Case law

Johansson v. Massachusetts Department of Correction

28 Mass. L. Rptr. 191 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 31, 2011

Furthermore, the Full Commission concluded that: (1) Johansson failed to establish a prima facie case of handicapped discrimination under G.L.c. 15 IB, §4(16) because she was not a qualified handicapped person; and (2) she … The position at the Central Office, unlike the position at MCI-Concord, is clearly more clerical in nature as the employee works with the Commissioner and the Department heads, not inmates.

Toas v. Shapiro

23 Mass. L. Rptr. 194 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 15, 2007

Once the party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must allege specific facts establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. … Clearly, in light of Rudenauer , the continuing treatment doctrine is not a viable mechanism for tolling the medical malpractice period of repose.

Guaranteed Builders & Developers, Inc. v. Bylinski

29 Mass. L. Rptr. 377 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 2, 2012

A 1967 recorded plan by WLT established the northerly boundary of 103 Shore Road. Lot 71 in the recorded plan in 1967 established what 103 Shore Road is today. … This letter did not explicitly state that the property of 103 Shore Road was exempt from town zoning by-laws, but the letter implied that 103 Shore Road might qualify for grandfathering. 103 Shore Road is in fact not eligible

Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Hills

4 Mass. L. Rptr. 53 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 14, 1995

“If the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts which would establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat … “It is clearly established that a party need not assert a counterclaim that has not matured at the time he served his pleading . . .

Daniels v. Dunlap

17 Mass. L. Rptr. 154 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 29, 2003

In medical malpractice cases, however, application of the discoveiy rule establishes that the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows, or should have known, that she had been “harmed by the defendant’s conduct … Lipke claimed prejudice from the delay and argued that allowing the motion would be futile because her status as a public employee entitled her to qualified immunity. Initially, this court (Gants, J.) addressed Dr.

Sassine v. Fidelity Management & Research Co.

31 Mass. L. Rptr. 584 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 22, 2013

The elements of a prima facie case are that the plaintiff was over forty years of age, he performed his job at an acceptable level, he was terminated, and he was replaced by a similarly or less qualified younger person. … Whether conduct violates a clearly established and well-defined important public policy is a question of law. Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent of the Walter E. Fernald State Sch., 404 Mass. 145, 151 (1989); Mercado v.

Lucas Noble and Amanda Noble v. Jessica Crovetti

Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 19, 2024

Ct. 359 (1981), and others, for the proposition that she “has absolute immunity” for statements made “while a judicial proceeding [was] active.” See Paper No. 5.1, pp. 11 – 12. … See Paper No. 4.1.[18], [19] Thus, the narrow question for the Court’s determination on the Motion For Attachment after the Court’s above rulings on the Motion To Dismiss, is whether Lucas has established a reasonable likelihood

Zisch v. Textron Defense Systems

5 Mass. L. Rptr. 231 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 11, 1996

“If the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege *232 specific facts which would establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in order to … In addition, the plaintiff argues that he was not considered for a marketing position with Textron for which he was qualified. Textron did hire someone from outside the company for a marketing position.

Commonwealth v. Vasquez

20 Mass. L. Rptr. 319 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 27, 2005

Implied assertions from speech intended as communication clearly come within the definition of a statement under rule 5.801( )(I). … In Stoddard, Justice Raker added this brief test to determine whether an out-of-court utterance or act qualifies as hearsay: “[a] reasonable test is to ask whether the words would remain probative if it could be established

Gimas v. Bialy

25 Mass. L. Rptr. 67 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 9, 2008

Certainly, what the arbitrator claims that other parties said or did in a proceeding outside a civil courtroom qualifies as “an extrajudicial statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” … The statute clearly mandates that “the remedies provided hereunder shall be the exclusive remedies available to teachers for wrongful termination." G.L.c. 71, §42 (emphasis added).

Commonwealth v. Philip Morris Inc.

8 Mass. L. Rptr. 547 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 30, 1998

They differ as to whether Chairman Bliley’s April 6 letter qualifies as a “ruling from the Chair.” … However, consistent with established jurisprudence on the subject of waiver, a witness is not required to be in contempt in order to avoid waiver, even if (as here) any consequences of that contempt can clearly be avoided

Webber v. Town of Petersham

19 Mass. L. Rptr. 243 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 13, 2005

Therefore, the fence in question qualifies as an “appurtenance” as that term is used in the by-law and is exempt from the reach of the by-law. … As noted above, the defendants have established a likelihood of success on the merits.

Curtis v. City of Fitchburg

16 Mass. L. Rptr. 391 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 4, 2003

The result would clearly contravene the intention of the statute, which was to encourage employees who had subsequently recovered from a disability to return to work and to insure that state employees were not abusing disability … Clearly, even if Curtis had immediately commenced the retraining program upon his certification by PERAC on June 9, 1997, he would not have been eligible for reinstatement until at least early September, almost three months

Commonwealth v. Giordano

25 Mass. L. Rptr. 4 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 29, 2008

However, the SJC’s opinion in Campbell suggests the opposite: “The common law definition of partnership, well developed through case law, and clearly stated by this court in decisions during the decade preceding the adoption … The great majority of state courts that have addressed the issue now before this Court have held that the common-law rule of the immunity of partners from prosecution for larceny of partnership assets survived the adoption

Kimball, Bennett, Brooslin & Pava v. McGahan

16 Mass. L. Rptr. 562 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 17, 2003

Liability McGahan argues that the court should have directed a verdict in her favor on the basis of liability because the evidence established that she was a qualified handicapped individual to whom Kimball Bennett had denied … Smith at 1113 (“A rule of per se admissibility of the investigative file would clearly undercut the district court’s function as independent fact-finder.

Barrios v. Viking Seafood, Inc.

6 Mass. L. Rptr. 281 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 15, 1996

It would make little sense to mandate that an action be filed when, at the time of filing, the right to relief has not yet been and could not be established. … “G.L.c. 23 IB, §4(b), was drafted to encourage settlements in multiple party tort actions by clearly delineating the effect settlement will have on collateral rights and liabilities in future litigation.” Bishop v.

Guimond v. Russell

16 Mass. L. Rptr. 582 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 8, 2003

Plaintiff contends that D’Amelio cannot establish hardship because he does not presently have a legal interest in the property. … It would clearly be a hardship and substantial expense for D’Amelio to enlarge and upgrade some Vs mile of Pilgrim Road.

Mongeon v. Arbella Mutual Insurance

17 Mass. L. Rptr. 631 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 23, 2004

Rasmussen clearly states that at most he suffered from anxiety from this accident and not from any cardiac condition. … As of that date, the plaintiffs medicals and other damages were clearly in excess of $60,000.

Lowell School Committee v. United Teachers of Lowell, Local 495

6 Mass. L. Rptr. 591 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 15, 1997

. *592 DISCUSSION This Court grants summary judgment where the record establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cassesso v. … Part 4 is as clear, and as clearly procedural, as Parts 1 and 2; it merely requires “a written statement as to the dispo *594 sition” of each transfer request by a specified date.

Demoulas v. Demoulas

31 Mass. L. Rptr. 509 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 25, 2013

Clearly Judge Lopez recognized the necessity of explicitly designating an objective, widely recognized standard, and knew how to identify such a standard. … Nor is such a prohibition inherent in the structure Judge Lopez established.