Case law

Century Cab Inc. v. Commissioner of Insurance

327 Mass. 652 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 31, 1951

In our opinion there was no failure to comply with the provision of the statute that the notice should include “a schedule clearly and precisely setting forth the premium charges proposed to be fixed and established for the … cannot be held that the new classification created by the rating plan was so lacking in reason as to be beyond the statutory power *663 of the commissioner, or that he was not warranted in finding that the experience of the qualified

Newell v. Department of Mental Retardation

446 Mass. 286 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 20, 2006

In light of the conflicting evidence we cannot conclude that the judge’s finding was clearly erroneous. … The e-mail establishes nothing more than what the transcript of the March 29 hearing establishes, i.e., that the ISP service coordinator made certain representations to the judge at the March 29 hearing about the April 30

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 3974 v. Sex Offender Registry Board

457 Mass. 53 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 4, 2010

Foremost among them is that the Legislature clearly intended that the board classify incarcerated sex offenders. G. L. c. 6, §§ 178E (a), 178L (1) (a). … To the contrary, the Legislature has established a flexible classification scheme.

Opinion of Justices to the Senate

303 Mass. 615 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 1, 1939

of the members of any of said boards may be members of the General Court and,all of them shall be residents of the respective counties for which they are chosen, and that the Governor shall make appointments of persons qualified … But for the establishment of boards of special commissioners they would have the duty of dividing the counties into representative districts.

In re Brown

427 Mass. 146 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 24, 1998

Any discourtesy to NAGE, Lyons, and Lyons’s family was clearly within the scope of Canon 3 (A) (3). … Second, Justice Brown argues that his comments are immunized from discipline because they derived from his knowledge of National Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 38 Mass. App.

Cahaly v. Benistar Property Exchange Trust Co.

451 Mass. 343 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 8, 2008

In order to take advantage of this rule, the funds must be transferred to an escrow account, qualified trust, or qualified intermediary pending the purchase of replacement property. … Benistar Trust advertised itself as a “qualified intermediary” under § 1031.

Phillips v. Eastern Railroad

138 Mass. 122 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 3, 1884

corporation may and shall apply “ the net earnings of said property in the manner provided in the thirteenth and fourteenth sections of said act, and shall make therefrom the payments therein provided to the sinking-fund therein established … We understand the words “ needful to maintain its road and equipment in good condition ” to relate to and qualify the words immediately preceding, namely, “ renewals and repairs,” and not to reach back so as to qualify the

Clerk of Superior Court for County of Middlesex v. Treasurer & Receiver General

386 Mass. 517 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 21, 1982

These funds are then transferred electronically to a central bank account established by the Treasurer, who has established and maintains an accounting system with the capabilities of segregating and recording the various … Clearly, the plaintiffs are State officials, as shown by the application of several relevant statutes. G. L. c. 221, §§ 12, 14, 94. G. L. c. 29A, § 1. G. L. c. 211B, § 9. G. L. c. 35, §§ 22, 23.

Maddocks v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board

369 Mass. 488 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 7, 1976

Groups 3 and 4 are clearly inapplicable to the plaintiff and the present inquiry, therefore, centers around Groups 1 and 2. … The plaintiff must fall into Group 1 if she does not qualify for a Group 2 classification.

Hutcheson v. Director of Civil Service

361 Mass. 480 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 31, 1972

Thus the present situation is that there is no "absolute preference" of qualified veterans over qualified nonveterans. … Clearly that statement is intended to apply only to that part of G.L.c. 31, § 23, providing that "[a] disabled veteran shall be appointed and employed in preference to all other persons, including veterans."

Town of Petersham v. Commissioner of Revenue

391 Mass. 136 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 13, 1984

L. c. 58, § 10B, is necessarily qualified by the requirements set forth in G. … These cases are clearly distinguishable, since both turned on a failure of the appellant to request findings and a report. It is not necessary that we have findings and a report in this case.

Commonwealth v. Arrington

455 Mass. 437 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 7, 2009

At the time she gave her testimony, Mann clearly was medicated, and the prosecutor requested leeway from the judge to lead the witness, which was allowed. … This same testimony would be offered by the Commonwealth at trial to establish that the defendant had committed assault and battery on Mann.

Kelley v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board

341 Mass. 611 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 6, 1961

The ground for dismissing the appeal was that, as was established at the hearing, a medical panel had not certified that the disability was service connected. This was ruled a condition precedent to retirement under G. … The case holds that the test is incapacity for the position or work of a similar nature for which the employee is qualified. There was therefore a mistake of law underlying the negative certificate.

Department of Public Welfare v. Anderson

377 Mass. 23 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 4, 1979

L. c. 197, § 9, nor does it clearly indicate whether the obligation held by the Commonwealth is of the deceased or of the estate. … We must therefore determine whether the immunity enjoyed by the Commonwealth from statutes of limitation includes immunity from the constraints of G. L. c. 197, § 9.

Commonwealth v. Chase

385 Mass. 461 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 2, 1982

This requirement of some scienter on the part of the defendant immunizes the statute from due process challenge. Just as the Commonwealth must prove parenthood beyond a reasonable doubt, Commonwealth v. … The Legislature has clearly provided, by § 16, that a judge may impose pendente lite orders after an initial adjudication of paternity under either § 12 or § 15.

Bullard v. Chandler

5 L.R.A. 104 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 25, 1889

It must be held, not as a limitation subsequently made, and therefore repugnant to the gift, but as a limitation to the gift as made, and thus qualifying and defining it. All to which *537 Mr. … The charity intended by the testatrix was clearly specified.

Cutler v. Tufts

20 Mass. 272 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1825

And if it is so, then most clearly, by reason as well as by the authorities, the latter clause ought to be rejected. 1 It is not an explanation, but a direct contradiction. … This point has been well argued by counsel exceedingly well qualified to manage a technical combat of this nature.

In re a Grand Jury Subpoena

430 Mass. 590 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 20, 2000

Ct. 290, 296 (1993) (“The role of lawyer does not constitute a cloak of immunity against subpoena”). … as a child, and who qualifies as a “parent.”

Commonwealth v. Carr

373 Mass. 617 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 9, 1977

Densmore, 12 Allen 535 (1866), to extend the exception to a declaration against penal interest, the court refused, id. at 537, but without attempting to justify the difference thus established. … After laying down the threshold definition that a statement, to qualify for admission, must have tended so far to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable man in the declarant’s position would not have

Flannery v. McNamara

432 Mass. 665 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 21, 2000

“The first type occurs when a will clearly describes a person or thing, and two or more persons or things *669 exactly fit that description. … Svenson, supra at *670 275 (extrinsic evidence inadmissible when offered to prove testatrices intended the term “heirs,” as used in their wills, not to include specific individual who qualified legally as heir).