Case law

Adams v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board

414 Mass. 360 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 19, 1993

To qualify for accidental disability retirement benefits under G. … The second ground on remand relied upon by CRAB, see note 4, supra, expressed its view that *365 the plaintiff had not clearly proved causation.

Commonwealth v. Carr

373 Mass. 617 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 9, 1977

Densmore, 12 Allen 535 (1866), to extend the exception to a declaration against penal interest, the court refused, id. at 537, but without attempting to justify the difference thus established. … After laying down the threshold definition that a statement, to qualify for admission, must have tended so far to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable man in the declarant’s position would not have

In re the Trusts Under the Will of Crabtree

440 Mass. 177 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 16, 2003

To the extent that the judge harbored doubt as to the fair value of the trustees’ services, 23 or doubt whether they had carried out their fiduciary duties to effectuate the will of the settlor, which he clearly did, it was … See id. at 665 (where “the beneficiaries [had united] on a qualified trustee ... [it was] arbitrary and capricious action and an abuse of discretion for the court to appoint a stranger”).

In the Matter of Amendment to Sjc Rule 3: 07

398 Mass. 73 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 16, 1986

interests of lawyers, many lawyers believe that solicitation is an inherently undignified and unseemly practice, but others suggest that this is an antiquated and elitist notion that serves only to perpetuate the status of an established … associate or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm from requesting referrals from a lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association or from cooperating with any other qualified

State Board of Retirement v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board

342 Mass. 58 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 10, 1961

He was discharged from the hospital on July 30, “unable to speak clearly” and “to use his left eye. ’ ’ He had difficulty walking. The doctors advised him “to have complete rest at home.” … Sprague, a well qualified cardiologist associated with the Harvard Medical School and the Massachusetts General Hospital, testified in effect that it is totally unknown to medical science what causes a thrombos to form in

Commonwealth v. Hussey (No. 1)

410 Mass. 664 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 15, 1991

These statements are not enough to qualify as the invocation of a right to cut off questioning. See Commonwealth v. … Brad- *672 show, supra at 265 (defendant’s words, “I don’t want to talk,” were insufficient to establish an assertion of his right to halt further questioning when, without any more encouragement than the question, “And then

Commonwealth v. Appleby

380 Mass. 296 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 1, 1980

We have already said that an assault with a dangerous weapon coupled with slight, intentional touching can qualify for assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon under G. L. c. 265, § 15A. … Farrell involved a female victim who had gone to a hotel room with the defendant, apparently for the purpose of having sexual intercourse, although this is not clearly stated in the review of the evidence.

Lovely v. Gill

245 Mass. 577 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 11, 1923

But on unreported evidence the master finds that this was done as a matter of practice and not as matter of agreement, and no implied contract has been established. … [the city], to agree upon the terms of employment, compensation of employees, and working hoars ” and other conditions, as established by their union.

Commonwealth v. Valentin

470 Mass. 186 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 8, 2014

To establish a claim of constitutional ineffectiveness, the defendant must establish that his  7 attorney's performance fell "below an objective standard … Both of these cases are consistent with an understanding that constructive denials of counsel rising to a level of structural error occur only where the defendant essentially is denied the assistance of any qualified

Green v. Putnam

62 Mass. 21 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 15, 1851

There can be no doubt, therefore, that this vote did operate as a grant of a qualified right to the premises in question, which was valid and effectual as against a subsequent purchaser, and subject to which the owner of … It follows, that the use of stone for building purposes, without the limits of Worcester by inhabitants of other towns, is clearly a violation of the right; and so far as the defendant has procured stone for such purposes

Massachusetts Oilheat Council v. Department of Public Utilities

418 Mass. 798 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 14, 1994

The statute clearly authorizes the use of special contracts for the sale of gas on terms different from the terms contained in the schedule of rates currently in effect. … The standards require that, in order to qualify for a negotiated rate, a noncore energy customer must have annual energy requirements of at least 30,000 million British thermal units and must have a bona fide energy alternative

Courier Citizen Co. v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation

358 Mass. 563 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 20, 1971

However, to qualify for such exclusion, the machinery must be used directly in one of the specified activities listed above in connection with the exclusion of materials, tools and fuel. . . . … however, third sentence of fn. 6, supra) and even though the "incidence” of the tax (despite its reimbursement to the registered vendor) has been ruled to be on the registered vendor, at least in situations where Federal immunity

Town of Harvard v. Maxant

360 Mass. 432 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 9, 1971

The defendant next argues that his use of the private landing strip is lawful because it qualifies as “customarily incidental” to the residential use of the property. … The use must be further scrutinized to determine *439 whether it has commonly, habitually and by long practice been established as reasonably associated with the primary use. . . .

Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney General

377 Mass. 37 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 8, 1979

Fraudulent misrepresentations as to cost of gas cannot become immune from suit by virtue of department promulgation of rates in reliance thereon. … The Legislature clearly never intended such a result when it enacted c. 164.

Hensley v. Attorney General Allen v. Attorney General

474 Mass. 651 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 6, 2016

medical marijuana law, the phrase "medical use of marijuana" is defined in such a way that it refers to the activities of medical marijuana treatment centers, and not just to "use" in the colloquial sense of consumption by qualifying … processing (including development of related products such as food, tinctures, aerosols, oils, or ointments), transfer, transportation, sale, distribution, dispensing, or administration of marijuana, for the benefit of qualifying

Goodman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.

412 Mass. 807 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 10, 1992

We conclude that the record in this case does not permit an informed resolution whether the leak in question was abrupt, and therefore, does not establish enough facts to warrant decision of the “suddenness” issue. … The expert’s observations provide nothing which clearly explains the source of the hole in Tank No. 2, or whether the release of pollutants came about as the result of a condition that developed so rapidly it could properly

Commonwealth v. Pezzano

387 Mass. 69 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 4, 1982

That is not a relaxation of the established and constitutional method of examination of witnesses before the grand jury but a part of it” (citation omitted). Lebowitch, petitioner, 235 Mass. 357, 362 (1920). … At the same time, though, we have indicated clearly that the limits of such flexibility are reached where a proposed change, expeditious as it may appear to be, impinges on the fundamental considerations behind the secrecy

North American Expositions Co. v. Corcoran

452 Mass. 852 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 7, 2009

Such a claim is clearly without merit. Cf. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc., 376 Mass. 313, 327-328 (1978). … We decline to uphold a fee award only if it is clearly erroneous. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 400 Mass. 272, 274 (1987).

Commonwealth v. Valiton

432 Mass. 647 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 17, 2000

Second, the Legislature recently established provisions in G. L. c. 90 that apply specifically to children under the age of eighteen years. See G. … BCAA also clearly meets the expansive definition of “program” under G.

Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Assessors of Boston

315 Mass. 712 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 28, 1944

The general findings of the board are explained and qualified and may be controlled by findings of specific or subsidiary facts, which the board made in considerable detail. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation v. J. … It will be recognized only where the property falls clearly and unmistakably within the express words of a legislative command. Redemptorist Fathers v. Boston, 129 Mass. 178, 180 . Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v.