Case law

White v. South Parish

54 Mass. 506 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 15, 1847

It is therefore guarded with great jealousy, and will not be held to exist, where it is not clearly given. None of these considerations apply to a voluntary donation. … It is not a question, to be considered here, whether the parish have established the right kind of school, or otherwise rightly appropriated the fund.

ELM Medical Laboratory, Inc. v. RKO General, Inc.

403 Mass. 779 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 11, 1989

Massachusetts recognizes the “fair report privilege,” which allows those who fairly and accurately report certain types of official or governmental action to be immune from liability for claims arising out of such reports … Most of the broadcasts containing the allegedly inaccurate statements were qualified by phrases such as “possibly,” “as many as,” and “may have.”

Corcoran v. Commonwealth

335 Mass. 29 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 27, 1956

In the ordinary case, where there is no reliance upon a statute granting immunity, a claim of privilege is clearly essential. As was said in Ross v. … Crane, 291 Mass. 28, 33 , in an opinion by Chief Justice Rugg, “The immunity is given in return for the relinquishment of a privilege, but the privilege must be asserted before there can be basis for the immunity.

Pond v. Pond

424 Mass. 894 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 13, 1997

The settlor’s intent in creating the trust was clearly to qualify for the marital deduction under § 2056(b)(7) of the I.R.C. … The settlor’s intent was to minimize estate tax payable by establishing a qualifying terminal interest trust. To qualify under § 2056, the trust must distribute income to the surviving spouse.

CFM Buckley/North, LLC v. Board of Assessors

453 Mass. 404 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 16, 2009

We conclude that the taxpayers failed to demonstrate “clearly and unequivocally that [they] come[] within the terms of the exemption.” Western Mass. Lifecare Corp. v. … While the taxpayers do not qualify as “charitable organizations” for purposes of G.

Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives

122 Mass. 594 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 7, 1877

voters for senators or representatives, and could not be qualified to hold either of those offices. … institute government; and to reform, alter or totally change the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity and happiness require it.” “ All the inhabitants of this Commonwealth, having such qualifications as they shall establish

Feeney v. Commonwealth

373 Mass. 359 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 16, 1977

It would also enervate the Legislature’s clearly articulated determination to allocate to the Attorney General complete responsibility for all the Commonwealth’s legal business. … L. c. 12, § 3, does not lead us to conclude that the Legislature intended to qualify the Attorney General’s authority as chief law officer in such a manner.

Manning v. City of Lowell

173 Mass. 100 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 4, 1899

The witness may have been qualified to testify as to the value of lands in Chelmsford, and yet not qualified to testify as to the value of lands in Lowell. … This evidence was clearly competent as an admission made by the petitioner. Patch v. Boston, 146 Mass. 52 . 4.

Commonwealth v. Libbey

216 Mass. 356 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 9, 1914

S. 549 , *358 567: "Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community.” … But the State, in the exercise of the police power, may legislate for the public health, the public safety and the public morals, and in a certain qualified sense for the public welfare, and thus restrict the freedom of the

Bowe v. Secretary of Commonwealth

320 Mass. 230 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 20, 1946

voters, whether the name signed was that of a qualified voter. … names of qualified voters.

Commonwealth v. Tague

434 Mass. 510 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 10, 2001

Francis, 375 Mass. 211, 215-216 , cert. denied, 439 U.S. 872 (1978), because, at the time he made the statement, he believed he was immune. … Tougas testified under a grant of immunity. The attack on McLaughlin resulted in the defendant’s conviction of armed assault with intent to murder McLaughlin.

Whalen v. Nynex Information Resources Co.

419 Mass. 792 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 28, 1995

To establish a prima facie case of “disparate treatment” on the basis of a handicap, a plaintiff must produce some evidence that: (1) he is handicapped; (2) he is a qualified handicapped person and he applied for a position … We decided first that the plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim “[fell] squarely *795 within the language of art. 15” because it was a “suit between two persons which clearly set[] forth a controversy concerning property.”

Western Massachusetts Lifecare Corp. v. Board of Assessors

434 Mass. 96 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 11, 2001

L. c. 59, § 5, Third, and that Western has not carried its burden of establishing overvaluation. We therefore affirm the board’s decision. 1. Facts. … The burden of establishing entitlement to the charitable exemption lies with the taxpayer. New England Legal Found. v. Boston, 423 Mass. 602, 609 (1996).

Pinshaw v. Metropolitan District Commission

402 Mass. 687 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 30, 1988

Monk’s conduct clearly was of the kind he was hired to perform. See note 3, supra. The issue is Monk’s motivation. … The immunity standard in Gildea v. Ellershaw, 363 Mass. 800 (1973), cited by the dissent, is not clearly relevant to the Federal jury verdict.

Opinion of the Justices to the Senate

419 Mass. 1201 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 28, 1994

The SSI program encourages States to supplement the federally-established minimum benefits levels to qualified SSI beneficiaries by entering into agreements with the Secretary. 3 General Laws c. 118A, § 3, provides that the … The disapproval of such orders is permitted because otherwise the Legislature could, by placing general laws within appropriation bills, immunize them from veto. Opinion of the Justices, 384 Mass. at 826.

Pixley v. Commonwealth

453 Mass. 827 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 19, 2009

Duval, 124 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (suggesting that judicial immunity might be warranted in circumstances where prosecution attempted to intimidate potential witness or deliberately withheld immunity to hide exculpatory … We have held that when the prosecution obtains statutory immunity for a witness, art. 12 requires that the immunity be transactional immunity, granting immunity from prosecution for any offense “to which compelled testimony

Lafayette Place Associates v. Boston Redevelopment Authority

427 Mass. 509 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 20, 1998

But of course this difference is merely the result of the assignment of functions to a redevelopment authority in communities that choose to establish one. … Consistent with the common law principles of governmental immunity which preceded the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, we conclude that public employers retain their immunity from suits arising from intentional torts.”

DeRoche v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination

447 Mass. 1 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 12, 2006

The department is a municipal electric department established by the voters of the town of Wakefield (town), pursuant to G. L. c. 164, § 34, to operate the light plant owned by the town. … L. c. 30A, § 14, where the commission had denied interest based on an error of law. 15 (d) We also have spoken clearly on the issue of the interest on front pay awards in discrimination cases. In Conway v.

Blake v. Avedikian

412 Mass. 481 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 16, 1992

Birbiglia, supra. 2 The defendants argue that the plaintiff failed to establish her proffered expert as qualified to give an opinion because no information was supplied as to the expert’s education, training, knowledge, or … Subsequent photographs taken on December 3, 1984 and January 8, 1985 clearly demonstrate the residual defects.

Weber v. Community Teamwork, Inc.

434 Mass. 761 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 13, 2001

more qualified.” … She first concluded that Weber had established a prima facie case of discrimination. That ruling is correct.