Case law

Beal Bank, SSB v. Eurich

444 Mass. 813 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 3, 2005

Eisenhauer, supra, the as-signee of a mortgage sought to establish that the mortgage had been discharged in error. … Clearly, EPS, as the bank’s servicing agent, had a business duty accurately to maintain such records for the bank.

Commonwealth v. Mendez

476 Mass. 512 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 22, 2017

Depina, 456 Mass. 238, 247 (2010), the trooper clearly had reasonable suspicion for the stop. See Commonwealth v. … He first argues that the immunized witness instruction regarding Moitoso was reversible error, as it improperly bolstered his credibility.

Freeman v. Planning Board

419 Mass. 548 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 24, 1995

Most recently, the First Circuit has observed: “Clearly, it is no simple matter to decide what abuses to regard as abuses of ‘substantive’ due process. … In view of our disposition of these issues, we need not reach questions related to qualified immunity raised by the defendants. *567 5. The judgments are reversed. Judgments are to enter for the defendants. So ordered.

Mounsey v. Ellard

363 Mass. 693 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 6, 1973

Instead of challenging the efficacy of a classification that establishes immunities from liability which no longer comport with modern accepted values and common experience, many courts have carved out special exceptions … acquaintances rendering friendly help in household routine or commonplace tasks to another member of the group does not cease to be a licensee or social visitor unless the character or circumstances of the assistance make it clearly

Muchnick v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n

341 Mass. 578 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 3, 1961

Another reason why the title does not indicate an unconditional maturity date of June 1, 1954, is that such a construction would ignore the words “except as hereinafter provided” in the paragraph qualifying the efficient … In this connection we are of opinion that “prior” clearly means prior in time and not prior in right; and, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, that it does not relate to priority in right in case of insufficiency of assets

Commonwealth v. Guardado

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 26, 2023

At the time of the defendant's trial, this court's precedent clearly had established that absence of licensure was not an essential element of any of the crimes with which the defendant was charged. … To the extent that Beal suggests that retrial is barred on double jeopardy grounds due to insufficient evidence, no matter the state of clearly established precedent, it is no longer valid precedent.

Rafferty v. Merck & Co., Inc.

479 Mass. 141 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 16, 2018

First, the amendments established a simpler and speedier approval process for generic drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). … The judge relied on "two well-established . . .

Kendall v. Kendall

426 Mass. 238 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 9, 1997

We reject the defendant’s claim that the divorce judgment “established Judaism” as the religion to govern his children’s upbringing. … Hassan was not a qualified expert and his testimony was highly prejudicial. Even assuming the testimony was inadmissible, the judge specifically stated that she did not rely on Dr.

Commonwealth v. Leach

156 Mass. 99 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 27, 1892

Without extending the decision beyond what is involved in the particular case before us, we are of opinion that where witnesses who are qualified as experts have been called by the government, and have been allowed to testify … If a patient can testify to her experience in her own case of disease, then clearly her physician, who was present and observed her, can testify, and he ordinarily would testify much more intelligently than she.

In re G.P.

473 Mass. 112 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 5, 2015

When the respondent appears in court, a qualified physician, psychologist, or social worker must examine her. Id. Counsel may remain present during the examination. See R.B. Minehan & R.M. … Clearly the degree of risk that the third prong requires to be proved is greater than that required by the first or second prong: by definition, a “very substantial” risk is not the same as a “substantial” risk, and requires

First Justice of the Bristol Division of the Juvenile Court Department v. Clerk-magistrate of the Bristol Division of the Juvenile Court Department

438 Mass. 387 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 7, 2003

The position taken by the defendants is that the statutes do not render clerks immune from well-established judicial authority over court house personnel. … If either disagrees with the clerk that a candidate is properly qualified for the responsibilities of the position, the disagreement is submitted to the CJAM for her resolution pursuant to § 10B (d).

Rivera v. Commissioner of Public Welfare

395 Mass. 189 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 12, 1985

Statute 1969, c. 800, § 10, clearly indicates that the Legislature intended G. … Congress clearly intended to prevent the States from pursuing such more restrictive treatment of the medically needy. H.R. Rep. 861, at 2055-2056.

Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To

391 Mass. 301 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 29, 1984

He answered, “No,” and did not qualify his *304 answer or expand it. … minutes, the judge discussed such matters as jury selection, interrogation and possible sequestration, interpreters, evidentiary stipulations, lists of anticipated witnesses, and the possibility of a witness’s requiring immunity

Continental Corp. v. Gowdy

283 Mass. 204 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 31, 1933

Clearly the words “without recourse” are not used in the technical sense in which they are used in a qualified indorsement of a negotiable instrument. … Y. 343 , unlike the case at bar, deal with immunity from future fraudulent acts and are distinguishable in accordance with established principles. See Granlund v. Saraf, 263 Mass. 76, 79 .

Commonwealth v. Williams

455 Mass. 706 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 8, 2010

“[E]vidence tending to impeach the credibility of a key prosecution witness is ‘clearly exculpatory.’ ” Commonwealth v. Neal, 392 Mass. 1, 11 (1984) (Neal), quoting Commonwealth v. Collins, 1, 8 (1982). … However, we have no reason to disagree with the defendant’s argument that where a defendant has specifically requested a particular item or type of evidence that qualifies as exculpatory, and that evidence is thereafter lost

Inhabitants of Brighton v. Wilkinson

84 Mass. 27 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 15, 1861

owners of the land over which the highway was laid. *29 To sustain this proposition, they insist, in the first place, that the proviso in St. 1824, c. 15, above recited, constitutes a grant by the Commonwealth of a perpetual immunity … This is certainly not made very clearly to appear.

Deane v. Caldwell

127 Mass. 242 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 3, 1879

The rule established by these decisions is clearly recognized (at least as to debts which become absolute within the period of the special statute of limitations) in the Gen. Sts. c. 99, §§ 5, 6. And see Cummings v. … But the surrender of the lease by the administrator, and its acceptance by the lessors, having been absolute, and not qualified by any reservation of or agreement for a right to sue the administrator or prove against the

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Board

388 Mass. 427 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 14, 1983

This language clearly implies that the words “personnel” and “medical” files are subject to the qualifying language of the modifying clause. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). … Thus, under New *442 England Box Co., supra, which concerned whether a public board had taken a certain action, those matters are clearly public records. But it is not required by G.

Lincoln v. Commonwealth

164 Mass. 368 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 17, 1895

A disadvantageous change in the shape or size of what remains clearly is a matter for compensation. And the principle which warrants such allowances was held logically enough in Walker v. … But the question is a practical one, and the mere intervention of a way legally established, but not visible on the surface of the ground, is not conclusive.

City of Quincy v. Brooks-Skinner, Inc.

325 Mass. 406 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 3, 1950

It is a method of establishing facts. Nothing is more common in practice or more useful in dispatching the business of the courts than for counsel to admit undisputed facts. … One obtaining a judgment against a municipality could never be sure that it was immune from attack until the time for granting writs of review had expired. See G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 250, § 22.