Case law

Coughlin v. Department of Correction

43 Mass. App. Ct. 809 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 14, 1997

He took the position that these decisions “clearly involve policymaking, a function which has largely been delegated to the executive branch.” “In Harry Stoller & Co. v. … If the allegedly tortious action was prescribed by statute or regulation, or established agency practice, then the governmental actor had no discretion to exercise, and § 10(6) immunity would not apply. Ibid.

Schleissner v. Town of Provincetown

27 Mass. App. Ct. 392 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 30, 1989

Bank, 395 Mass. 614, 621-622, 623-624 (1985), is not clearly erroneous. … However, “historically, municipalities have not been immune from liability for creating or maintaining a private nuisance . . .

Drivas v. Barnett

24 Mass. App. Ct. 750 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 30, 1987

It has been held that a witness who has been qualified as an expert “may base his opinion upon facts observed by himself or within his own knowledge and testified to by himself or upon facts assumed in the questions put to … L. c. 258, § 10(¿>), established for discretionary functions.

Abdul-Alázim v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Cedar Junction

56 Mass. App. Ct. 449 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 15, 2002

In light of this result, and the fact that the judge did not find the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, we need not reach the plaintiff’s claim that he was wrongfully denied discovery with respect to the determination … whether such immunity would be conferred.

Cooney v. Department of Mental Retardation

52 Mass. App. Ct. 378 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 27, 2001

L. c. 19C, § 1, arid upon the immunity from civil liability provided by G. … First, she claims that Campbell did not establish that she was a mandated reporter with consequent *388 immunity from liability for the reporting of abuse.

Cooper v. Richter

8 Mass. App. Ct. 878 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 13, 1979

Berkowitz’s career as a general practitioner would not qualify him to express the opinions” sought by plaintiffs’ counsel (compare DeJesus v. … We think that any prejudicial effect created by the remark was clearly overcome by the rest of the charge.

Mendez v. M.S. Walker, Inc.

26 Mass. App. Ct. 431 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 4, 1988

Abuse of the *433 privilege, they were instructed, could consist of deliberate falsehoods or rash or reckless statements. “ [T]he law does not protect one or give a qualified immunity if a defendant does not have reasonable … Here, clearly, it did hot. Recklessness can also be shown by a failure to verify in *434 circumstances where verification is practical and the matter is sufficiently weighty to call for safeguards against error.

Patterson v. Christ Church

85 Mass. App. Ct. 157 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 3, 2014

Consequently, the defendants are entitled to immunity from the negligence claims as a matter of law under G. L. c. 21, § 17C. 8 2. … Indeed, if this were true, any lessor who qualified for protection but earned an economic benefit from the lease would be barred from asserting the statute as a defense.

Kewley v. Department of Elementary and Secondary Education

86 Mass. App. Ct. 154 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 22, 2014

Substantive due process requires the government to establish a rational basis for the deprivation or the diminution of such licensure. See Williamson v. … Wachusett's exercise of that lawful discretionary authority (by the school committee or administrators) is immune from any requested affirmative injunctive order compelling the issuance of a contract to Kewley.

Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo

54 Mass. App. Ct. 363 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 1, 2002

The ruling was consistent with the judge’s finding at a pretrial voir dire that the statement qualified as an excited utterance. … Hence he was given immunity shortly before the date of trial. Called by the Commonwealth, Greene gave extended testimony, in part as a declared hostile witness.

Hopkins v. Medeiros

48 Mass. App. Ct. 600 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Feb 24, 2000

Hopkins qualifies as a rescuer. Hopkins was present at the melee because of his fellow officers’ emergency call. … Ct. 382, 388 (1981) (police officer whose negligence allegedly injured fellow officer not immune from suit; no comparable provision in c. 41 analogous to immunity of coemployees in c. 152 of workers’ compensation act). 16

Ossinger v. City of Newton

26 Mass. App. Ct. 831 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jan 30, 1989

We need not stop to consider whether the mayor, in respect to his acts as such, might claim an immunity from liability, if a claim against him were otherwise supported. 6 *836 3. … Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-710 (1976). 6 For immunity to attach the official’s action must not have violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Hudson v. Commissioner of Correction

46 Mass. App. Ct. 538 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 29, 1999

In any event, since the protective order was sought and granted in connection with the defendants’ defense of qualified immunity from suit as well as from liability, its allowance in this procedural context was well within … (a) discretionary and (b) did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Massachusetts Highway Department v. Perini Corp.

79 Mass. App. Ct. 430 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 9, 2011

On the contrary, *438 the record clearly establishes that the parties raised with the DRB the issue regarding the significance of the interim funding for purposes of preaward and postaward interest, and we read the DRB’s … Sovereign immunity. CA/T also raised before the motion judge the defense of sovereign immunity, arguing that it did not consent to pay postaward interest as part of an arbitration award.

Ford v. Town of Grafton

44 Mass. App. Ct. 715 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 8, 1998

L. c. 258, § 10(h), (/), provides immunity to the town. … Moreover, even if the evidence established such a custom or policy, it would not necessarily establish the town’s intent to discriminate against women and/or victims of domestic violence.

Cohasset Heights, Ltd. v. Zoning Board of Appeals

53 Mass. App. Ct. 116 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 29, 2001

A judge of the Land Court ruled that the permit thus did not qualify as a prior nonconforming use. We reverse and hold that under G. … It clearly establishes that issuance of a special permit marks the beginning of protection as a prior nonconforming use from subsequent zoning changes.

Jewish Geriatric Services, Inc. v. Board of Assessors of Longmeadow

61 Mass. App. Ct. 73 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 30, 2004

To qualify for the exemption, taxpayer organizations bear the burden of establishing “clearly and unequivocally,” Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. … Given the current statutory framework and the facts presented in this case, we uphold the board’s ruling that Ruth’s House does not serve a charitable purpose and thus does not clearly and unequivocally qualify for a property

Commonwealth v. Starkus

69 Mass. App. Ct. 326 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jun 13, 2007

Victim’s statements to qualified examiners. … The victim’s statements, describing her own experience, clearly constitute independently admissible *338 evidence and, therefore, may properly be relied upon by a qualified examiner to render an opinion.

Lee v. President & Fellows of Harvard College

60 Mass. App. Ct. 836 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 20, 2004

For purposes of establishing a triable claim of age discrimination under G. … decision; and that the employer sought to replace him with a younger person who was no more qualified than the plaintiff.

Moncy v. Planning Board

50 Mass. App. Ct. 715 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jan 19, 2001

Bangs qualified to render an opinion on the legal status of Bates Lane. … “It is settled that whether a witness offered as an expert is qualified to give an opinion, rests very largely in the discretion of the presiding judge whose decision will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous as matter