Case law

Zoppo v. John Hancock Insurance

6 Mass. L. Rptr. 137 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 31, 1996

At first glance, it might seem that the GIC is kin to the associations thus shielded from the operation of G.L.c. 93A and ought also to be immune from its proscriptions. … Poznik, 417 Mass. at 51 . 6 The regulations promulgated by the GIC clearly describe the GIC’s power to determine participant eligibility and the amount and extent of coverage provided under the plan. 805 C.M.R. §§3:05(2)

Voigt v. City of Medford

22 Mass. L. Rptr. 122 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 30, 2007

Carr stated that certain unidentified people in the community did not want a tattoo establishment in Medford Square. … Section 94-148 requires all body art establishments to seek a special permit from the city council to conduct business.

Brundige v. Todd

29 Mass. L. Rptr. 188 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 16, 2011

The unrebutted presumption by itself establishes standing. That is enough, but there is more. … Whatever the reason for the prior owners’ mortgage on only two of three lots and their subsequent default, it would be perverse to adopt a rule of standing that immunizes the resulting non-conformities from challenge by the

Boston Police Department v. Chaves

29 Mass. L. Rptr. 453 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 1, 2012

Scott] but was still acutely anxious and unable to answer even simple questions clearly or directly. … Under established case law, the city bore the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that it had such a reason.

AIF Realty, LLC v. TD Banknorth, N.A.

25 Mass. L. Rptr. 267 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 17, 2008

Article XXIX, titled “Attorneys Fees,” establishes the following general rule for allocating attorneys fees: If either party brings any action or proceeding to enforce, protect, or establish any right or remedy, the prevailing … The various provisions of the Lease addressing attorneys fees clearly delineate the circumstances over which they govern.

Batchelder v. Borden, Inc.

2 Mass. L. Rptr. 637 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 4, 1994

“If the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts that would establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat … The plaintiff in this case has amassed sufficient evidence to qualify under at least the last three of these theories.

Brown v. Commonwealth

12 Mass. L. Rptr. 426 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 12, 2000

In order to establish a violation, the plaintiff must prove purposeful discrimination. Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979). … The court also has before it the reports and evaluations of qualified psychiatrists and any evidence and testimony which was introduced at the trial.

McFadyen v. Maki

21 Mass. L. Rptr. 251 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 13, 2006

BACKGROUND The undisputed material facts, as established by the summary judgment record and taken in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, are as follows. … Although he acknowledges that snow-covered tree stumps posed some risk to its customers, Maki argues that his conduct does not qualify as wilful, wanton or reckless.

Loltek-Jick v. O'Toole

29 Mass. L. Rptr. 269 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 15, 2011

Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 Colum.L.Ref. 463, 469-70 (1909). … Kunian’s conduct in drafting the P and S clearly had no relation to a pending or threatened proceeding.

Giacalone v. I.E.S., Inc.

10 Mass. L. Rptr. 209 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 17, 1999

They retained IES because they believed IES was qualified to perform an environmental site investigation. … Some damages, however, would clearly be recoverable were this case to proceed to trial.

Sherter v. Ross Fialkow Capital Partners, LLP

31 Mass. L. Rptr. 98 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 4, 2013

Ross’s name along with Fialkow’s appeared at the bottom of the investment letter, which both men clearly intended to be used as a solicitation. … Ross protests, however, that as a limited partner, he is immune from liability. The argument mistakes the rules laid down in both the Partnership Act and MUSA.

Cox v. T.S. Truck Services, Inc.

19 Mass. L. Rptr. 695 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 23, 2005

Damages With respect to the hauling of bituminous concrete to public construction projects, the plaintiffs have established their entitlement to prevailing wages. … As previously noted, neither party offered any direct evidence of the actual rate established by the commissioner. See fri. 5, supra

Nascimento v. Harvard Community Health Plan, Inc.

7 Mass. L. Rptr. 572 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 26, 1997

Nascimento, and to other participants in its health plan, by purchasing memberships for them in HCHP, a federally qualified HMO that is independent of Harvard University. … Although an action for specific performance clearly is an action designed to enforce contractual rights, so too is an action for damages flowing from an alleged contractual breach.

Boespflug v. Community Housing Resource, Inc.

24 Mass. L. Rptr. 547 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 11, 2007

To qualify for inclusion in the Affordable Rental Housing Overlay District, the proposed buildings and pavement may not cover more than 25% of the area of the entire parcel. 30.6.B(3) Parking. … General Laws c. 40A, §9 requires the Board, to make “a detailed record of its proceedings” and to “set[ ] forth clearly the reason for its decision.”

Northern Security Insurance v. Sandpiper Village Condominium Trust

24 Mass. L. Rptr. 500 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 3, 2008

The cases cited by Northern Security in which the Court found that there was no “occurrence” are clearly distinguishable. See Rideout v. … The Court acknowledges that “the insured deserves reimbursement for his reasonable outlay ‘in successfully establishing the insurer’s duty to defend under the policy.’ ” Hanover Ins. Co. v.

Shukhman v. Northeast Lens Corp.

19 Mass. L. Rptr. 157 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 4, 2005

Shukhman has not presented evidence that he was replaced or his duties assumed by substantially younger personnel, who were equally or less qualified. … G.L.c. 151B, §1(8) provides that “[t]he term ‘age’ unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context, includes any duration of time since an individuaTs birth of greater than forty years.”

Walsh v. Carney Hospital Corp.

8 Mass. L. Rptr. 574 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 10, 1998

s Establishment Clause. … Defendants argue that Carney Hospital is protected by the charitable immunity statute.

Graf v. Hospitality Mutual Insurance

33 Mass. L. Rptr. 13 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 29, 2015

Mass. 1992) (“We hold, therefore, that individuals . . . under contract with the government, are entitled to raise a qualified immunity defense because they are the functional equivalent of public officials”); Rodi v. … immunity).

Beechin v. United States Mineral Products Co.

8 Mass. L. Rptr. 252 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 10, 1998

The Supreme Judicial Court clearly stated that “either the insurer or the employee, but not both, may *254 file suit.” Pinto, 418 Mass. at 498 . … Benton, 356 Mass. 444 (1969) (court bound by stipulations of immunity signed by Attorney General); Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v.

Larson v. Borden

16 Mass. L. Rptr. 685 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 15, 2003

In Hanover, the Court reasoned that since 1) eligibility turns on the ability to qualify for the appropriate funding; 2) to qualify an applicant must propose to build “low or moderate income housing”; and 3) the phrase is … To qualify as a housing program pursuant to the regulations, the program need not specify each of the criteria in its guidelines. Id. at *11.