Case law

Adoption of Hugo

428 Mass. 219 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 14, 1998

When a judge complies with these mandates, we do not disturb his findings unless they are clearly erroneous. … “There is no requirement that testimony on a question of discrete knowledge come from an expert qualified in [a] subspecialty rather than from an expert more generally qualified.” Commonwealth v.

Commonwealth v. Simon

456 Mass. 280 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 12, 2010

Colleton, 387 Mass. at 795-796 , we concluded that art. 12 demanded that any immunity from prosecution granted by the government to secure a witness's self-incriminating testimony be full transactional immunity, not the more … narrow use or derivative use immunity deemed sufficient under the Fifth Amendment.

Royce v. Commissioner of Correction

390 Mass. 425 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 10, 1983

However, the limits of such discretion are established by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Correction. … The plaintiff contends that he has had no review to date and has been “warehoused” in the D.S.U. for over two years without any review. 9 Clearly, if these alleged facts are established by evidence, the plaintiff would be

Massachusetts Hospital Ass'n v. Department of Medical Security

412 Mass. 340 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 26, 1992

The department’s regulations do not limit the amount of reimbursement hospitals may receive for qualified free care services. *345 3. The validity of the performance regulation. … The plaintiffs argue that the Superior Court judge correctly concluded that the performance regulations are repugnant to the statute, since the statute clearly and comprehensively describes the method by which uncollectible

Merchants Discount Co. v. Esther Abelson, Inc.

297 Mass. 517 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 28, 1937

In paragraph 2 the plaintiff alleges that the defendant Esther Abelson owned and conducted the business of merchandise of embroideries and linens in her business establishment located on Boylston Street, in Boston. … Ed.) c. 109A, where intent is presumed in law, like transfers without fair consideration, insolvency or pending insolvency is the qualifying factor.

Adie v. Mayor of Holyoke

303 Mass. 295 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 29, 1939

The petitioner duly qualified under the appointment on July 1, 1938. On January 9, 1939, the mayor notified the petitioner in writing that he was removed from that office. … Mayor of Boston, 298 Mass. 448, 450 , are clearly distinguishable. See also Cunningham v. Mayor of Cambridge, 222 Mass. 574, 580 .

Wyeth v. Stone

144 Mass. 441 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 9, 1887

The design of the Legislature in this statute clearly was to qualify and limit the rights of an adopted child under the previous statute, as construed by this court. … The purpose of § 8 is to provide for cases where property comes to a man’s children, not by inheritance, but under a settlement, trust deed, or will, and to establish a rule governing the rights of adopted children in such

Mathews v. Mathews

141 Mass. 511 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 7, 1886

Section 15 established a rule •of inheritance, and created an estate very different from dower. … This was clearly, unless qualified in some way, filing in the probate office her election to claim dower.

Danzell v. Webquish

108 Mass. 133 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1871

, § 1, “ all Indians, and people of color, heretofore known and called Indians, within this Common, wealth, are hereby made and declared to be citizens of the Commonwealth, and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities … mulatto and negro inhabitants, occupying lands within the plantation, had no other title to the same but what they derived from grants or assignments made to them by the original proprietors ; and that it was necessary clearly

Commonwealth v. Pappas

384 Mass. 428 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 21, 1981

In support of the defendant’s motions to dismiss the complaints, evidence was presented to the judge which tended to establish the following facts. … As well, these causes of delay are “circumstances” that justify the failure to issue the citation, and they are clearly consistent with the declared purpose of G.

Vigeant v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co.

260 Mass. 335 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 30, 1927

Immunity granted to a class, however limited, having the effect to deprive another class, however limited, of a personal or *340 property right, is just as clearly a denial of equal protection of the laws to the latter class … as if the immunity were in favor of, or the deprivation of right permitted worked against a larger class;” and at pages 337, 338, “Classification must be reasonable.

Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute

443 Mass. 367 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 9, 2005

Clearly, the jury felt so as well. The plaintiff’s evidence easily meets the standard for proof of causation in retaliation claims under G. L. c. 151B. See Abramian v. … L. c. 231, § 85K, was enacted in 1971, a nonprofit hospital, such as Dana-Farber, enjoyed charitable immunity from tort liability.

South Boston Betterment Trust Corp. v. Boston Redevelopment Authority

438 Mass. 57 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 31, 2002

However, a maximum amount was established with respect to both of those exactions. Id. … Because the MOU clearly violates the statutory and regulatory scheme, it is unenforceable.

Gorman v. City of Peabody

312 Mass. 560 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 29, 1942

A final decree was entered establishing the agreed amount of the alleged deficiency and, in effect, ordering compliance by the respondent and its officers with the provisions of said § 34. The respondent appealed. … It was held that the orders of the city council to which the referendum was sought were clearly executive, and not legislative, in their nature.

Thomas v. Blake

126 Mass. 320 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 28, 1879

The question is, whether, the facts which this evidence tends to establish show any misconduct or default in Darling, for which the defendant is liable on this bond. … If it was intended to include judgments recovered upon past transactions, a surety has the right to insist that such intention should clearly appear.

Wincek v. Town of West Springfield

399 Mass. 700 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 21, 1987

We do not accept this argument because it ignores the word “damages” which clearly serves to qualify the liability of the third party. … The town has not established that the contracting parties intended the town to be a beneficiary of their contract. See Flattery v. Gregory, 397 Mass. 143, 148-149 (1986).

Stockwell v. Couillard

129 Mass. 231 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 13, 1880

The deed of the defendant to the plaintiff clearly pointed out that Bowen, his heirs and assigns, had an interest in the land *233 conveyed; and a reference to the public records would have disclosed the character and extent … As the deed to the plaintiff conveyed only such title as the grantor had in the land, excluding the interest of Bowen therein, the covenant of seisin was qualified and limited by the grant. Allen v.

Jean W. v. Commonwealth

414 Mass. 496 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 8, 1993

The Act abolished the absolute immunity that governmental units had enjoyed previously. … Clearly, such a broad reading of our Din-sky opinion runs directly contrary to the spirit of G. L. c. 258 and our decision in Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208 (1977).

Sharon v. City of Newton

437 Mass. 99 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 10, 2002

The release is a clearly labeled, two-sided document, which Merav brought home from school for her parents to review. … Comm’n, 387 Mass. 51, 55 (1982), it does so by abrogating sovereign immunity only within a narrow statutory framework. The Act does “not create any new theory of liability for a municipality,” Dinsky v.

Commonwealth v. Bell

442 Mass. 118 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 21, 2004

Defense counsel sought to use the regulations to establish that ABCD University High School is not a secondary school under the school zone statute. … Such an exclusion would also clearly negate the intent of the Legislature to provide drug-free school zones, see Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647 , 651 n.7 (1992) (Governor Michael S.