Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Carabetta v. Board of Appeals

    73 Mass. App. Ct. 266 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 4, 2008

    Ct. at 903 (if municipal zoning code purports to establish more generous zoning provisions than those contained in G. L. c. 40A, § 6, it must do so expressly). … There is no argument that lot 3 qualifies for relief under § 6. Neither the parties nor the judge directly address whether the lots maintained separate identities.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Patterson v. Liberty Mutual Insurance

    48 Mass. App. Ct. 586 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Feb 18, 2000

    That ruling was clearly erroneous and arbitrary. Only “documents included in the medical records” require objections at the conference level, 452 Code Mass. … Patterson makes no effort to demonstrate that the unintroduced reports would have qualified under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, see G.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Diemer

    57 Mass. App. Ct. 677 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 27, 2003

    Proponents of this view also cite the preamble to the treaty as “expressly disclaiming] the creation of any individual rights: ‘[T]he purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the … On redirect, the Commonwealth established that Hudson’s August statement to the police was consistent with his trial testimony.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Rass Corporation v. The Travelers Companies, Inc.

    90 Mass. App. Ct. 643 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 10, 2016

    To establish waiver, Rass must to demonstrate that the payment amounted to the intentional relinquishment of a known right. See Rotundi v. … Butler, 424 Mass. 413, 420 (1997) (judge's c. 93A findings will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous). c.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • South Street Nominee Trust v. Board of Assessors of Carlisle

    70 Mass. App. Ct. 853 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 19, 2007

    However, where, as here, the statutory language is not free of ambiguity, courts are bound to apply the “well-established principle that tax laws are to be strictly construed, and ambiguities in tax statutes are to be resolved … Although not expressly defined by the statute, “classification” is defined by a regulation to mean “the tax status attaching by operation of law to all land qualifying under [chapter 61,] which qualification is duly certified

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Harris-Lewis v. Mudge

    60 Mass. App. Ct. 480 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Feb 20, 2004

    essentially, that the case was complex and intricate, and no clear consensus existed among numerous expert consultants; and that Mudge’s decisions were appropriate and in accordance with the appropriate standard of care for qualified … And more specifically, Mudge had testified in the first trial that “in terms of the basis of information that I had about the cause of [Lewis’s] potential cardiomyopathy, [Lewis’s disclosure] clearly changed my understanding

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Terzian

    61 Mass. App. Ct. 739 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 31, 2004

    Here, clearly the first two requirements of the one-party exception were met. 6 The defendant finds issue with the third requirement. … From this evidence the motion judge could correctly conclude that the requisite organized crime nexus had been established.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Adoption of Cadence

    81 Mass. App. Ct. 162 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jan 24, 2012

    In making such an order, the judge may, among other options, “transfer temporary or permanent legal custody” to “any person . . . qualified to give care to the child.” Ibid. … The purpose of the home study is to guide the judge’s decision regarding whether the placement candidate is “qualified to give care to the child.” G. L. c. 119, § 26(h)(2)(i).

    Cited 45 timesPublished
  • City of Lynn v. Thompson

    50 Mass. App. Ct. 280 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 23, 2000

    . § 1983 (1994) establishes a remedy against anyone acting “under color of any statute, *287 ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” who violates the civil rights of any citizen or other person. … With regard to the taxpayer’s interest, there is no clearly defined, by statute or otherwise, strong public policy of not subjecting a municipality and its citizens to financial risk in circumstances such as these.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Innis v. Robertson

    67 Mass. App. Ct. 388 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 15, 2006

    One need not have obtained a judgment in order to qualify as a creditor for fraudulent conveyance purposes. See Shapiro, Perlin & Connors, Collection Law § 14:6 (3d ed. 2000). In Re Tracey, 88 B.R. 512, 517 (Bankr. D. … Nor are we persuaded by the defendants’ contention that the judge’s findings that George was insolvent at the time of the challenged conveyances, or that he would thereby be rendered insolvent, were clearly erroneous.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Chiaraluce v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Wareham

    89 Mass. App. Ct. 290 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 8, 2016

    We accept the facts as found by the trial judge, unless they are clearly erroneous, Colony of Wellfleet, Inc. v. Harris, 71 Mass. App. … On appeal to this court, we reversed, concluding that the locus did not qualify for grandfathering under § 6 because it lacked the requisite fifty feet of frontage. Nielsen v. Board of Appeals of Wareham, 69 Mass.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Butler

    90 Mass. App. Ct. 599 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 4, 2016

    “[T]he procedure used in this Commonwealth to choose jury panels from lists of qualified jurors is random selection. . . . … The defendant has not established that the judge abused his discretion. The defendant also did not establish that any particular group was underrepresented in the venire. 2.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Ocasio

    71 Mass. App. Ct. 304 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Feb 29, 2008

    While he was clearly at the threshold of the apartment, the record contains no evidence of any protest or objection, despite the fact that not one, but two searches occurred while he stood at the door. 6 He argues on appeal … As a result of his silence at the time of search, we need not address whether his status would have qualified him for the protection afforded a cotenant in Georgia v. Randolph, supra, if he had in fact objected.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Ramzi, Inc. v. Department of Public Health

    85 Mass. App. Ct. 353 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 28, 2014

    Upon entering into the vendor agreement, Ramzi became a qualified WIC *355 vendor and was authorized to sell WIC-approved items to WIC recipients according to the protocol set out in the vendor agreement. Ibid. … No pattern need be established to sustain a one-year suspension based on State agency vendor sanctions. See ibid:, 74 Fed. Reg. 551 -552.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Taunton Greyhound Ass'n v. State Racing Commission

    10 Mass. App. Ct. 297 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 18, 1980

    The principle of that case is that an agency cannot deviate from an established pattern of conduct with *303 out setting out the reasons for the deviation. … ]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate *307 local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • BREANA WILLIAMS v. JOHN HICKSON & Others.

    Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 14, 2023

    same, we nevertheless must adopt the judge's findings absent clear error, keeping in mind that "[i]n a bench trial[,] credibility is 'quintessentially the domain of the trial judge [so that her] assessment is close to immune … First, the judge clearly considered the plaintiff's donative intent when concluding that Sadie was a gift.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Rudow v. Fogel

    12 Mass. App. Ct. 430 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 17, 1981

    The plaintiff, a passenger in the car driven by her husband, brought an action against him for damages, and he defended on the ground of interspousal tort immunity. … Massachusetts is interested in establishing for its domiciliaries the obligations of family members to one another. New York has a similar interest for its *437 domiciliarles.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Connor v. Marriott International, Inc.

    Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 18, 2024

    The plaintiffs argue that because the hotel's supposed no solicitation policy was not "clearly and conspicuously posted," they were removed in violation of § 12B. … Tellingly, the bill in which these provisions were included was titled, "An act further establishing the rights of innkeepers." St. 2000, c. 167.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Perry

    65 Mass. App. Ct. 624 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 2, 2006

    Through cross-examination and argument, the defendant attempted to establish a defense of misidentification. … Requiring a period of commitment eliminates from consideration any prior offenses for which an otherwise qualifying prison term is suspended.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Calvanese v. WW Babcock Co., Inc.

    10 Mass. App. Ct. 726 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 21, 1980

    The final determination “must be largely left to the discretion of the trial judge, and that discretion will not be interfered with unless in its exercise he clearly appears to be wrong.” Griffin v. … The reports did not qualify as hospital records under G. L. c. 233, § 79. Nor were they business records under G. L. c. 233, § 78. Contrast Poirier v. Plymouth, 374 Mass. at 210-211 .

    Cited 15 timesPublished

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