Case law

Lynch v. Police Commissioner

43 Mass. App. Ct. 107 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 7, 1997

tjhere is no guarantee whatsoever, that if the number [of medallions] is increased ... a particular applicant would receive a medallion”; and, as Lynch recognizes, “the Commissioner has discretion ... to determine who is a qualified … There the court unambiguously “conclude[d] that the language of the statute [St. 1934, c. 280] clearly establishes that . . . the department is to determine the appropriate number of medallions to be issued according to the

Sheppard v. Zoning Board of Appeal of Boston

81 Mass. App. Ct. 394 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 7, 2012

Although there was a three-day bench trial, many of the key underlying facts were established by stipulation. … have a de minimis impact on the [plaintiffs’] view of the ocean,” and the judge had the benefit of taking a view, “we cannot conclude that [his] ultimate finding that the [plaintiffs] were not aggrieved persons . . . was clearly

Kenney v. Rust

17 Mass. App. Ct. 699 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 5, 1984

Whether they are so qualified is a preliminary question for the decision of the trial judge.” Willey v. Cafrella, 336 Mass. 623 (1958). See also Menici v. Orton Crane & Shovel Co., 285 Mass. 499, 503-505 (1934). … 1974). 8 The relevant portion of Mass.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2) states: “If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish

Timpson v. Transamerica Insurance

41 Mass. App. Ct. 344 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 19, 1996

In reviewing a grant for summary judgment, we determine “whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment … insured need not specifically intend or anticipate the full extent of the injury which ultimately results; rather the exclusion can apply where the insured should have known that some harm was likely to occur as a result of a clearly

Wynne v. Creigle

63 Mass. App. Ct. 246 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 14, 2005

Given these facts, it is manifest that the plaintiff could not establish the first of the conjunctive requirements — that the defendant’s petitioning was devoid of any reasonable factual or legal basis. Other issues. … Were we to consider the question, however, we are confident that the written statement would qualify under the principles recently discussed in Kobrin .

In re Robert Janocha's Case

93 Mass. App. Ct. 179 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 2, 2017

General Laws c. 152, § 65, establishes the trust fund as a State administered fund that compensates injured employees and reimburses insurers for payment of benefits under statutorily defined circumstances. … Section 65(2)( e ) conditions payment of benefits by the trust fund to a qualifying employee whose employer is "uninsured in violation of this chapter."

Cornell v. Michaud

79 Mass. App. Ct. 607 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 31, 2011

Roland next complains that the judge committed clear error in finding that the Cornells presented credible evidence sufficient to establish their standing to seek judicial review. … In order to qualify as a “person aggrieved,” one must assert “a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private property interest, or a private legal interest.” Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v.

Crown Electric Supply Co. v. State Office of Minority & Women Business Assistance Appeal Board

51 Mass. App. Ct. 753 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jun 4, 2001

. §§ 2.00 et seq. (1994), for purposes of qualifying for favorable treatment *754 in the award of contracts on capital facility projects under G. … L. c. 23A, unless a contrary intent is clearly indicated, “ ‘women business enterprise’, for the purpose [of] receipt of services from SOMWBA means a business enterprise that is both owned and controlled, by one or more women

Guardianship of Kelvin

94 Mass. App. Ct. 448 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 8, 2018

More specifically, if a judge "finds that a qualified person seeks appointment, venue is proper, the required notices have been given, the conditions of [§] 5- 204 (a) have been met, and the welfare and best interest of … Ct. 380, 383 (1995) ("ultimate determination of current parental unfitness does not clearly and convincingly follow from the cursory findings made, even when seen as not clearly erroneous and taken together as a whole

Holland v. BLH Electronics, Inc.

58 Mass. App. Ct. 678 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 31, 2003

sought to fill the plaintiff’s position by hiring someone else who was no more qualified than the plaintiff. … Foster had an unobstructed view of the plaintiffs workstation and could hear clearly what was said by Blair and the plaintiff.

In re Adoption of Jeanette

94 Mass. App. Ct. 1113 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 18, 2018

The judge's findings of fact "must be left undisturbed absent a showing that they are clearly erroneous." Adoption of Kimberly , 414 Mass. 526 , 529 (1993). Mother's unfitness and termination . … Jeanette's doctor noted that she was behind on immunizations and that she should begin early intervention services as soon as possible.

Care & Protection of Quinn

54 Mass. App. Ct. 117 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 6, 2002

Under ordinary circumstances, a decision not to postpone a normally scheduled trial, including a trial in a care and protection case, would be relatively immune from appellate second-guessing. … At the time of the order under review, long-term goals for the children had yet to be established.

Commonwealth v. Grant

73 Mass. App. Ct. 471 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jan 7, 2009

The judge found that “[t]he Commonwealth has not met its burden” of establishing that the defendant’s conduct “satisfies the dangerousness necessary for a commitment under G. L. [c.] 123A.” … The fact that the defendant committed only noncontact offenses does not immunize him from being classified as a sexually dangerous person. 13 One who, as a result of a mental abnormality or personality disorder, has repeatedly

LeBlanc v. Board of Appeals of Danvers

32 Mass. App. Ct. 760 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 7, 1992

The first zoning by-law of the town took effect on July 29, 1946, and established a minimum frontage requirement of eighty feet and a minimum area of 8,000 square feet in the district in which the lot is located. … The right exists even more clearly where without improvement the way is impassable and useless.” Guillet v. Livernois, 297 Mass. 337, 340 (1937).

Commonwealth v. Kartell

58 Mass. App. Ct. 428 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jun 30, 2003

[that it] tend[ed] to qualify, characterize or explain the underlying event,” i.e., the shooting. … This well-established rule is rooted in the constitutional principle that “criminal defendants [are guaranteed] ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” Crane v.

In re Boston Children's Service Ass'n

20 Mass. App. Ct. 566 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 12, 1985

Gean’s advice), that there be a clearly identifiable caretaker. The mother was awaiting trial on a capital offense, and her continued availability was uncertain. … That was before the father succeeded in establishing a home.

Commonwealth v. Medina

81 Mass. App. Ct. 525 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 4, 2012

The defendant argues that only a properly qualified expert is competent to give such testimony and that its erroneous admission created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. … The jury would not have applied this instruction to the defendant’s recorded statement where he clearly did not testify at trial.

Russell Block Associates v. Board of Assessors of Worcester

88 Mass. App. Ct. 351 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 16, 2015

Turning to the merits, the primary question in dispute is whether the garage qualified in part for residential classification. See G. … They are archetypical decisions of legislatures that, when expressed clearly, should not -- really cannot -- be subject to judicial second guessing.

Commonwealth v. Shagoury

6 Mass. App. Ct. 584 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 12, 1978

The judge may within his discretion admit a nonex-pert’s testimony on the value of an item once he has found that the witness is qualified so to testify due to his familiarity, knowledge and experience with the item. … The judge’s conclusion that Saunders was so qualified was not clearly erroneous, and he properly admitted Saunders’s testimony, leaving its weight to be determined by the jury. See Rubin v.

Cahaly v. Benistar Property Exchange Trust Co.

68 Mass. App. Ct. 668 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 17, 2007

This tax advantage required the plaintiffs to transfer their sale proceeds to an escrow account, qualified trust, or qualified intermediary pending their purchase of replacement property. … Paley and the plaintiffs were clearly adversarial parties at trial. As the trial judge has noted, Paley’s credibility is properly a matter for the jury to consider.