Case law

Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission v. Bettencourt

474 Mass. 60 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 6, 2016

L. c. 32, §§ 1 through 28,] inclusive, and of corresponding provisions of earlier laws shall be deemed to establish and to have established membership in the retirement system as a contractual relationship … We hold today, however, that under the pension forfeiture scheme established by G.

Commonwealth v. Thomas

439 Mass. 362 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 13, 2003

“The impeachment was complete on reading the records and establishing that the witness was the subject of them. . . . … Uncorroborated testimony of immunized witness.

Suffolk Construction Co. v. Division of Capital Asset Management

449 Mass. 444 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 13, 2007

Court for the Dist. of Ariz., 881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 1989) (work-product doctrine not a privilege but a “qualified immunity”). See also Mass. R. Civ. … Attorney work product, an immunity for the attorney, on the other hand, is discoverable on a showing of need. See Hickman v.

Edwards v. Warren Linoline & Gasoline Works

38 L.R.A. 791 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 15, 1897

Such association is treated in the statute as a partnership which, upon the performance of certain acts, shall possess specified rights and immunities. … Many other instances of legislation might be given where the distinction between a corporation proper and a mere association or organization is shown to be clearly in mind.

Haskins v. Warren

115 Mass. 514 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 7, 1874

If he proceeds to deliver without insisting upon payment, and without qualifying the act in some way. the condition or mutual dependence is waived or severed. … If the seller intends to insist upon either he must refuse the indulgence, or protect his right by a special and qualified delivery.

Commonwealth v. Hackett

84 Mass. 136 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 15, 1861

We are disposed to apply the rule strictly, and to exclude everything which does not clearly come within its just and proper limitations. … A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime, and to take away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard.

Booth v. Kornegay

452 Mass. 1005 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 19, 2008

Facts. 5 The settlor established the trust in January, 1995; he died on October 1, 1999. … In particular, “[w]e have allowed the reformation of trust instruments which produced tax results that were clearly inconsistent with the settlor’s tax objectives.” Id., quoting Bank-Boston v.

Russell v. Cooley Dickinson Hospital, Inc.

437 Mass. 443 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 8, 2002

To establish a prima facie case for employment discrimination on the basis of handicap, the plaintiff must show that she was terminated, that she is “handicapped,” that she is a “qualified handicapped person,” and that she … The defendants argue and the judge concluded that the plaintiff cannot establish that she is a qualified handicapped person because at all relevant times she was collecting disability benefits on the basis of being “temporarily

First Natl. Bank of Boston v. First Natl. Bank Boston

375 Mass. 121 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 27, 1978

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that, in Article Eighth, Crockett clearly expressed an intent to obtain the maximum allowable marital deduction. As we pointed out in Putnam v. … Additionally, the trust established under Article *125 Eighth was designed to qualify for the marital deduction under I.R.C. § 2056. 5 A contrary intent is not to be found on examination of the will.

Adams v. City of Boston

461 Mass. 602 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 7, 2012

This language, clear on its face, is not qualified by any other part of the statute. A CBA of four years would clearly conflict with the statute and be declared invalid. … Municipalities are thus clearly required to pay one-half the sums listed in the payment provision.

Dulgarian v. Stone

420 Mass. 843 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 24, 1995

Each statement was a true fact, a nonprovable as false fact or an opinion, clearly identified as such, based on disclosed nondefamatory facts. … Summary judgment was proper because the plaintiffs could not establish that the defendants’ conduct arose from improper motives or involved improper means.

Harlow v. Thomas

32 Mass. 66 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1833

The reference to the deed from Bent to the defendant was for the purpose of description, to identify the land conveyed and to distinguish it from other adjoining land of the defendant, and not to limit or qualify the title … The plaintiff having established his right to recover, it only remains to inquire what shall be the measure of damages. The' general rule in cases of this kind, is plain and undisputed.

Blaisdell v. Commonwealth

372 Mass. 753 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 14, 1977

In order for the privilege to apply, at least two factors need be established. … Since the protection afforded a defendant by way of immunity must be coextensive in scope with that afforded by the privilege, statements short of confessions of guilt *763 must also be immunized lest they become a “link

Santana v. Registrars of Voters of Worcester

398 Mass. 862 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 31, 1986

The judge’s finding was not clearly erroneous. *866 B. Constitutional violation cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). … The finding was not clearly erroneous. In this State, as in most jurisdictions, recovery for emotional distress is limited.

Moe v. Secretary of Administration & Finance

382 Mass. 629 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 18, 1981

Certain minimum requirements must be met, however, to qualify for Federal aid. … The plaintiffs clearly allege that the challenged restriction will prevent them from obtaining abortions.

School Committee of Boston v. Board of Education

364 Mass. 199 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 29, 1973

L. c. 71, § 37D, as amended by St. 1971, c. 958, and clearly applies to redistricting by the Committee *208 in the ordinary course of planning to eliminate racial imbalance. … Otherwise, it is claimed, Board planning would be immune" from the requirements of equal consideration of safety and neighborhood-districting.

Clapp v. Massachusetts Benefit Ass'n

146 Mass. 519 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 7, 1888

He further held, that the words “ to the best of my knowledge and belief,” found in the first clause of the acknowledgment, were applicable to the second clause, and qualified it as they qualified the earlier clause, and … answers were untrue, and known or believed by him to be so, it has successfully sustained that burden in several instances, and that the jury should have been instructed to render a verdict in accordance with the facts thus established

Carleton v. Commonwealth

447 Mass. 791 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 7, 2006

We do not construe Carleton’s art. 114 right to be free from employment discrimination based on handicap more *813 broadly than that which is provided him in § 4 (16). 37 Because he is unable to establish that he is a “qualified … Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979), we construe “otherwise qualified” to mean qualified in spite of (as opposed to except for) a handicap.

Halsey v. McLean

94 Mass. 438 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 15, 1866

The principles by which we must be controlled are sufficiently well established. … The construction given to this provision by the courts of New York clearly establishes its qualified and penal character in their opinion. And we regard their construction as conclusive upon us.

Poirier v. Town of Plymouth

374 Mass. 206 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 10, 1978

Further, the inspection should be undertaken only by qualified specialists. … Leahy Co., 300 Mass. 565, 568 (1938). 4 The defendant, maintaining that it is a common employer, thus argues that it enjoys immunity from tort suit.