Case law

New London County Mutual Insurance v. Matthews

10 Mass. L. Rptr. 126 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 22, 1999

If the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, in order to defeat the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must respond and allege specific facts which would establish the existence of material … These two factors, in and of themselves, clearly lead to the determination that Matthews was indeed a resident of the Marino household.

Capolupo v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection

17 Mass. L. Rptr. 190 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 1, 2003

General Laws c. 30, §61, establishes an official policy of environmental protection in the Commonwealth by directing that all State agencies “review, evaluate, and determine the impact on the natural environment of all works … MESA’s definition of the word “take” is broadfar broader, for example, than in other statutes where “take” or “taking” clearly refers only to the hunting, trapping, or other harvesting of fauna or flora.

Kent v. Commonwealth

12 Mass. L. Rptr. 165 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 27, 2000

Co. forcefully rejected the argument that the work product privilege, described by the court as an established legal doctrine forming part of the common law, should be implicitly read into the PRL. See id. at 804-06. … construed to include any implied exceptions, regardless of public policy concerns, of the common law, or of any other consideration; I read the *168 court to be saying that the exemptions expressly set out in the statute very clearly

Nadal-Ginard v. Children's Hospital Corp.

4 Mass. L. Rptr. 506 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 1, 1995

Finally, defendants argue that those individual defendants who are unpaid trustees of the Hospital, a charitable institution, are immune to suit pursuant to G.L.c. 231, §85W, and that Children’s charitable immunity caps any … (“BCHF”) was established in 1983.

Farragut Mortgage Co. v. Arthur Andersen LLP

10 Mass. L. Rptr. 285 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 15, 1999

One of the conditions of the merger, as established by Kislak, is that the deal must qualify for “pooling-of-interests" accounting. … The terms of the release clearly discharges Kislak and those who may be jointly liable with Kislak.

Scott v. Granada Computer Services, Inc.

5 Mass. L. Rptr. 351 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 2, 1996

Under that formulation the vague or ambiguous complaint tends to be immune from dismissal under rule 12 . . . but where . . . the complaint sets out with clarity and precision the detailed factual allegations which the plaintiff … established public policy.”

Diaz v. Henry Lee Willis Community Center, Inc.

9 Mass. L. Rptr. 169 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 14, 1998

On December 1, 1994, Oberreit’s executive director report stated, with regard to the outpatient department, “(t]wo of the current staff are not qualified to provide service under either DPH or MHMA minimum standards.” … Such evidence is insufficient to establish the required causation.

Cammarano v. Boston Bar Ass'n

4 Mass. L. Rptr. 183 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 21, 1995

Plaintiff was told by Moran and Marcellino that he appeared to be qualified for appointment. … Moreover, as the affidavits show quite clearly many middle aged applicants are selected.

Brimage v. City of Boston

13 Mass. L. Rptr. 4 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 24, 2001

If the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. … Finally, as §10(j) is not applicable, the evidence clearly establishes a triable issue of material fact as to whether the employer knew or should have known that Rosario was unfit and posed a danger to others with whom he

Allard v. Carroll

7 Mass. L. Rptr. 262 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 11, 1997

Despite disharmonious definitional authority, Plaintiff appears to qualify. … More substantively, Plaintiffs exhibits clearly establish her collateral agreement with Porthouse vis a vis the two promissory notes whereby Porthouse assumed full responsibility for the $83,500 note (Slade loan) and one-third

Beling v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc.

10 Mass. L. Rptr. 542 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 22, 1999

To establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination, the plaintiff must present evidence that: (1) she is handicapped within the meaning of the statute; (2) she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the … However, co-employees themselves “are not immunized from suit by the workers’ compensation act for tortious acts, which are unrelated to the interest of the employer.” Id. (citations omitted).

Thomka v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc.

22 Mass. L. Rptr. 263 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 12, 2007

At schools where there is insufficient student interest to establish separate boys’ and girls’ teams, the schools may field mixed-gender teams. … The plaintiff competed in the 2005 fall boys’ individual tournament, after qualifying by score, by reason of a preliminary injunction issued by the court. 13 Clearly, as the rule stands now,- if the plaintiff qualifies to

Dolan v. Bay Construction Group Co.

3 Mass. L. Rptr. 21 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 9, 1994

Article 114 of the Massachusetts Constitution Article 114 states: “No otherwise qualified handicapped individual shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, denied the benefits of, or be … Dolan claims that she contracted cancer and seriously damaged her immune system as a result of exposure to toxic agents while working for AT&T.

White City Shopping Center v. PR Restaurants, LLC

21 Mass. L. Rptr. 565 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 31, 2006

DISCUSSION Under the well-established test of Packaging Industries Group v. … PR argues that a flour tortilla qualifies as “bread” and a food product with bread and a filling is a sandwich.

R.L. Whipple Co. v. Coastal Energy, Inc.

17 Mass. L. Rptr. 78 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 14, 2003

“If the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts which would establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat … Employer’s immunity from tort claims by a plaintiff employee bars a third-party defendant’s right of contribution from the employer. Liberty Mutual v.

Merchants Mutual Ins. v. Face Place, Inc.

20 Mass. L. Rptr. 511 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 10, 2006

Like Malcolm, each of these experts was highly qualified in the field of fire investigation. … “In considering whether an actor not clearly within the statute is entitled to repose, the court engages in a fact-based activities analysis.

Powell v. Stevens

17 Mass. L. Rptr. 592 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 3, 2004

[T]he special damages rule of the slander of title action requires the plaintiff to establish pecuniary loss that has been realized or liquidated, as in the case of specific lost sales. … It is unclear, however, whether attorneys fees would qualify as special damages.

Epstein v. Lanza

6 Mass. L. Rptr. 705 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 8, 1997

At a minimum, Plaintiff clearly qualifies as a limited purpose public figure, having thrust himself into the vortex of the behavioral science discussion in an attempt to influence its outcome, Lyons v. … One cannot reasonably characterize any statement in the Lanza essay as “extreme or outra *746 geous," within the definition established by Agis v. Howard Johnson, 371 Mass. 140, 144 (1976).

Diminico v. National Grange Mutual Insurance

30 Mass. L. Rptr. 654 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 4, 2012

The party seeking the fees bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of both components. See Society of Jesus of New Eng. v. Boston Landmarks Comm’n, 411 Mass. 754, 759 (1992). … Certainly, the result obtained on behalf of the class was a good one and the legal work was of a high qualify.

Alunkal v. Codex Corp.

1 Mass. L. Rptr. 592 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 7, 1994

The MCAD complaint was clearly timely as to the transfer. … Alunkal can demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he was qualified for and applied for a promotion [or was qualified to remain in his pre-transfer position