Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
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Davidson v. General Motors Corp.
57 Mass. App. Ct. 637 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 25, 2003
The plaintiffs claim that once the new closely held corporation was established, GM/MHD had a fiduciary duty toward them. The motion judge agreed. … of their conclusory nature, support an inference that GM/MHD failed to act with good faith and deal fairly with the plaintiffs. 9 The structure created by the parties to govern their relationship in this new enterprise clearly
Cited 22 timesPublished48 Mass. App. Ct. 573 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Feb 18, 2000
If it is determined that the violation was “willful . . . , the violator shall not be entitled to claim any privilege absolute or qualified,” and he shall be liable for actual damages and exemplary damages. … The plaintiff also argues that without a grant of immunity, interrogation in a lie detector test would violate the plaintiff’s privilege against self-incrimination, citing Attorney Gen. v.
Reversed by Bellin v. Kelley, 435 Mass. 261 (2001)Cited 4 timesPublishedCambridge Housing Authority v. Civil Service Commission
7 Mass. App. Ct. 586 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 17, 1979
The board clearly has the right to abolish a position it finds to be unnecessary and uneconomical. … Although the hearing officer concluded that "the evidence does not establish a quantum of bad faith, which, in itself, is sufficient to invalidate” the board’s action, see Murray v.
Cited 25 timesPublishedBristol Asphalt Co., Inc. v. Rochester Bituminous Products, Inc.
Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 28, 2023
for nonsham litigation1 (which, I note, is in any event an immunity from liability, not suit). … In Wenger, for example, the Supreme Judicial Court clearly applied a de novo standard of review in holding, as a matter of law, that two counts of a plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed under the anti-SLAPP statute, because
Cited 0 timesPublished104 N.E.3d 685 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jun 28, 2018
We conclude that the judge's finding that the Schwarz loan was Vona's personal obligation was not clearly erroneous. c. Equalization of preacquisition capital contributions . … In Vona's view, the only qualified expert was his expert, and the judge's rejection of his opinion was clearly erroneous.
Cited 0 timesPublished69 Mass. App. Ct. 720 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 14, 2007
Given that broad definition, perhaps the notice qualifies. But the question then becomes “an admission of what?” … Accordingly, even if the notice qualifies as an admission, it does not advance Beach’s claim against Commerce.
Cited 1 timesPublishedHickey v. Commissioner of Public Welfare
38 Mass. App. Ct. 259 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 16, 1995
To qualify as loans, however, there needed to be a document, signed by the borrower and expressing the borrower’s intent to repay. Ibid. … Hickey’s catalog of failings harp on such matters as a failure to distinguish clearly betwen SSI and SSDI and whether Hickey ever said that motels were a satisfactory place to live (she did not).
Cited 13 timesPublishedBoston Bicycle Couriers, Inc. v. Deputy Director of the Division of Employment & Training
56 Mass. App. Ct. 473 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 18, 2002
To establish the latter and qualify under the § 2(c) independent contractor standard, the insignia must be that of a freestanding, independent entrepreneurial business in which the worker has a proprietary interest. … Thus, a driver’s ‘business’ was not established ‘independently’ of AFM.
Cited 23 timesPublished80 Mass. App. Ct. 348 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 6, 2011
Ct. 58, 59-62 (1987), this court held that the plaintiffs’ decedent qualified as a worker jointly employed by two employers, and that the decedent’s worker’s compensation coverage provided both employers with immunity from … The evidence established that PPM and Sarcia were undertaking the Ipswich project jointly. 6 In instances of symbiotic *356 business arrangements, the trend of courts is “to dispose of close cases, not by insisting on an
Cited 6 timesPublished54 Mass. App. Ct. 276 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 21, 2002
The Commonwealth argues this statement was clearly erroneous. … was not clearly erroneous.
Cited 25 timesPublished71 Mass. App. Ct. 81 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jan 25, 2008
He alleges that (a) his constitutional right to travel under the privileges and immunities clause was violated because he was not treated as a welcome visitor; and (b) his right to be free from cruel and usual punishment … L. c. 6, § 178C, lists all of the Massachusetts crimes which qualify as “sex offenses,” and which, therefore, require prehearing registration.
Cited 15 timesPublished87 Mass. App. Ct. 10 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jan 14, 2015
This court held that the inability to join the United States as a party was not fatal because the Wampanoag Tribe had waived sovereign immunity in matters concerning the land at issue and could be sued directly. … set-off of lots 1-173, which was recorded at the Dukes County registry of deeds in book 49, page 1. 7 See St. 1869, c. 463, § 1 (granting the "Indians" within the Commonwealth "all the rights, privileges and immunities
Reversed by Kitras v. Town of Aquinnah, 474 Mass. 132 (2016)Cited 2 timesPublishedCahaly v. Benistar Property Exchange Trust Co.
85 Mass. App. Ct. 418 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jun 6, 2014
In so doing, we accept the judge’s findings of fact as true unless they are clearly erroneous. … trust, or with a qualified intermediary.
Cited 2 timesPublished85 Mass. App. Ct. 408 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jun 4, 2014
A result of .08 percent, if credited by the factfinder, establishes guilt of OUI. G. L. c. 90, § 24(l)(a)(l), first par. Motion to suppress. … Concomitantly or independently, it may offer into evidence a properly qualified breathalyzer reading of .08 or higher. If the factfinder accepts the reading, it establishes per se the crime. See Commonwealth v.
Cited 15 timesPublished88 Mass. App. Ct. 28 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 13, 2015
The judge held that Jamie failed to establish that a mistake was made in the formation of the IRA. We review the propriety of that decision. … Mazzarella, 430 Mass. 248, 250 (1999) (trust language indicated settlor's intent to qualify for marital deduction); Grassian v.
Cited 6 timesPublished30 Mass. App. Ct. 596 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 16, 1991
This omission is not fatal where the ultimate conclusion is clearly evident from the record and implicit in the denial of the motion. See Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 392 Mass. 583 , 586 n.2 (1984). … “To qualify as exigent circumstances, the situation facing the officers at the time they commenced their warrantless search must be such that it was impracticable for them to get a warrant.” Commonwealth v.
Cited 43 timesPublishedCity Welding & Manufacturing Co. v. Gidley-Eschenheimer Corp.
16 Mass. App. Ct. 372 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 18, 1983
Not only was the causal relationship established, but we think the quantification of profits was not so speculative or uncertain as to preclude their recovery. See Neal v. … The implicit findings of the judge that GE was legally liable to Fontaine and that the amount of the judgment was reasonable were not clearly erroneous. 4. Oral statements.
Cited 18 timesPublishedMassachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 16, 2015
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that each of the three qualifying acts was maliciously intended, defined by G. … The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that each of the three qualifying acts was maliciously intended, defined by G.
Cited 0 timesPublished59 Mass. App. Ct. 457 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 30, 2003
Our court held otherwise, holding that “[u]nder § 6, issuance alone qualifies a special permit as a prior nonconforming use. . . . … [Section 6] clearly establishes that issuance of a special permit marks the beginning of protection as a prior nonconforming use from subsequent zoning changes.” Id. at 118-119.
Cited 5 timesPublished60 Mass. App. Ct. 225 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 29, 2003
criminal liability that a reasonable person in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true; and (3) the statement, if offered to exculpate the accused, is corroborated by circumstances clearly … Perez, 437 Mass. 186, 187-189 (2002), the appeal of a codefendant in this case convicted of being an accessory after the fact. 2 The unavailability of the declarant was established.
Cited 4 timesPublished
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