Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
1,873 results
1.38s
Gurry v. Cumberland Farms, Inc.
406 Mass. 615 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 12, 1990
Clearly, therefore, the workers’ compensation statute was intended to deal with injuries and liability occurring in the course of the employer-employee relationship. … Therefore, we conclude that a dispute of fact existed on the question whether Cranberry Growers and Dairy were engaged in a “joint venture” that qualified them for “single employer” status under c. 152. 3.
Cited 78 timesPublished468 Mass. 86 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 9, 2014
Without establishing a general rule, a number of prior appellate decisions have indicated that *89 to be entitled to the public use statute’s immunity from claims of ordinary negligence, a landowner must permit all members … for immunity”); Cregan v.
Cited 3 timesPublished390 Mass. 1 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 18, 1983
The statutory language does not, however, clearly resolve the issue. Two circumstances strongly support our conclusion. … A statute which is silent on the subject of the principal’s immunity but grants immunity to the agent would be expected to have no effect on the established common law.
Cited 25 timesPublished394 Mass. 341 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 26, 1985
This court has not found it neccessary to *344 decide whether this statutory scheme establishes the exclusive procedure by which a Superior Court judge may grant immunity to a witness. See Commonwealth v. … Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 970 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct justified a court’s ordering the prosecutor to grant statutoiy immunity and that a witness capable of producing “clearly exculpatory evidence”
Cited 30 timesPublished369 Mass. 350 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 29, 1975
Id. at 244 . 7 Many of the early cases which, in partial reliance on these cases, established the rule of parental immunity in other jurisdictions are collected in Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 482 , n.* (1938). … These courts are among those which have accepted qualified abrogation of the rule. See Rigdon v. Ridgon, supra; Silesky v. Kelman, supra; Goller v.
Cited 90 timesPublishedEzekiel v. Jones Motor Co., Inc.
374 Mass. 382 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 15, 1978
We have extended the qualified privilege to a greater variety of situations. See, e.g., *386 Hutchinson v. New England Tel. & Tel. … Before giving this example, the judge clearly informed the jury that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that Lauber accused the plaintiff of the crime of larceny or dishonest conduct as an employee.
Cited 52 timesPublished428 Mass. 684 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 21, 1999
Commonwealth claims that § 10 (i) *697 establishes that where a plaintiff can make out a claim that a government actor has acted with gross negligence in releasing an individual, the other immunities provided by § 10 cannot … We need not, therefore, address the parties’ arguments regarding the availability to defendants of a qualified immunity defense. See Estate of Gilmore, supra at 723 ; Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist., 784 F.
Cited 168 timesPublishedClarke v. Board of Collegiate Authority
327 Mass. 279 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 3, 1951
[the administrator of veterans’ affairs] a list of the educational and training institutions, including industrial establishments, within the commonwealth which are qualified and equipped to furnish any form of education … If the agency advises the administrator that an institution is qualified, it is “deemed qualified.”
Cited 14 timesPublished371 Mass. 358 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 18, 1976
Jackson, supra, indicates clearly that the State of New York would assert no interest on the facts of this accident. … today to support a general rule of interspousal tort immunity.”
Cited 82 timesPublishedBrown v. Office of the Commissioner of Probation
475 Mass. 675 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 11, 2016
Thus, public employers are not liable for postjudgment interest unless some other statute clearly waives sovereign immunity with respect to such interest. … L. c. 258, § 2, does not clearly indicate a legislative intent "to compensate the plaintiff for loss of the use of money when damages are not paid on time." Onofrio, supra at 659-660.
Cited 6 timesPublished326 Mass. 185 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 30, 1950
No case in Massachusetts has been brought to our attention, and we have discovered none, in which a conditional or qualified privilege was established by the occasion of disseminating information of general common interest … It is clearly understandable, however, that the members of a labor union are interested in the doings of their officers and committees and have a right to such information.
Cited 61 timesPublished304 Mass. 396 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 28, 1939
Clearly the alleged acts were within the power of the defendants. … These are mere epithets which cannot change or qualify the material facts. Pratt v. Gardner, 2 Cush. 63 , 71. Caverno v. Fellows, 286 Mass. 440, 443 .
Cited 10 timesPublished398 Mass. 687 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 2, 1986
This court has held that G.L.c. 258, § 2, does not in and of itself enlarge governmental liability beyond the remedies established under the common and statutory law. Dinsky v. … That was clearly not the case here.
Cited 22 timesPublished276 Mass. 398 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 9, 1931
The selection of jurors has constantly been required to be from those qualified to vote. Qualifications for voting have been continuously established by the Constitution. … of women becoming so qualified.
Cited 138 timesPublished464 Mass. 261 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 30, 2013
We further determined that our holding should apply retroactively in order to “further[] the purpose of having a consistent and clearly defined body of law.” Id. at 592 . … However, in exceptional circumstances, when “determining whether a new rule arising from decisional law should apply prospectively, we look at three factors: (1) whether a new principle has been established whose resolution
Cited 26 timesPublished377 Mass. 914 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 13, 1979
Even a statutory affirmation of governmental immunity would clearly have been definitive action. … When Whitney is read correctly, it becomes even more clear that we should not modify the law now established by a comprehensive statute. Judgment affirmed.
Cited 19 timesPublishedBoston Medical Center Corp. v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Health & Human Services
463 Mass. 447 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 14, 2012
“The Constitution, by delegating to Congress the power to establish the supreme law of the land when acting within its enumerated powers, does not foreclose a State from asserting immunity to claims arising under federal … We imputed to the voters who enacted the law an intent to waive sovereign immunity to enforce the Commonwealth’s obligation to pay qualifying candidates public funds for their political campaigns, and saw “no reasons of ‘
Cited 63 timesPublished291 Mass. 28 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 6, 1935
Ed.) c. 55, § 37' (e), (1), (2), (3) and (4) were not established. … The immunity is given in return for the relinquishment of a privilege, but the privilege must be asserted before there can be basis for the immunity.
Cited 14 timesPublishedAmerican National Red Cross v. Labor Relations Commission
363 Mass. 525 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 4, 1973
[Program] are clearly integrated with and vitally affect the operations of non-profit hospitals within the Commonwealth . . . … Although there is no simple test for ascertaining whether an institution is so closely related to governmental activity as to become a tax-immune instrumentality, the Red Cross is clearly such an instrumentality” (emphasis
Cited 3 timesPublished387 Mass. 790 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 28, 1982
L. c. 93A, § 6 (7), to provide a grant of transactional immunity. 9 The statutory language is clearly cast in terms of admissibility in evidence of information obtained. … Corcoran, 332 Mass. 44 (1955). 8 That transactional immunity is the long-established and still vital law of this Commonwealth is also established by a variety of legislative enactments. See, e.g., G. L. c. 54, § 120; G.
Cited 61 timesPublished
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