Case law

Sico v. City of Cambridge

1 Mass. L. Rptr. 13 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 13, 1993

Cambridge has now moved for summary judgment under Mass.R.Civ.P. 56, on the grounds that (1) it is immune from suit because the alleged negligent conduct falls within the discretionary function exception of the Massachusetts … First, no “statute, regulation, or established agency practice prescribes a course of action,” Wheeler, supra at 38 , that Cambridge must follow in designing its playgrounds or their safety features.

LaFleur v. Cicconi

13 Mass. L. Rptr. 647 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 13, 2001

If the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts establishing the existence of a material fact in order to defeat the motion. … other than reimbursement for actual expenses, as an officer, director or trustee of any non-profit charitable organization including those corporations qualified under 26 USC Section 501 (c)(3) shall be liable for any civil

Dupre v. Falcone

3 Mass. L. Rptr. 388 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 22, 1995

Plaintiffs claim that the liquor license for the Heritage Lounge should not have been renewed is clearly barred by this new exception to the Tort Claims Act. 4 B. … A public employee is immune from liability for negligent acts performed while acting within the scope of his employment. G.L.c. 258, §2.

Town of Natick v. Modern Continental Construction

8 Mass. L. Rptr. 524 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 15, 1998

facility and seating, and clearly invites members of the public to eat what they buy right there on the premises. … The pavilion does not qualify as a “take out” establishment.

Cambridge Place Investment Management, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co.

32 Mass. L. Rptr. 1 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 23, 2014

Documents that A has prepared in anticipation of the litigation would be within the qualified immunity in his own suit but would be freely discoverable by defendant on a subpoena duces tecum issued in connection with the … Cambridge Place and BLBG have the burden of establishing their entitlement to work product protection. Matter of the Reorg. of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. Ltd. (Bermuda), 425 Mass. 419, 421 (1997).

Rich v. Rich

28 Mass. L. Rptr. 553 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 8, 2011

Lesley Rich contends that the Wiretap Act does not apply here because emails and instant messages do not qualify as “wire communications.” … Lesley Rich is therefore immune from any liability based on these disclosures.

Marino v. Town Council

13 Mass. L. Rptr. 14 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 14, 2001

The Charter established a town council/town manager form of government. … But, the circumstances of the earlier petitions are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar, and estoppel will not lie. The first example (Plaintiffs’ Ex.

McLaughlin v. City of Lowell

8 Mass. L. Rptr. 343 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 3, 1998

Qualified Immunity The individual defendants maintain that summary judgment is required on the Section 1983 claim because of their qualified or good faith immunity as government officials. … In reviewing Section 1983 claims against government officials on summary judgment, trial courts are urged to determine whether the law allegedly violated “was clearly established at the time an action occurred.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Spencer

6 Mass. L. Rptr. 624 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 15, 1997

Where an individual commits a criminal act, that individual’s right to travel is qualified. Id. … Therefore, the tolling provision is rationally related to legitimate state interests and does not violate the defendant’s qualified right to travel.

Rodrigues v. Trafalgar House, Inc.

9 Mass. L. Rptr. 441 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 18, 1998

To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, based upon a handicap, the plaintiff must present credible evidence that (1) she is handicapped within the definition of C. 15 IB, (2) she is qualified to perform … Clearly, this amounts to a violation of the Standards of Conduct Policy where plaintiff knew she was cleared to return to work, and expected to be absent more than three days.

Auburndale Plaza, LLC ex rel. Gravestar, Inc. v. Sarni Cleaners of Framingham, Inc.

10 Mass. L. Rptr. 671 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 29, 1999

Getty Petroleum Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1164, 1180 (D.N.J. 1994) (“The expressed intent of the parties and the circumstances at the time of the Agreement clearly establish that the equipment was to be treated as ‘trade fixtures … As there are clearly material facts in dispute here, and each party has presented some evidence supporting its position, summary judgment as to these counts must be denied as the Kourouvacilis standard has not been satisfied

Chiao-Yun Ku v. Town of Framingham

15 Mass. L. Rptr. 758 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 27, 2003

These cases are distinguishable because Drake was clearly acting within the scope of his employment and “on behalf of the public employer.” This court concludes that the “public duty” rule is not applicable. III. … If there is a statute, regulation, or established agency practice then there is no discretion and the discretionary function exception is not applicable. See id.

National Private Truck Council v. Commissioner of Revenue

6 Mass. L. Rptr. 350 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 6, 1997

It was designed to “define clearly a lower limit for the exercise” of a state’s power to tax the local activities of foreign corporations, Heublein, 409 U.S. at 280 , 281 n.7, by defining what “minimum activities would not … Furthermore, P.L. 86-272 only provides immunity from net income taxes.

Welch v. Tellabs Operations, Inc.

14 Mass. L. Rptr. 44 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 24, 2001

Once the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 17 . … First, in an employment reference, a statement about a person’s performance is clearly a matter of opinion that depends on the demands of the job and the subjective standards of the employer. Flavia Bianci v.

Somers v. Converged Access, Inc.

23 Mass. L. Rptr. 511 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 23, 2008

“The term ‘age’ unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context, includes any duration of time since an individual’s birth of greater than forty years.” … Even giving Somers the benefit of the doubt and assuming he was qualified for the position, thereby meeting prong three, Somers fails to establish a prima facie case on the fifth prong.

Cataldo v. National Grid USA

23 Mass. L. Rptr. 493 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 15, 2008

“The work-product rule is not a privilege but a qualified immunity protecting from discovery documents and tangible things prepared by a party or his representative in anticipation of litigation.” … “In order to place documents under the mantle of Rule 26(b) (3) for work product protection, a proponent must establish that the documents satisfy three criteria.

Williams v. Brigham & Women's Hospital, Inc.

14 Mass. L. Rptr. 438 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 8, 2002

However, “[a] qualified or conditional privilege . . . immunizes a defendant from liability unless he or she acted with actual malice ... or unless there is unnecessary, unreasonable or excessive publication, and the plaintiff … Once a defendant has established that he or she had a qualified privilege to publish or write the defamatory statement, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the defendant abused the privilege.

Nordberg v. Massachusetts Department of Education

29 Mass. L. Rptr. 163 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 8, 2011

Earlier in this case, the Appeals Court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiffs claims on grounds of sovereign immunity (G.L.c. 258, § 10(b)) and failure to state a constitutional claim. Nordberg v. … The summary judgment record now establishes as fact those allegations upon which the Appeals Court relied.

Crosspoint Associates, Inc. v. Papas

3 Mass. L. Rptr. 62 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 7, 1994

Furthermore, defendants argue that notwithstanding their First Amendment immunity, plaintiff has failed to allege the required elements of its state common law/statutory claims. … Clearly, plaintiffs complaint argues that Emery knew that the Corps lacked jurisdiction and despite this knowledge proceeded to petition the Corps for relief.

Rouleau v. Maki Corp.

19 Mass. L. Rptr. 535 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 26, 2005

See Larkin , 405 Mass, at 181 (services contract alone insufficient to establish implied contract-based right to indemnification); Decker , 389 Mass, at 38 (sales agreement alone insufficient to establish implied contract-based … The plain language of the indemnity provision clearly evidences an intent on the part of the contracting parties that Bret was to indemnify Metrowest.