns would qualify … “Waiver must be shown clearly, unmistakably, and unequivocally.” Id., quoting Boston v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 169, 174 (1999).

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  • Commonwealth v. Fret

    17 Mass. L. Rptr. 279 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 18, 2004

    This is sufficient to establish that actual force was used. See Commonwealth v. … “In our opinion this was clearly sufficient, particularly in the circumstances of an ongoing robbeiy, to cause the victim reasonable apprehension with respect to his physical security.” Id. at 437 .

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  • Birnbrich v. New England Business Service, Inc.

    16 Mass. L. Rptr. 557 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 21, 2003

    FACTS The record establishes the following facts, which are either undisputed or viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. … She does not appear, in her brief, to maintain that either comment constituted direct evidence of discriminatory animus, and clearly, neither did.

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