Case law

Chenery v. Goodrich

98 Mass. 224 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 15, 1867

In considering the several grounds of demurrer to the declaration in the present case, it is to be borne in mind that, under the rules of pleading established by statute in this Commonwealth, essential changes have been made … But, if we are wrong in this view of the case, we are clearly of opinion that the action is maintainable on another ground.

Andover Housing Authority v. Shkolnik

443 Mass. 300 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 14, 2005

However, that was clearly not the case. See, e.g., City Wide Assocs. v. … In conclusion, the tenants have failed to establish that the authority discriminated against them in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(3)(B), and G.

Ferro v. School Department

447 Mass. 1021 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 16, 2006

As drafted, the trust instrument directs the establishment of the “Moses & Mary Souza Scholarship Fund,” from which scholarships are to be awarded to qualified students graduating from New Bedford High School; after ten years … As a result of this change, the fund will qualify for tax exemption under I.R.C. § 501.

Eyssi v. City of Lawrence

416 Mass. 194 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 26, 1993

Moreover, “[a] statute is not to be interpreted as effecting a material change in or a repeal of the common law unless the intent to do so is clearly expressed.” Riley v. Davison Constr. … The 1985 amendment to the workers’ compensation act did not alter these established canons of statutory construction. Accord MacQuarrie v.

Strong, &c.

37 Mass. 484 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 29, 1838

For these purposes he may still have to resort to a quo warranto, and possibly before he can get qualified to another mandamus. … Two processes may be necessary to enable the petitioner to get possession of the office, the one to establish the legality of his own election, the other -to set aside that of the incumbent.

Seder v. Kozlowski

311 Mass. 30 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 25, 1942

The decree dismissing the appeal from the final decree after rescript, therefore, stands, and such final decree is immune from attack since there is no effective appeal therefrom. … It merely established facts preparatory to the entry of a final decree.

Santos

461 Mass. 565 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 22, 2012

Although the judge clearly did not so intend, the instruction *574 could have led the jury to believe that by legislative directive, more weight ought to be given to the conclusions of the Commonwealth’s witnesses than to … General Laws c. 123A, § 6A, as appearing in St. 1993, c. 489, § 4, established a five-member community access board (CAB), affiliated with the Department of Correction, which “conduces] annual reviews of and prepare[s] reports

In re Chapman

482 Mass. 293 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 16, 2019

The civil commitment procedures established by statute in Massachusetts differ greatly depending on whether an individual is alleged to be dangerous by reason of mental illness under G. … If this report "clearly indicate[d]" that the prisoner was a sexually dangerous person, the Commonwealth would petition for commitment, and the court would hold a hearing to determine whether the individual was in fact sexually

Perez v. Boston Housing Authority

368 Mass. 333 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 10, 1975

The result we have reached is clearly required by the law. … The weakness of this argument lies in the fact that the position of the tenants clearly must rely in part on the provisions of c. 121B in so far as that statute establishes powers and responsibilities of the Commonwealth.

Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. Hartfield Realty Co.

284 Mass. 540 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 7, 1933

Such a recital would clearly have limited the second proviso to the status of a mere repetition of the *546 first proviso. … It cannot be assumed that the parties then perceived no conflict, because they considered that the second proviso merely qualified the first proviso.

In re Keenan

287 Mass. 577 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 12, 1934

Section 65 is a statute which the courts would naturally adopt by analogy in that class of cases even if less clearly applicable as matter of interpretation. Strout v. United Shoe Machinery Co. 215 Mass. 116, 119 . … The procedure has been according to established practice. Painstaking consideration has been given to all his arguments.

Preston v. City of Boston

29 Mass. 7 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 21, 1831

But we think this case is clearly distinguishable from that cited. … Resident citizens, being in other *13 respects qualified, have a voice in assessing taxes, in electing assessors and other officers, and by means of their powers and immunities, have a security against over-valuation and

Foster v. Mayor of Beverly

315 Mass. 567 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 29, 1944

Nor do we think that the Legislature has evidenced an intent to create a privileged class of corporations immune in at least one respect from zoning regulation. … “On this point binding precedents establish the test to be whether the provisions of the ordinance as applied to the plaintiffs and their properties 'are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation

Daley v. State Tax Commission

376 Mass. 861 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 18, 1978

The Federal Code in the 1971 text, with effect for 1972, as a general rule taxed distributions from qualified employee benefit plans as ordinary income. § 402(a)(1). … Quite clearly, as the taxpayers concede, the General Court could have drawn a line in the statute between increments on the contributions and the contributions themselves, with different rates applied to the portions of the

Attorney General v. Loomis

225 Mass. 372 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 27, 1916

That statute established the term of office for the city clerk in all cities which accepted its provisions. … Clearly this section establishes no term for any office except that it incorporates by necessary implication the term of office of city clerk as fixed by St. 1901, c. 332, now R.

Commonwealth v. United Books, Inc.

389 Mass. 888 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 15, 1983

L. c. 272, § 31, expressly applies the Statewide standard only to questions of priirience, the Legislature clearly intended that the Commonwealth standard should apply also to questions of patent offensiveness.” … L. c. 272, § 29. *893 We believe that our prior decisions establish that the definition of obscenity in G.

Jacob's Pillow Dance Festival, Inc. v. Assessors of Becket

320 Mass. 311 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 30, 1946

The board found these facts: The appellant was incorporated under the laws of this Commonwealth “to establish, conduct and maintain a school at which those showing talent in dancing may obtain a complete and well-rounded … It must meet these requirements in order to qualify for exemption, under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 59, § 5, Third. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. Assessors of Boston, 294 Mass. 248, 254-255 . Assessors of Boston.v.

Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto

458 Mass. 657 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 11, 2011

Then, within a few months of the 1994 trial, Storella entered into a different immunity agreement with the prosecutor, one that gave him immunity from prosecution for any crimes connected with the shootings, including murder … As previously stated, see note 11, supra, the Commonwealth also may raise the issue whether the new DNA evidence qualifies as newly discovered.

Gannon v. City of Boston

476 Mass. 786 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 18, 2017

Newspaper Co., 457 Mass. 113, 120 (2010) ("Once an employee 'make[s] at least a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible,' the burden of proof [of both production and persuasion] shifts to the employer to establish … The plaintiff's showing of being 'otherwise qualified' encompasses or subsumes the issue of direct threat, the argument goes, because a person who is a direct threat would not be qualified for the job; being qualified implies

Trumbull v. Trumbull

4 L.R.A. 117 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 10, 1889

. *202 A devise to one, and if he die without heirs of his body then over to another, would create an estate tail in the first taker, whatever the actual intention of the testator might have been; but words qualifying such … In the case at bar, the devise is not only in express terms to the first taker for life, but the intent of the testator clearly appears to provide for George B.