Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

659 results

0.31s

  • Petersen v. US Airways

    31 Mass. L. Rptr. 666 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 19, 2013

    The contract terms—which the defendants (or some of them) established—did not need to be further described than this. … US Airways’ assertion that EasyCGI was “clearly” the party with whom the plaintiffs contracted has, with the exception of the term “clearly,” a plausible ring to it.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Sperrazza

    3 Mass. Supp. 416 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 29, 1982

    Simpson, 370 Mass. 119 , 121 n.1 (1976) (“Recently, we noted the existence of this unresolved question [i.e., whether G.L.c. 233, sec. 20F, establishes the exclusive procedure by which a Superior Court Judge may grant immunity … Accordingly, even if the plea bargain agreement were to be interpreted as broadly as Sperrazza requests,, he could form no reasonable reliance thereon in light of the clearly controlling law, a matter which this Court infers

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  • Patriarca v. Center for Living & Working, Inc.

    10 Mass. L. Rptr. 486 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 8, 1999

    [liability may be imposed on an employer ... if an at-will employee is terminated for a *488 reason that violates a clearly established public policy.” Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 757 (1997). … Director . . . provided however that the immunity conferred by this section shall not apply to any acts or omissions intentionally designed to harm or to any grossly negligent acts or omissions that result in harm to the

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  • Priester v. Town of Auburn

    21 Mass. L. Rptr. 149 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 1, 2006

    As a municipal employee, Hammond was immune from suit for negligence in the course of his employment under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G.L.c. 258, §2 (“Tort Claims Act”). … However, that immunity does not insulate the Town from suit for negligence for the acts of Hammond.

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  • Kelleher v. Dumont

    3 Mass. L. Rptr. 37 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 21, 1994

    The court is certainly diagramed with the Mayor’s refusal to consider an apparently highly qualified candidate on an established civil service list for the position of Chief Engineer. … The second paragraph of G.L.c. 31, §27 provides in relevant part, If an appointing authority makes an original or promotional appointment from a certification of any qualified person other than the qualified person whose

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Byrnes v. Lukes

    30 Mass. L. Rptr. 157 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 21, 2012

    In the present case, the members of the School Committee are clearly public officials. Lane v. … Even if a specific amount of damages remains subject to further evidence, the plaintiff has established a violation of the Wage Act.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Greenup v. City of Cambridge

    25 Mass. L. Rptr. 335 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 15, 2009

    The individual defendants, moreover, cannot be shown to have violated any “clearly established constitutional right,” so as to have lost their immunity from liability for their discretionary official actions.

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  • Doe v. City of Lowell

    18 Mass. L. Rptr. 543 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 18, 2004

    The CD4 cells are a surrogate marker for the functioning of the immune system. … The needle stick that Doe sustained to his right index finger qualifies as an injury within the purview of the statute. Blair v.

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  • Nylen v. Dalton

    1 Mass. L. Rptr. 572 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 22, 1994

    Ill, 204(b) provides that “documents, incident reports or records otherwise available from original sources shall not be immune from subpoena, discovery or use in any judicial proceeding . . . merely because they were presented … Clearly the statutory medical peer review privilege is not absolute.

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  • Hyppolite ex rel. Hyppolite v. City of Boston

    1 Mass. L. Rptr. 31 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 23, 1993

    Once the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts establishing the existence of a material fact in order to defeat the motion. … Chan would have been immune from suit for his “nonfeasance” under the common law. If this defense were so clearly meritorious, the city would surely have raised it in its own defense with or without Dr.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Wasserman v. Town of Bellingham

    7 Mass. L. Rptr. 40 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 27, 1997

    Blackstone’s Motion for Summary Judgment In support of its motion for summary judgment as to Counts III and V of the complaint, Blackstone argues that, to the extent the plaintiffs’ allege negligence, it is immune from liability … Blackstone contends that DeSimone, the Grove Hall Contracting, Inc. representative, is not qualified to render an expert opinion on causation because he lacks the education and experience to make such a determination.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • In re Deposition of Harrington Memorial Hospital

    17 Mass. L. Rptr. 294 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 26, 2003

    All three affidavits recite that Harrington has established risk management and qualified patient care assessment programs. … Her deposition testimony also clearly reflects a self-protection justification for submitting a report to her superiors.

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  • Commonwealth v. Cronin

    20 Mass. L. Rptr. 111 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 26, 2005

    The first clause clearly makes it so, and neither proviso excludes it. … They are also subject to standards established by national accreditation bodies. See note 3, supra.

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  • White v. City of Boston

    7 Mass. L. Rptr. 232 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 22, 1997

    [and] [t]he defendants clearly had a right — and a duty — to ensure that all physicians at the hospital practiced, within reason, safely and skillfully.” Id. at 983-84 . … The defendants argue that c. 32, §8 as amended is unconstitutional because St. 1906 c. 291 gives the commissioner discretion to appoint, establish, and organize the police force and the legislature cannot remove this discretion

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • JAMES CARVER v. CAROL A. MICl and STEPHEN KENNEDY

    Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 7, 2022

    Here, Carver conceded at the hearing that he does not qualify under the Statute by suffering from a "terminal illness." Rather, he argues that he qualifies because he suffers from "permanent incapacitation." … In the Court's view, the record clearly establishes that Dr. Strauss has concluded Carver suffers from myriad significant, incapacitating, chronic medical conditions.

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  • Govoni v. Town of Acushnet

    5 Mass. L. Rptr. 120 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 17, 1995

    BACKGROUND The undisputed material facts as established by the summary judgment record are as follows 1 . … Because any claim under c. 79, §16 is clearly time-barred, the Town is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 3.

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  • STEPHEN B. CORN, M.D. v. BRIGHAM AND WOMEN'S HOSPITAL & Others

    Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 15, 2023

    Com has not established that he was a "qualified handicapped person" as of 2016. … These facts do not, however, establish that Dr. Corn was a "qualified handicapped person" capable of"performing the essential functions of a particular job" at BWH (emphasis added) in 2016.

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  • Town of Barnstable v. Massachusetts Energy Facilities Siting Board

    25 Mass. L. Rptr. 375 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 4, 2009

    The well-established rule is that a party seeking declaratory relief must exhaust all available administrative remedies before resort to the courts. Walpole v. … Further, this is not a case where the matter in controversy is clearly beyond the scope of EFSB’s authority.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Brown v. Leahy

    31 Mass. L. Rptr. 505 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 3, 2013

    The guiding provision of C. 269, Sec. 12E is clearly the 500 feet minimum distance requirement. … Count I seeks a declaratory judgment, ruling as a matter of law that the Plaintiffs’ Property qualifies as an outdoor target range within the meaning of G.L.c. 269, Sec. 12E(d), and that any person who uses this range for

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Caranci v. Pillarisetty

    21 Mass. L. Rptr. 627 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 25, 2006

    The residents assert that they are public employees and thus are immune from suit under G.L.c. 258, §2. … Subparts B and C of Part II provide that the University is to ensure that residents are properly qualified, licensed, and insured against liability, and “shall establish and implement personnel and institutional policies,

    Cited 1 timesPublished

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