Case law

Blakeley v. Gorin

365 Mass. 590 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 12, 1974

Clearly there would be some effect on the property. There was testimony to support a finding that the effect would not be de minimis but would be substantial. … It seems clear that the arcade is not one of the "usual" permitted projections qualifying as an exception to the set-back restrictions and it would violate both of them.

Commonwealth v. Gallett

481 Mass. 662 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 20, 2019

The judge sustained the objection, concluding that she did not "think this witness [was] qualified to talk about the possible wounds that might be inflicted on knife wielders." … For evidentiary reasons, the judge found that Gallett was "clearly . . . prohibited from introducing any evidence about . . . Gallett's alleged reaction when . . .

Commonwealth v. Edwards

444 Mass. 526 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 1, 2005

Although granted immunity, after the appropriate hearing, Crockett persisted in his refusal to testify at the defendants’ scheduled trial and, on April 12, 2004, was found in contempt of court in violation of G. … Mello, 420 Mass. 375 , 381 n.8 (1995) (on review of motion to suppress, “we do not disturb the judge’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous”).

Shaw v. Boston & Worcester Railroad

74 Mass. 45 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1857

But the second point more directly affects the real controversy—the variance which this evidence would show between *72 the case which the plaintiff would claim to establish by it, and that made in her declaration, and stated … This verdict is clearly excessive, immoderate, intemperate, and uould not have been determined by a reasonable and dispassion *83 ate application of correct legal principles. This appears by the following tests: (1.)

Commonwealth v. Brown

477 Mass. 805 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 20, 2017

Maloney, 927 F.2d 646, 651 (1st Cir. 1990) (words "you may infer" clearly indicated that inferences of malice and intent were permissive). … L. c. 265, § 1, which establishes two degrees of murder.

Earle v. Wood

62 Mass. 430 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1851

Acts were passed soon after the adoption of the provincial charter, in 1692 and 1693, for establishing a high court of chancery for the province. Anc. Chart. 222, 274. … The act has no special exception of conveyances in trust, but the exceptions are thus stated: Unless it is stated that the grantees or devises shall hold jointly, &c., or unless other words be therein used, clearly and manifestly

Cushman v. Cushman

179 Mass. 601 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 18, 1901

Whether witness qualified as expert question for presiding judge, see Kailboad, 6. Discretion of Court. 26. … Held, that the refusal was right, there being clearly a lien for the extra work, and, also, that the petitioner might establish his lien for the amount due him in equity and good conscience for the benefit conferred by him

DeMatteo v. DeMatteo

436 Mass. 18 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 8, 2002

He had a substantial ownership interest in his family’s construction business; this and other real estate holdings and investments established him as a man of significant net worth, described more fully below. … The judge did not find that the attorney was not qualified to represent the wife or that she had failed to represent her adequately. Dominick v. Dominick, 18 Mass. App.

Baker v. Baker

74 Mass. 101 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1857

We think there are three leading purposes, manifested by the testator, in this will: First, after placing at his wife’s use and disposal furniture, carnages and generally the means of maintaining a household establishment … These phrases are, “ shall descend to his father,” “ to his mother,” to “ his next of kin,” which may be in the ascending or collateral line, as well as the descending; but in these cases these terms so qualify the word “

Foley v. Polaroid Corp.

400 Mass. 82 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 21, 1987

More particularly, we consider whether a threat of discharge can constitute the imprisonment required to establish such a claim. … We also have recognized a qualified or conditional privilege "where the publisher and the recipient have a common interest, and the communication is of a kind reasonably calculated to protect or further it." Sheehan v.

Howard v. Merriam

59 Allen 563 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 15, 1850

When the owner of land permits a tenant at will to enter and occupy, it must be well known to the parties, because it is a well-established rule of law, that upon a conveyance of the estate the tenancy at will must terminate … But this is clearly *584 settled otherwise by the statute, which provides, “that the person entitled to the premises, may be restored to the possession.”

Commonwealth v. Lee Manuel Rios

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 14, 2025

On April 2, police established surveillance of the Nursery Street apartment where the defendant, Natalie, Nelson, Torres, and Torres's children were staying. … The FCHC inmate handbook does clearly state, in bold, capitalized letters, "All calls made on the blue [inmate and detainee] telephones except attorney and consulate calls are recorded and subject to monitoring."

Commonwealth v. French

357 Mass. 356 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 4, 1970

They do not appear very directly or clearly to charge defendants (not present when the statements were made) with complicity in Deegan’s murder. … Pretty clearly he was pointing out the difference in weight which might be given to serious offences and to automobile traffic offences.

Commonwealth v. Holley

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 14, 2017

Christian, 430 Mass. at 556, explained that it is "the stealing or taking of property[] that qualifies them for application of the felony-murder rule." … Unlike in Connor, supra at 842-843, where a juror refused to deliberate or keep his oath, the juror's illness in this case was clearly a personal problem.

Commonwealth v. Philip Chism

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 25, 2025

It is a further question whether the motion judge's order qualified as prejudicial error. We hold that it did not. Dudley insisted that the IQ test scores did not change his opinion. … Moreover, the record does not support the defendant's claim that Kinscherff's testimony was "clearly based" on his exposure to the suppressed Danvers police station statement.

Commonwealth v. Barboza

387 Mass. 105 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 5, 1982

Gormley contends that Mark's presence at the scene of the firebombing does not establish his involvement. She also contends that flight is insufficient to support a finding of participation in the act. … The inclusion of acts by household members among the types of conduct singled out for expedited treatment clearly indicates that the Legislature viewed such acts as "cause" for termination. See Weston v.

Commonwealth v. Celester

473 Mass. 553 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 10, 2016

The judge allowed the statement to come in without specifically deciding whether it qualified as a spontaneous utterance because of defense counsel's concession that it did. … Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-691 [1984],) sense] and the Fifth Amendment in the same breath, let alone set forth a clearly established right to that effect").

Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

452 Mass. 337 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 23, 2008

The question is not whether Wal-Mart’s records are dispositive evidence, conclusively establishing liability and damages “of themselves.” … “There may, of course, be some regressions so incomplete as to be inadmissible as irrelevant; but such was clearly not the case here.” Id. at 400 n.10.

Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indemnity Co.

454 Mass. 337 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 24, 2009

“Excess . . . insurance over a qualified purely self-insured retention of risk would not be considered ‘primary;’ the self-insurance itself is the ‘primary’ layer.” Id. at § 5:3, at 2. … In such a case both policies clearly cover the entire loss.” (Citations omitted.) Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 437, 470 (1994).

Commonwealth v. Correia

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 12, 2023

Although rap lyrics do not qualify as bad act evidence,12 here, the defendant's lyrics conveyed ideas or acts that 12 We have considered rap lyrics to be bad act evidence on at least one other occasion. … In Kendrick, 351 Mass. at 211, "excessive force" is described as "unreasonable and clearly excessive in light of the existing circumstances" or "manifestly disproportionate."