Case law

J.R. v. K.R.

Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 21, 2025

"Unless clearly erroneous, the trial judge's determination of value will stand." Fechtor v. Fechtor, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 859, 863 (1989). … Neither the husband nor the wife provided a qualified expert on business valuation; the husband's expert witness was not qualified to provide valuation of the 7- Eleven; and the wife's expert witness did not consider the

Bouley v. Reisman

38 Mass. App. Ct. 118 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Feb 3, 1995

“In testing the sufficiency of a change, we will read it as a whole ... to ascertain whether the judge has clearly, adequately, and correctly explained to the jury the principles that ought to guide and control their action … Reisman’s trial counsel established that Bouley’s attending physician after she left the emergency room was a Dr. Doshi. Through questions of the witness, Dr. Reisman’s lawyer tried to show that Dr.

Mari & Sons Flooring Co. v. Southeastern Massachusetts University Building Authority

3 Mass. App. Ct. 580 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 28, 1975

Section 17 of the act 3 establishing the Authority (St. 1964, c. 703, as amended) makes applicable to the Authority the competitive bidding statute (G. … The critical figure in the proposal form was clearly the “net contract sum” — the eventual contract price at which the lowest bidder was to undertake the carpeting.

Powers v. H.B. Smith Co.

42 Mass. App. Ct. 657 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 20, 1997

Contrary to Smith’s contention, our review of the record indicates that the plaintiff met his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination. … L. c. 15 IB (he was over the age of 40); (2) he was qualified for the position of quality control inspector; (3) he was terminated; and (4) a similarly or less qualified younger person was retained. 6 See Tardanico, supra

Allen v. Allen

86 Mass. App. Ct. 295 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 16, 2014

Harold argues that proper recording is not required for the July deed to be valid against Deborah because she qualifies both as the grantor's heir and as the grantor's devisee. … That result cannot be what the Legislature intended in establishing the recording system. See Ward v. Ward, 70 Mass. App.

Dodge v. Dodge

18 Mass. App. Ct. 940 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 3, 1984

Counsel for the husband ably argue that the New York rule of construction (the “New York rule”) as to which the trial judge instructed the jury should be qualified and applied only in certain contexts. … Parenthetically, the husband did not adduce evidence satisfying the New York standard that waiver must be clearly established and will not be inferred from equivocal acts, Carfi v.

Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n v. Board of Registration in Nursing

18 Mass. App. Ct. 380 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 18, 1984

. § 5.04 (1981) the board established “Criteria for Qualification of Continuing Education Programs/Offerings,” and at § 5.05 (1981) it established “Responsibility of Individual Licensee.” 7 MNA filed a complaint *383 in the … L. c. 112, § 74, see note 2, supra, are clearly met by §§ 5.04 and 5.05, which establish criteria for the approval of programs and a mechanism for verification of compliance by nurses with their continuing education obligations

Commonwealth v. Sullo

26 Mass. App. Ct. 766 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jan 18, 1989

Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 510 (1982). 6 The Commonwealth has not carried its burden of establishing that this was a lawful inventory search. … Ct. 581, 582 (1985). 2 Conley had very little experience with gambling offenses and did not qualify as an expert on gambling techniques or paraphernalia.

Miller v. Milton Hospital & Medical Center, Inc.

54 Mass. App. Ct. 495 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 12, 2002

In the medical peer review context, the court must first determine whether the records for which the privilege is claimed are on their face such as clearly fall within the privilege. See Carr v. … First, to the extent the December 12 letter qualifies as a peer review record, the defendants have not (contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention) “waived” the right to invoke the privilege by “disclosing” it to Dr.

Capitol Bank & Trust Co. v. Richman

19 Mass. App. Ct. 515 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 25, 1985

She also maintains that the contents of the guaranty should not have been established by secondary evidence. … We also reject Marilyn’s argument that the bank should be held to a standard of clear and convincing proof to establish the lost guaranty.

Champion v. Champion

54 Mass. App. Ct. 215 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 19, 2002

His finding is not clearly erroneous, and we are bound by it. See Sarrouf v. … Ct. 859, 863 *219 (1989) (“[u]nless clearly erroneous, the trial judge’s determination of value will stand”). 3. Income from the business.

City of Somerville v. Somerville Municipal Employees Ass'n

80 Mass. App. Ct. 686 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 25, 2011

The relevant question here, as first clearly formulated during oral argument, is whether Pefine received “salary or compensation for service rendered in any civil service position” in violation of G. L. c. 31, § 71. … in the state and local service, encouraging competition and offering an opportunity for all qualified persons to compete.’ ” Ibid., quoting from Sholock v.

Commonwealth v. Lahey

80 Mass. App. Ct. 606 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 12, 2011

Scores of cases establish the standard of review. The appellate court accepts the motion judge’s subsidiary findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. … We cannot reject those credibility determinations of subsidiary facts as clearly erroneous. *614 In turn, those findings establish, as an ultimate fact, the practical certainty of the discovery of the defendant by the Attleboro

Luyen Huu Nguyen v. University of Massachusetts

66 Mass. App. Ct. 276 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 11, 2006

The plaintiff “first learned that the Program had been established on or about April 11, 2000 — over two months after the application deadline — when he was given an envelope and a press release dated December 22, 1999, and … The candidates selected were far less qualified than the Plaintiffs.”

Creamer v. Arbella Ins. Grp.

95 Mass. App. Ct. 56 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 13, 2019

The initial release of the oil was accidental; it thus qualifies as an "occurrence" under the policy. See Trustees of Tufts Univ . v. Commercial Union Ins. … Contrary to the plaintiffs' assertions, the c. 21E claim clearly incorporated these factual allegations.

O'Brien v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

82 Mass. App. Ct. 905 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 25, 2012

First, there clearly is evidence that O’Brien’s chronic pain constitutes a physical impairment. … MIT did not argue, and the motion judge did not reach the question, whether O’Brien could make out the second element of his prima facie case, establishing that he is a qualified handicapped person.

Commonwealth v. Labbe

6 Mass. App. Ct. 73 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Feb 28, 1978

There, it was held that the evidence established nothing more than opportunity. … After the wife first asserted the privilege, the judge inquired to establish whether she would do so in all instances, and then he excused her as a witness.

COMMONWEALTH v. DOMINIC SHINER.

101 Mass. App. Ct. 206 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jun 15, 2022

We therefore caution future litigants against seeking to rely on lay demonstrations in place of duly qualified expert testimony. … [Note Dissent-2] Daley obviously was not qualified as an expert, and neither the Commonwealth nor the majority contends otherwise.

Wynne v. Creigle

63 Mass. App. Ct. 246 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 14, 2005

Given these facts, it is manifest that the plaintiff could not establish the first of the conjunctive requirements — that the defendant’s petitioning was devoid of any reasonable factual or legal basis. Other issues. … Were we to consider the question, however, we are confident that the written statement would qualify under the principles recently discussed in Kobrin .

Commonwealth v. Caldwell

25 Mass. App. Ct. 91 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 19, 1987

L. c. 60B, § 2(0, the city must credit one-half of the amount collected to the municipal waterways *94 improvement and maintenance fund, established by G. L. c. 40, § 5(72). … Given the essence of the harbormaster’s function, the flow of benefits to the group of boaters required to pay is “sufficiently particularized” to qualify it as a fee.