Case law

Commonwealth v. Nesbitt

452 Mass. 236 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 18, 2008

Brault’s statements to the 911 operator might also qualify as a dying declaration. See infra at 249-252. … Because Brault’s statement here qualifies under the narrower concept of a dying declaration, see Commonwealth v.

Greene v. Pacific Mutual Insurance

91 Mass. 217 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1864

There can be no doubt that the facts proved at the trial establish an indisputable case of barratry. … The course of decisions in England on this subject is concisely and clearly stated in 2 Arnould on Ins. 1064-1071.

Commonwealth v. Drew

397 Mass. 65 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 12, 1986

[that] clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.” … We conclude that the offered statement was not “clearly corroborated” and was therefore not admissible.

Commonwealth v. Corcoran

252 Mass. 465 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 22, 1925

The defendant Reese, who was called and testified as a witness, was promised immunity by the district attorney if she would testify. … It is well established that evidence which merely tends to prove that defendants have committed similar offences is not admissible.

Rosnov v. Molloy

460 Mass. 474 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 31, 2011

The presumption that statutes operate prospectively is well established. Fleet Nat’l Bank v. … This cannot qualify as a “swift” response. Swift v. AutoZone, Inc., 441 Mass. 443, 449-450 (2004).

Tarbell v. Parker

101 Mass. 165 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 15, 1869

The defence is, that the *166 note has been paid or extinguished by operation of law, so that no judgment can be rendered upon the mortgage; and we have only to see if the facts establish this defence. … Jewett was appointed and qualified as one of his executors. If the note were held by Abel Jewett as indorsee, this would constitute in law primd facie a discharge of the note, Samuel A.

Murphy v. Safety Insurance

429 Mass. 517 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 4, 1999

James was a passenger in the insured vehicle at the time of the accident and qualified as a covered household member under Safety’s policy. … The Safety policy, which contains the language in the standard motor vehicle liability insurance policy established by the Commissioner of Insurance, see Hanover Ins. Co. v.

Phelps v. MacIntyre

397 Mass. 459 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 29, 1986

The facts before the motion judge did not clearly preclude the possibility that the plaintiff might incur additional medical expenses before trial raising the total medical expenses then incurred ($324) above $500. … Schupp, 383 Mass. 739, 743 (1981) (considering a question not directed to whether anticipated posttrial medical expenses could qualify toward the $500 threshold, we said that the no-fault statute “places no time constraint

Palmer v. BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF MARBLEHEAD

368 Mass. 620 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 29, 1975

They cite the well established principle that a statute conferring substantive rights, as opposed to one defining procedural practice, is not to have retroactive application unless the Legislature clearly *624 so intended … Significantly, the earlier versions of the bill contained an emergency preamble which in pertinent part provided that this bill is "to provide forthwith for a career incentive program for the recruitment and retention of well qualified

Commonwealth v. Edelin

371 Mass. 497 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 17, 1976

Clearly the doctor’s duty to the viable fetus arises at the time he knows or reasonably should know that he could be dealing with such a subject. … That immunity extends to the privilege of terminating the pregnancy; it does not protect against wilful, wanton or reckless conduct which causes the death of a viable fetus.

Commonwealth v. Cory

454 Mass. 559 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 18, 2009

Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-169 . 13 , 14 The first four of these factors by themselves establish that the *569 GPS requirement has a pronounced punitive effect. … By way of analogy, a statute expanding the length of time that probation must run would clearly be punitive. Cf. Commonwealth v.

Reep v. Commissioner of the Department of Employment & Training

412 Mass. 845 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 11, 1992

An individual shall not be disqualified from receiving benefits ... if such individual establishes to the satisfaction of the commissioner [of the Department of Employment and Training] that his reasons for leaving were for … But this argument, however appealing, cannot override what seems to us to be the clearly expressed legislative intent.

Commonwealth v. Philip Morris Inc.

448 Mass. 836 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 23, 2007

There is no reason why the Commonwealth, as opposed to any other party to a contract, cannot be subject to an analysis of its having met (or not) contractual conditions within the terms established by the contract. … Qualifying Statute. . . .

Murphy v. Hanright

238 Mass. 200 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 10, 1921

A delivery, however, may be established after such record. Parker v. Hill, 8 Met. 447 , The issue of delivery is ordinarily one of fact. Mills v. Gore, 20 Pick. 28 . … The discussion of the judge as to the evidence and its effect clearly indicates that he found there had been no delivery of the deed at any time, although no express finding to that effect was made.

Commonwealth v. Pentz

247 Mass. 500 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 25, 1924

His contention is that the statute establishes no standard of conduct sufficiently definite to inform a person charged with its violation of the nature and extent of his offence, and affords no ascertainable test of guilt … The operation of an automobile upon a way is a clearly defined act, susceptible of being easily understood. Its operation so as not to endanger the lives or safety of the public is the description of a fact.

Attorney General v. Merrimack Manufacturing Co.

80 Mass. 586 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 15, 1860

Rights of pews and sittings are often created and conveyed, by which the power of the proprietors to dispose of the church may be to some extent qualified and limited. … The consecration is, and is to be regarded as, a religious ceremony, and not as an act qualifying the estate in the land.

R.D. v. A.H.

454 Mass. 706 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 11, 2009

Forrest, 278 Mass. 547, 552-554 (1932). 9 The judge was therefore correct in placing the burden on R.D., as the proposed permanent guardian, to establish A.H.’s unfitness; she was also correct that the standard of proof R.D … It is the purpose of this chapter to establish a means for such children either to be acknowledged by their parents voluntarily or, on complaint by one or the other of their parents or such other person or agency as is authorized

Reade v. Secretary of the Commonwealth

472 Mass. 573 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 3, 2015

Empowering the clerk to grant relief clearly was intended to expedite the waiver process in cases involving routine costs and expenses. … Because Reade did not receive such benefits, he would not have qualified as indigent under the 1980 version of the statute.

Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manufacturing Co.

94 Mass. 298 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 15, 1866

a franchise; and that such aggregate value represents not merely the corporate property, but also the rights, privileges, immunities and benefits of the corporate organization constituting the franchise. … If therefore the mode of valuation tends at all to establish the position that this is a property tax, it tends also to show it to be a tax, not upon the property of the corporation, but rather upon the property of the individual

The First Marblehead Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue

470 Mass. 497 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 28, 2015

We view the language of § 2A (e) (vi) (B)18 to be unambiguous in establishing the rebuttable default presumption described by the board. See Commissioner of Revenue v. … Such a reading would leave open the possibility that loans qualifying as property of the taxpayer could exist without being assigned anywhere. This is clearly an unintended and ultimately absurd result.