Case law

Mendoza v. Licensing Board

444 Mass. 188 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 11, 2005

Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (describing why nude and erotic dancing qualify as “expression” with references to historical and cultural sources). … The trial judge correctly ruled that Mendoza was a “prevailing party” and thus qualified for a discretionary award of attorney’s fees. 5. Conclusion.

Tax Collector of North Reading v. Reading

366 Mass. 438 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 3, 1974

Where the Legislature intended to provide for the payment of taxes or payments in lieu thereof it has clearly so provided. For example, G. … could also tax the personal property held within their territorial limits. 2 Since a municipality would obviously not tax property owned by it and held within its territorial limits, § 47 insures the municipality the same immunity

Richards v. Treasurer & Receiver General

319 Mass. 672 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 3, 1946

Such a statute is subject to many well established limitations, Amory v. … For all practical purposes assessors became immune to action, and in most cases the amount that could be recovered from a city or town was not worth the effort and expense of litigation.

Draghetti v. Chmielewski

416 Mass. 808 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 26, 1994

Chmielewski is not immune from liability-dimply because the statements were not direct quotations. … Last, Chmielewski asserts that he and the citizens who read the Union-News share a “common interest” in the communication which entitles him to a qualified privilege.

Cyran v. Town of Ware

413 Mass. 452 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 19, 1992

Important to the decision were several statutes that established a police officer's obligations in the circumstances. … "[T]he very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government's traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort actions and to establish novel and unprecedented governmental liability." Id. at 319 .

Pasche v. Graham

180 Mass. 157 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 27, 1901

It does not appear that the court in granting the review made any order as to costs, and the qualifying terms above cited are unimportant in this case. … Sts. c. 99, are new, but it is said by the commissioner's in their report: These sections are in accordance with the established practice; and are proposed mostly to prevent or remove doubts.”

Commonwealth v. Walczak

463 Mass. 808 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 12, 2012

presentment and indictment of a grand jury, in case of high offences, is justly regarded as one of the securities to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive public prosecutions, and as one of the ancient immunities … Div.), cert. denied, 167 N.J. 635 (2001) (prosecutor owes duty to instruct grand jury on possible defenses “only when the facts known to the prosecutor clearly indicate or clearly establish the appropriateness of an instruction

Opinions of the Justices to the House of Representatives

386 Mass. 1223 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 23, 1982

If enacted, it would constitute the first step to accomplish by indirection what art. 44 clearly forbids, and the voters of the Commonwealth have clearly rejected by referendum vote on several recent occasions. … It is assumed to be capable of comprehension by those qualified to vote. Attorney General v. Methuen, 236 Mass. 564, 573 [1921]. Loring v. Young, 239 Mass. 349, 372 [1921].

Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health

348 Mass. 414 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 2, 1965

Statutory standards for cream and ungraded cream are established by Gr. … Similarly, advertising matter displayed on the frozen food counters from which Coffee-Rich is purveyed clearly and conspicuously states that Coffee-Rich is a “frozen non-dairy” product.

Commonwealth v. Smith

460 Mass. 385 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 12, 2011

The judge’s instructions in no way vouched for the Commonwealth’s theory of the incident; she clearly stated: “The Commonwealth is going forward with these indictments saying that they allege, and it will be up to you to … Where it is apparent that Penn’s statement qualifies as spontaneous utterance and was nontestimonial, it was not error to admit it at trial. *396 c. Exclusion of Penn’s statement to defendant’s investigator.

Salisbury Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. Division of Administrative Law Appeals

448 Mass. 365 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 15, 2007

The division has the power “to establish certain rates of payment for health care services.” G. L. c. 118G, § 2 (b). … Clearly it does. In reviewing a regulation, this court does not substitute its judgment concerning the wisdom of the regulation for that of the agency.

Civetti v. Commissioner of Public Welfare

392 Mass. 474 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 12, 1984

For the reasons we have discussed, we conclude that the plaintiffs qualified for AFDC payments under 106 Code Mass. … A categorically eligible child must also meet financial eligibility standards by qualifying as “needy.”

Palmer v. Board of Selectmen

368 Mass. 620 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 29, 1975

They cite the well established principle that a statute conferring substantive rights, as opposed to one defining procedural practice, is not to have retroactive application unless the Legislature clearly *624 so intended … credits shall be earned and in light of the legislative policy sought to be effectuated by the act. 6 When so considered “further” can be inferred to mean attaining educational levels beyond the minimum requirements set for qualifying

Chazournes v. Edwards

20 Mass. 5 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1825

Though the decision does not seem to be in exact conformity with the rule as before settled in several cases, yet the principle is clearly admitted. … A series of cases decided in New York have established the rule in that state incontrovertibly. The case of Livingston v.

Isaacson v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co.

325 Mass. 469 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 8, 1950

The persons who succeeded to Smith’s interest in the trust upon his decease did so not through the laws of Maine but according to the terms of the trust as previously established under Massachusetts law. … The case is clearly distinguishable.

Massachusetts Highway Department v. Perini Corp.

444 Mass. 366 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 26, 2005

Before it was modified, as described below, division I, subsection 7.16, of the contract established a process for the resolution of disputes between the parties, which was to culminate in nonbinding arbitration before a … [ujnless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’ ” Chicopee, supra at 421 , quoting AT&T, supra at 649.

Commonwealth v. Boston Edison Co.

444 Mass. 324 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 25, 2005

Among the five potential means of establishing liability under G. … In light of our conclusion, we do not address the reported issue of the Commonwealth’s immunity from liability.

Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp.

410 Mass. 805 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 8, 1991

(permitting a grant of immunity for specified crimes for witnesses in a grand jury investigation); Correllas v. Viveiros, ante 314 (1991). … Fiesner has not clearly identified any “secured right” with which TCC interfered.

Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance

379 Mass. 212 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 8, 1979

This phrase clearly leaves room to accommodate other torts which the court might deem to involve damage to the person. … The statute refers to “damage to the person” without qualifying either the word “damage” or the word “person” with an adjective such as “physical.”

Commonwealth v. Conaghan

433 Mass. 105 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 22, 2000

Conaghan’s motion raises a serious question as to her mental competency to assist her attorney in establishing a defense and to plead guilty voluntarily. … The words of the statute clearly include mental competency.