Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
1,873 results
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ELM Medical Laboratory, Inc. v. RKO General, Inc.
403 Mass. 779 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 11, 1989
Massachusetts recognizes the “fair report privilege,” which allows those who fairly and accurately report certain types of official or governmental action to be immune from liability for claims arising out of such reports … Most of the broadcasts containing the allegedly inaccurate statements were qualified by phrases such as “possibly,” “as many as,” and “may have.”
Abrogated on other grounds by United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 406 Mass. 811 (1990)Cited 94 timesPublishedOpinion of the Justices to the Senate
229 Mass. 601 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 1, 1918
The purpose and effect of that amendment, reported by a committee of which Daniel Webster was chairman, were clearly set forth by Lemuel Shaw, afterwards Chief Justice, who as a member of that convention was its leading supporter … To call the municipal organization established by the proposed bill, “town,” cannot modify its essential governmental nature. We are constrained to answer "each of the questions in the negative.
Cited 14 timesPublished335 Mass. 29 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 27, 1956
In the ordinary case, where there is no reliance upon a statute granting immunity, a claim of privilege is clearly essential. As was said in Ross v. … Crane, 291 Mass. 28, 33 , in an opinion by Chief Justice Rugg, “The immunity is given in return for the relinquishment of a privilege, but the privilege must be asserted before there can be basis for the immunity.
Cited 5 timesPublished424 Mass. 894 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 13, 1997
The settlor’s intent in creating the trust was clearly to qualify for the marital deduction under § 2056(b)(7) of the I.R.C. … The settlor’s intent was to minimize estate tax payable by establishing a qualifying terminal interest trust. To qualify under § 2056, the trust must distribute income to the surviving spouse.
Cited 29 timesPublishedWhalen v. Nynex Information Resources Co.
419 Mass. 792 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 28, 1995
To establish a prima facie case of “disparate treatment” on the basis of a handicap, a plaintiff must produce some evidence that: (1) he is handicapped; (2) he is a qualified handicapped person and he applied for a position … We decided first that the plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim “[fell] squarely *795 within the language of art. 15” because it was a “suit between two persons which clearly set[] forth a controversy concerning property.”
Cited 22 timesPublished434 Mass. 510 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 10, 2001
Francis, 375 Mass. 211, 215-216 , cert. denied, 439 U.S. 872 (1978), because, at the time he made the statement, he believed he was immune. … Tougas testified under a grant of immunity. The attack on McLaughlin resulted in the defendant’s conviction of armed assault with intent to murder McLaughlin.
Cited 28 timesPublishedCFM Buckley/North, LLC v. Board of Assessors
453 Mass. 404 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 16, 2009
We conclude that the taxpayers failed to demonstrate “clearly and unequivocally that [they] come[] within the terms of the exemption.” Western Mass. Lifecare Corp. v. … While the taxpayers do not qualify as “charitable organizations” for purposes of G.
Cited 7 timesPublished373 Mass. 359 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 16, 1977
It would also enervate the Legislature’s clearly articulated determination to allocate to the Attorney General complete responsibility for all the Commonwealth’s legal business. … L. c. 12, § 3, does not lead us to conclude that the Legislature intended to qualify the Attorney General’s authority as chief law officer in such a manner.
Cited 33 timesPublishedOpinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives
122 Mass. 594 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 7, 1877
voters for senators or representatives, and could not be qualified to hold either of those offices. … institute government; and to reform, alter or totally change the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity and happiness require it.” “ All the inhabitants of this Commonwealth, having such qualifications as they shall establish
Cited 10 timesPublished173 Mass. 100 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 4, 1899
The witness may have been qualified to testify as to the value of lands in Chelmsford, and yet not qualified to testify as to the value of lands in Lowell. … This evidence was clearly competent as an admission made by the petitioner. Patch v. Boston, 146 Mass. 52 . 4.
Cited 26 timesPublished216 Mass. 356 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 9, 1914
S. 549 , *358 567: "Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community.” … But the State, in the exercise of the police power, may legislate for the public health, the public safety and the public morals, and in a certain qualified sense for the public welfare, and thus restrict the freedom of the
Cited 45 timesPublishedBowe v. Secretary of Commonwealth
320 Mass. 230 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 20, 1946
voters, whether the name signed was that of a qualified voter. … names of qualified voters.
Cited 91 timesPublishedWestern Massachusetts Lifecare Corp. v. Board of Assessors
434 Mass. 96 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 11, 2001
L. c. 59, § 5, Third, and that Western has not carried its burden of establishing overvaluation. We therefore affirm the board’s decision. 1. Facts. … The burden of establishing entitlement to the charitable exemption lies with the taxpayer. New England Legal Found. v. Boston, 423 Mass. 602, 609 (1996).
Cited 20 timesPublishedPinshaw v. Metropolitan District Commission
402 Mass. 687 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 30, 1988
Monk’s conduct clearly was of the kind he was hired to perform. See note 3, supra. The issue is Monk’s motivation. … The immunity standard in Gildea v. Ellershaw, 363 Mass. 800 (1973), cited by the dissent, is not clearly relevant to the Federal jury verdict.
Cited 53 timesPublished443 Mass. 327 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 20, 2005
Massachusetts law recognizing such absolute immunity accords with well-established law across the country. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-334 (1983), and cases cited; Blevins v. … With specific reference to the board, it is also an extremely modest modification of the earlier statute that gave qualified immunity to persons filing complaints, reporting or providing information, “or assisting the board
Cited 83 timesPublished453 Mass. 827 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 19, 2009
Duval, 124 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (suggesting that judicial immunity might be warranted in circumstances where prosecution attempted to intimidate potential witness or deliberately withheld immunity to hide exculpatory … We have held that when the prosecution obtains statutory immunity for a witness, art. 12 requires that the immunity be transactional immunity, granting immunity from prosecution for any offense “to which compelled testimony
Cited 23 timesPublishedOpinion of the Justices to the Senate
419 Mass. 1201 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 28, 1994
The SSI program encourages States to supplement the federally-established minimum benefits levels to qualified SSI beneficiaries by entering into agreements with the Secretary. 3 General Laws c. 118A, § 3, provides that the … The disapproval of such orders is permitted because otherwise the Legislature could, by placing general laws within appropriation bills, immunize them from veto. Opinion of the Justices, 384 Mass. at 826.
Cited 5 timesPublishedRotondi v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board
463 Mass. 644 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 29, 2012
We find no reason to distinguish between forms of compensation that qualify for the purposes of calculating an individual’s retirement allowance, and forms of compensation that qualify in satisfying a minimum eligibility … In order to qualify as “regular compensation,” payments must be “ ‘recurrent,’ ‘regular,’ and ‘ordinary’ remuneration.” Bulger v.
Cited 12 timesPublishedLafayette Place Associates v. Boston Redevelopment Authority
427 Mass. 509 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 20, 1998
But of course this difference is merely the result of the assignment of functions to a redevelopment authority in communities that choose to establish one. … Consistent with the common law principles of governmental immunity which preceded the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, we conclude that public employers retain their immunity from suits arising from intentional torts.”
Cited 110 timesPublished412 Mass. 481 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 16, 1992
Birbiglia, supra. 2 The defendants argue that the plaintiff failed to establish her proffered expert as qualified to give an opinion because no information was supplied as to the expert’s education, training, knowledge, or … Subsequent photographs taken on December 3, 1984 and January 8, 1985 clearly demonstrate the residual defects.
Cited 22 timesPublished
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