Case law

Attorney General v. Campbell

191 Mass. 497 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 16, 1906

Willard’s successor, and he duly qualified and entered upon the duties of the office. … By the St. 1859, c. 196, the Superior Court was established to take the place of the Court of Common Pleas throughout the Commonwealth.

Mann v. Board of Assessors

387 Mass. 35 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 3, 1982

L. c. 61A, §§ 1 through 7), and provides that a board of assessors shall disallow an application for such classification if, in its judgment, the land does not qualify. G. L. c. 61A, § 9. … The Act clearly provides that the FVAC guidelines are some evidence of use value. G. L. c. 61 A, § 10.

Burnham v. Mark IV Homes, Inc.

387 Mass. 575 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 5, 1982

trial, Mark IV took the position that the transactions and actions complained of by the plaintiffs occurred primarily and substantially in New Hampshire, where Kapper’s dealership was located, and that Mark IV therefore was immune … This was clearly not an instruction that the jury should find in an amount that would enable the plaintiffs to replace the roofs.

Martinez v. Commissioner of Public Welfare

397 Mass. 386 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 22, 1986

To qualify for AFDC, an applicant must meet the categorical and financial eligibility requirements established by the department. See Civetti v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 392 Mass. 474 , 476 n.4 (1984). … The amount of aid to be received is a matter which the statute clearly leaves to the department.

In re the Discipline of an Attorney

442 Mass. 660 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 13, 2004

Indeed, the fire marshal’s ability to conduct fair and informed fire investigations clearly is in a gas utility company’s, and the public’s, interest. … We decline to construe this right so as to immunize every written or oral statement made by an attorney in connection with an issue being litigated in a civil suit because such a broad reading would preclude enforcement of

Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc.

426 Mass. 122 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 12, 1997

The plaintiff began his employment with the defendant on October 12, 1987, and by all accounts, he was a good employee and was qualified for his position. … The defendant was warranted in taking into account the extent to which the time card completion policies and the stealing policies had been clearly established and promulgated at the times of the employees’ respective offenses

Commonwealth v. Lussier

364 Mass. 414 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 18, 1973

Instead, we think that another well established principle governs the disposition of this case: “A jury may find a crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt even though the inference of guilt from the facts established is not … Butera, 420 F. 2d 564 (1970), arguably to the contrary, is clearly distinguishable.

Putnam v. Longley

28 Mass. 488 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 14, 1831

So, on the other side, the cases clearly show, that as a general rule, when a partnership has been proved, a demand upon one is a demand upon all, notice to one is notice to all, and an admission or acknowledgment or promise … The argument from inconvenience may have considerable weight upon a question of construction, where the language is doubt *499 ul; it is not to be presumed, upon doubtful language, that the legislature intended to establish

Knight v. Wilder

56 Mass. 199 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1848

The question is clearly stated by the arbitrators. … But in the same sentence, the word is qualified by the expression “ at right angles with the river.” And such, we have no doubt, was the judgment of the court in that case.

Rockwood v. Snow Inn Corp.

409 Mass. 361 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 20, 1991

The boundary line between *367 the sea and land subject to private ownership was established by the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-1647 and recognized by Storer as the ordinary low water mark. … susceptible of more than one interpretation, it appears that, by citing Storer with approval, the Sparhawk court intended to follow, not depart from, Storer , and thus to focus on a low water mark that could reasonably qualify

Braman v. Stiles

19 Mass. 460 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1824

my estate not before disposed of I do give &c.,” without doubt are sufficient, in a will, to pass a fee simple, although there are no words of limitation; so that Jonas Stiles, by force oí these words, if not afterwards qualified … That a naked power to the executor to sell has this effect, appears very clearly from Powell on Dev. 292, 302, 310 ; Co. Lit. 113 a, note 146, 342 b, note 298 ; Bergen v. Bennet, 1 Caines’s Cas. in Err. 14.

Shelton v. Homer

46 Mass. 462 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1843

of opinion thát the term “ executors,” as here used, relates to those persons who actually become such by taking upon themselves the office, and would have been satisfied, if one only of the appointed executors had been qualified … It is true that conveyances by a trustee to his co-trustee have been sustained, under peculiar circumstances ; but the rule, as clearly established in the courts of chancery, both in England aud in New York, is, that where

COMMONWEALTH v. MARKEESE MITCHELL (And Two Companion Cases)

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 20, 2025

s alleged gang affiliation.[15] With respect to Shantel's prior law-related experiences, Shantel had testified under a grant of immunity in a homicide trial in 2009, but juror no. 15 was unaware of this testimony or the trial … Regardless of how a defendant meets this latter burden, establishing juror bias is crucial to prevailing on such a claim.

Stratos v. Department of Public Welfare

387 Mass. 312 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 31, 1982

The department contends that Stratos is not entitled to an attorney’s fee under § 1988 because his challenge to the department’s regulation does not qualify as an action under § 1983. … As a general rule, time spent in establishing and defending a fee, or objecting to an unduly small award, should be included in the final calculation of the award.

Commonwealth v. Valerio

449 Mass. 562 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 20, 2007

Considering whether the defendant agent was entitled to *571 qualified immunity, the Court observed that “even a cursory reading of the warrant . . . would have revealed a glaring deficiency that any reasonable police officer … Although it is established that art. 14 does require police officers to have a copy of a search warrant with them at the time they conduct a search, see Commonwealth v.

In re the Proprietors of the New South Meeting-House

95 Mass. 497 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 15, 1866

This summary of the history of the origin, organization and continued existence of the society or parish of which the present corporation is the legitimate successor and representative, indicates very clearly the character … From what has been already said concerning the tenure on which property belonging to ancient parishes in Boston is held, and the qualified right which pew-holders or members of such corporations have in its enjoyment and

Lyons v. New Mass Media, Inc.

390 Mass. 51 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 30, 1983

Clearly the parties here do not agree on the essential facts and it would appear that a jury question is presented. … Under this standard, the defendants’ motion must necessarily fail if they do not “establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” or if the opposing party “establish[es] that there is a genuine, triable issue.”

Trustees of Phillips Academy v. King

12 Mass. 545 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 15, 1815

the policy of the law, with the capacity of acting, in several respects, as an individual, particularly of taking and granting property, of contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued, of enjoying privileges and immunities … For myself, I confess that I do not clearly perceive any other sense, than that in which the two articles mean substan£*564] tially * the same thing, notwithstanding some diversity of expression, in which they can be said

Tyler v. Hammond

28 Mass. 194 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 2, 1831

The law here, and in England, and in New York •and other states, is clearly settled, I apprehend, to the contrary. … I am therefore inclined to think, that this remark was intended to be qualified by the previous observations as to presumptions in doubtful descriptions.

Opinion of the Justices to the Senate

286 Mass. 611 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 4, 1934

In harmony with that principle, it has long been established that certain police regulations and other matters peculiarly affecting local interests, not embraced within the ordinary power to make by-laws and ordinances, may … The quoted words of proviso or exception in that section are thus clearly restricted to petitions filed so that less than thirty days intervene before the next State election.