Case law

Graham v. McGrail

370 Mass. 133 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 9, 1976

L. c. 268A, § 19, but that there was a valid quorum and that the chairman’s votes were valid and effective to establish the budget. … L. c. 268A, § 19, might “participate in any way in establishing the entire Budget.”

May v. Breed

61 Mass. 15 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1851

As to the law regulating remedies, it is as clearly settled, and upon most satisfactory grounds, that every case must be governed by the law of the place where the remedy is sought. … nature and character, the force and obligation of the contract, deciding to what extent it binds the parties in all the various contingencies which mav occur, what shall be deemed actual *36 and specific performance, or qualified

Wellington &c.

33 Mass. 87 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1834

expound the laws, to declare what has and what has not the force of law, and to apply them to the investigation and adjustment'of the rights, duties, and obligations of citizens, in the actual administration of justice, it is clearly … Respect for the legislature, therefore, concurs with well established principles of law, in the conclusion, that such act is not void, but voidable only ; and it follows as a necessary legal inference from this position,

Doris v. Police Commissioner of Boston

374 Mass. 443 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 21, 1978

This is clearly not a case in which a statute has focused on the “local matters” of a “particular city or town.” See Opinions of the Justices, 356 Mass. 775, 787-788 (1969). … The 1971 amendment to § 99A deleted the qualifying phrase: “In any city or town which accepts this section.” St. 1971, c. 956, § 1.

Massachusetts Electric Co. v. Department of Public Utilities

383 Mass. 675 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 3, 1981

While the company concedes that “ [i] t is a recognized tenet of administrative law that an agency can adopt policy decisions in the context of adjudicatory proceedings,” it qualifies this by urging that “[a]n automatic application … This alone is sufficiently *680 impractical to outweigh the adverse impact of retroactive application, at least where, as here, the department is working within a detailed, organized system of precedent which clearly established

L.L., a juvenile v. Commonwealth

470 Mass. 169 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 5, 2014

Because § 178E (f) itself does not clearly define the appropriate level of risk warranting relief from registration under § 178E (f), we seek guidance on the issue from other sections of the act. … It follows that to qualify for exemption from registration under § 178E (f), a juvenile sex offender's risk of reoffense should be less than this "low" registration-triggering risk.

Kinney v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board

330 Mass. 302 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 10, 1953

It does not clearly appear whether on September 16, 1952, when the repealing act was approved, the petitioner had already attained a status making him eligible then to claim retirement rights. … For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to state further qualifying details. 1 See cases collected in 54 A. L. R. 943, 945; 98 A. L. R. 505, 506; 112 A. L. R. 1009, 1010; 137 A. L. R. 249, 252.

Adoption of Georgia

433 Mass. 62 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 14, 2000

We do not disturb these findings absent a showing that they are clearly erroneous. Petition of the Dep’t of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 397 Mass. 659, 670 (1986). … A CASA is not qualified to testify and report simply by being a CASA, and when an objection is made to qualifications, the judge must first determine that the CASA is qualified before accepting testimony or a report from

Reynolds Bros. v. Town of Norwood

414 Mass. 295 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 16, 1993

[Chapter 44, § 31,] is not . . . intended to extend the doctrine of municipal immunity so as to leave contractors entirely without remedy for breach of contract in the absence of an appropriation.” … Clearly, that legislative purpose would not be served, but instead would be frustrated, by a decision in this case that the contract in question was invalidated by the absence of a certification.

Commonwealth v. Coolidge

128 Mass. 55 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 27, 1880

It may be that the same act may involve more than one of them; but it is necessary to allege only one intent, if that intent is proved, and all the other facts necessary to constitute the crime are established. … This distinction is clearly pointed out and illustrated in Regina v. Tiddeman, 4 Cox C. C. 387, cited at the bar by the counsel on both sides.

Young v. Miller

72 Mass. 152 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1856

Welles, 17 Mass *155 424, following Judge Trowbridge, thinks that there must have been some qualifying expressions, which the reporter' omitted to state, in that case. … But in that case the mortgage was given for the security of one note only, and the mortgage deed was delivered with the note to the indorsee, and this act was clearly an indication of the intent of the mortgagee to give the

Commonwealth v. Lykus

367 Mass. 191 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 27, 1975

The witnesses were particularly definite in identifying certain words which were said, not in a whisper, but clearly. Only one of the eight witnesses, called as to this issue, could make no voice identification. … Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert *204 witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion.”

Camara v. Attorney General

458 Mass. 756 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 25, 2011

The plaintiff, Michael Camara, is its vice-president and qualifies as a statutory employer of ABC’s employees within the meaning of the Wage Act. … Black’s Law Dictionary 373 (9th ed. 2009). 10 This interpretation of the term, as the Attorney General contends, clearly furthers the Wage Act’s overarching policy of protecting employees’ rights to wages. Cf.

Attorney General v. INDUS. NATIONAL BANK OF RI

380 Mass. 533 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 2, 1980

Clearly, a suit to enforce a C.I.D. is not a local action. Venue is not restricted under G. L. c. 93A to the county where specific property is located. G. L. c. 93A, § 7. … Otherwise, the Congressional enactment, which was intended generally to afford national banks immunity from suit in foreign States, would be meaningless because the exception would engulf the rule.

Fisher School v. Assessors of Boston

325 Mass. 529 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 30, 1950

The board of trustees established the salary of the president and he in turn established “all other salaries for the members and faculty of the school.” … But “the burden of proof is upon the one claiming an exemption from taxation to show clearly and unequivocally that he comes within the terms of the exemption.” Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v.

Denny v. Cabot

47 Mass. 82 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1843

explained in the present contract; the clear meaning of the terms of which is, that Cabot, Appleton & Co. were to pay Cooper one third part of the profits, after making certain specified deductions therefrom, and Cooper clearly … ; the question is, whether the circumstances, under which the participation exists, may not qualify the presumption, and satisfactorily prove, that the portion of the profits is taken, not in the character of a partner, but

Holbrook v. Burt

39 Mass. 546 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 22, 1839

transfer, a proposition which cannot be maintained, but that the word “ assent ” was used in a qualified sense, and is limited to such an assent as would amount to a promise to pay the assignee. … To establish that fact, the defendants must prove, that the plaintiffs knew or had good reason to believe, that there was a deficiency, when they made the representations.

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 7083 v. Sex Offender Registry Board

472 Mass. 475 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 21, 2015

In addition, the factors SORB is to consider in determining whether reclassification is warranted, and the evidence that a sex offender must present to establish a reduced risk of reoffense, clearly contemplate that the … Procedural due process is not satisfied where the burden to establish his or her level of risk is, in effect, shifted to the offender.

Attorney General v. Crocker

138 Mass. 214 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 9, 1885

No objection is made that the respondents were not duly qualified, if elected; and the question is whether the record made by William O. … The act establishing the county of Hampden was passed in February, 1812, to take effect on the 1st day of the next August.

Vranos v. Franklin Medical Center

448 Mass. 425 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 27, 2007

Suggestions for implementation of such policies include establishing a process to review or verify reports of disruptive physician behavior, establishing a process to notify a physician whose behavior is disruptive that a … Ct. 495, 499 (2002), instructs that a reviewing court first determine whether the records for which the privilege is *437 claimed clearly fall within the privilege on their face.