Case law

Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety

355 Mass. 94 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 24, 1968

“Such a result might fairly be characterized as absurd, and an intention to accomplish this absurd result, unless clearly required by the language of the statute, is not to be attributed to the Legislature.” … There is nothing in the record to indicate that the individuals who were promoted to fill the two vacancies were not qualified. There was no discrimination. 3.

Kirwin v. Attorney General

275 Mass. 34 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 2, 1931

Five persons were nominated as executors, all of whom qualified. The survivor, Thomas H. Armstrong, died in June, 1927. … The fund thus validly established as a public charity was given to the executors in trust, to be used for such public charitable purposes as should meet their approval.

Feeney v. Dell Inc.

465 Mass. 470 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 12, 2013

commitment to consumer protection legislation, to insulate themselves from small value consumer claims creates the potential for countless customers to be without an effective method to vindicate their statutory rights, a result clearly … In addition, and unlike the arbitration clause in Concepcion, Dell’s arbitration clause did not permit a consumer to bring qualifying claims in small claims court in lieu of arbitration.

Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination

371 Mass. 130 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 30, 1976

We discuss for the first time the proof which is necessary to establish unlawful discrimination in violation of G. … He may meet that burden by establishing an unanswered prima facie case of discrimination.

Palitz v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Tisbury

470 Mass. 795 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 3, 2015

L. c. 41, § 81R, that waiver is only valid to the extent that zoning compliance is required to qualify for an ANR endorsement. … The drafters were clearly concerned that the subdivision control law might be manipulated to encroach on other land use authorities.

Chelsea Hous. Auth. v. McLaughlin

482 Mass. 579 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 9, 2019

Such intent may be "clearly expressed" *721 in one of two ways: by words in the statute itself clearly stating that the statute supersedes the common law, or by "necessary implication." … The commissioners' motion to dismiss was allowed because, as board members of a public agency who had not engaged in malfeasance, they were statutorily immune from suit. See G. L. c. 121B, § 13.

Boston Housing Authority v. Bridgewaters

452 Mass. 833 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 7, 2009

The BHA claims that Bridgewaters has not established a nexus or causal link between his disability and the assault on his brother. … not expressly establish a causal link between his mental disability and the violent assault on his brother that occurred when he was not medicated.

New Habitat, Inc. v. Tax Collector

451 Mass. 729 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 3, 2008

“Exemption from taxation is to be strictly construed and must be made to appear clearly before it can be allowed.” Springfield Young Men’s Christian Ass’n v. Assessors of Springfield, 284 Mass. 1, 5 (1933). … Ct. 596, 599 (1997) (providing residence and care to elderly and infirm helped to establish organization as charitable).

Doe v. Town of Blandford

402 Mass. 831 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 13, 1988

The Legislature, by excluding intentional torts from the waiver of governmental immunity, sought to insulate the government from liability for intentional conduct which it had not authorized. … As to the alleged negligent hiring in 1968 (count I), this clearly does not involve a continuing tort, and, thus, as to count I, there was no timely presentment. Count I should be dismissed.

Baker v. Parsons

434 Mass. 543 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 12, 2001

Ann. tit. 12, § 1443.1 [1993]); Rhode Island (petition immune from suit unless subjectively and objectively baseless; see R.I. Gen. … Laws §§ 9-33-1 — 9-33-4 [1997]); Tennessee (immunity from SLAPP suits unless petition knowingly or recklessly false; see Tenn.

Andover Savings Bank v. Commissioner of Revenue

387 Mass. 229 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 25, 1982

Nevertheless, such regulation does not alter the essential purpose for which mutual banks are established. … Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), no longer require that national banks be immune from State taxation. See First Agricultural Nat’l Bank v.

Commonwealth v. Murungu

450 Mass. 441 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 16, 2008

Explaining that Simu’s testimony demonstrated that she did not qualify as a complaint witness, he allowed the mother to testify as a substitute first complaint witness. … Simu’s trial testimony clearly appeared biased in favor of the defendant. 8 Contrary to Commonwealth v. King, supra, two complaint witnesses were permitted to testify. This was error.

Williams v. SECR. OF EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF HUMAN SERV.

414 Mass. 551 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 11, 1993

It is within the discretion of the agency to determine priorities for allocation of resources among services where the enabling statute does not itself clearly establish particular priorities. … Currently there are no guidelines on whether a State mental health system has satisfactorily established the "most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130

Commonwealth v. Murray

135 Mass. 530 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 1, 1883

The transaction is alleged to have taken place when the defendant “ was lawfully brought before - the District Court of Central Berkshire, a court duly and legally established, and before Joseph Tucker, Esquire, the standing … It further alleges that said Tucker was then and there lawfully presiding in said court, and that he was a judicial officer duly qualified to perform the duties of his office as such.

Tracy v. Cambridge Junior College

364 Mass. 367 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 12, 1973

These necessary elements of proof are established by the application of G. L. c. 152, §§ 1, 66, and 67. … As her work was clearly compatible in character with jobs previously held covered, her potential professional career was irrelevant to the question at hand.

Commonwealth v. Kneeland

37 Mass. 206 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 2, 1838

Could the convention or the people have intended to secure to the freedom of the press so great latitude and such extraordinary immunities ? … But clearly does not include atheists.

Commonwealth v. Travis

372 Mass. 238 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 25, 1977

L. c. 123A, § 1, establishes a relatively broad definition of “sexually dangerous person,” the procedure specified by G. … “Commitment must be justified on the basis of a legitimate state interest, and the reasons for committing a particular individual must be established in an appropriate proceeding.

Commonwealth v. Camblin

471 Mass. 639 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 12, 2015

breath test result is deemed admissible under the statute, and even though the scientific principle underlying the breathalyzer's premise may be generally accepted, 20 the Alcotest presents a new methodology that is not immune … The question remains whether, despite the fact that the motion judge did not consider the merits of the defendant's challenges, the present record clearly establishes the 25 The judge's second reason for declining

Opinion of the Justices to the Senate

363 Mass. 909 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 13, 1973

Clearly the press has no special immunity from civil and criminal laws which relate to its business aspects. Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Bd. 301 U. S. 103, 132-133 . Associated Press v. … L. c. 56, § 42) and would not be completely immune from libel suits. The penalties which might be imposed for a violation of § 39A are not insubstantial.

Plymouth Rock Energy Associates v. Department of Public Utilities

420 Mass. 168 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 26, 1995

Under PURPA, if a power generation project meets certain specified requirements, it is characterized as a Qualifying Facility (QF). 16 U.S.C. § 796 (18) (B). … The statute and its implementing regulations clearly mandate that the rate to be paid by utilities for electrie energy be determined by the avoided cost to the utility of generating that energy or purchasing it elsewhere.