Case law

Hume Lake Christian Camps, Inc. v. Planning Board of Monterey

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 7, 2023

statement provides: "We desire that each person coming into contact with this global ministry will accept Jesus Christ as their personal savior; grow in their faith and Christian character development; establish … This purpose is clearly set forth in Hume's mission statement, which articulates Hume's desire that "each person coming into contact with [Hume's] ministry will . . .

Commonwealth v. Cotto

471 Mass. 97 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 8, 2015

Therefore, the judge continued, the evidence of Farak's misconduct, in particular, and the administrative problems at the Amherst drug lab, in general, qualified as "newly discovered." … Subpoena to establish scope and timing of Farak's misconduct.

The McLean Hospital Corp. v. Town of Lincoln

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 23, 2019

"To the extent that it is a finding of fact, it must be set aside as 'clearly  9 See Fitchburg Hous. Auth. v. … We must ascertain, based upon the facts found by the trial judge, to which we afford appropriate deference absent clear error, whether McLean's proposed use of the property qualifies as having "educational purposes" within

Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Attorney General

480 Mass. 700 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 11, 2018

She recalled the sample clearly because of its size and its source, but also because that had been the first time that she had crossed a line into a new level of lab misconduct. … The attorney responded that Farak would cooperate if she were to receive a sentence of probation and immunity for additional State and Federal charges. The Attorney General's office declined to accept the offer.

Commonwealth v. Charros

443 Mass. 752 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 31, 2005

The statements were properly excluded as hearsay, and they did not qualify as statements against penal interest. … There had been no showing that Ryan was not available, and the statement had not been corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating trustworthiness. See Commonwealth v.

Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson

448 Mass. 718 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 10, 2007

But contrary to our regular practice when establishing a new rule not constitutionally mandated, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dwyer, ante 122, 124, 147 (2006); Commonwealth v. … At trial, the defendant testified that he had given officials at the scene incorrect accounts of the fight because he was concussed, he was not thinking clearly, he wanted to go home, and he did not want to press charges

Commonwealth v. Storey

378 Mass. 312 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 25, 1979

. *319 denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977), our approval of these techniques is strongly qualified by the observation that prosecutors, and the public they represent, may often stand to benefit at trial through the use of formal … The gun was correctly admitted in evidence because it was clearly relevant to show that the defendant had readily available means of committing the offense. Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 491 (1978).

Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Public Utilities

368 Mass. 780 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 29, 1975

However, it was established at the rate hearings that approximately 36.5% of the SNG plant’s production served the Northern Division. … L. c. 25, § 5. 20 A person’s intervention before the department may qualify him as a “party” (see Save the Bay, Inc. v. Department of Pub.

Commonwealth v. Lang

473 Mass. 1 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 1, 2015

Because we have recognized that "a defendant's legal counsel is uniquely qualified to assess the nuances that attend the development of the trial strategy," counsel reasonably may decline to accept the advice of a retained … The defendant has offered no evidence indicating that he would have agreed to present a lack of criminal responsibility defense at the time of the original trial, and has clearly asserted that he would not present the

Commonwealth v. Daye

411 Mass. 719 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 29, 1992

We cannot say on this record that “the substantial rights of [the defendants] are clearly shown to have been prejudiced.” Commonwealth v. Fuller, 399 Mass. 678, 684 (1987). … jury, the defendants objected to the judge’s instruction relating to the credibility of a witness and requested that the judge instruct the jury that they could not reach their verdict on the uncorroborated testimony of an immunized

Commonwealth v. Prunty

462 Mass. 295 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 23, 2012

Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008) (trial court determination merits “great deference” and “must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous”). … Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (Batson),] adds nothing new to the law already established in this Commonwealth.

Strasnick v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy

408 Mass. 654 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 26, 1990

It is not necessary under these circumstances for them to guess as to whether periods of over a year qualified as “a short time.” … It is clear that “[i]f an agency wishes to rely on a fact, that fact must be established by evidence in the record. . . .

Devine v. Town of Nantucket

449 Mass. 499 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 19, 2007

L. c. 240, § 6, title to the Locus is hereby quieted and established to be in” him. The town appealed, and we transferred the case here on our own motion. 3 We affirm. 4 1. Facts. … We begin with the judge’s findings, which we accept unless they are clearly erroneous. Mass. R. Civ. R 52 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1402 (1996). See, e.g., Kendall v.

Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives

411 Mass. 1201 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 5, 1991

Outside § 50 establishes that fund and provides for the development of plans to ensure self-sufficiency of the parks based on receipts. … This clearly would remove legislatively imposed restrictions on the appropriation and would alter the legislative purpose. Therefore, such disapproval would be ineffective.

Commonwealth v. Seabrooks

433 Mass. 439 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 12, 2001

Guided by these well-established principles, we reject the defendant’s challenges. At trial the defendant did not challenge four of the five jurors whom he now claims should have been excused for cause. … Sherry’s alleged disclaimer qualified as a Lamb warning.

Matsuyama v. Birnbaum

452 Mass. 1 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 23, 2008

The all or nothing rule “fails to deter” medical negligence because it immunizes “whole areas of medical practice from liability.” McMackin v. … Spievack, supra at 494 n.4 (recognizing established use of clinical staging systems for cancer in medical prognoses).

Mayor of Boston v. Treasurer & Receiver General

384 Mass. 718 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 15, 1981

I think the existence of that connection is clearly implied in the legislative action here. … The answer seems to be clearly, "Yes."

Adjartey v. Cent. Div. of the Hous. Court Departmentand

481 Mass. 830 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 10, 2019

This conclusion is in keeping with the established practice of our other trial courts, the text of the indigency affidavit form, and the examples of "extra costs" provided for by statute. … "The burden is on the landlord to establish that he [or she] provided the requisite notice in compliance with the statute." Harris , supra , citing Ryan v.

Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court

442 Mass. 228 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 28, 2004

Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.” … Instead, the Legislature has specified the rates to be paid, and has not appropriated funds to pay the rates “established]” by CPCS.

Town of Hingham v. Department of Telecommunications & Energy

433 Mass. 198 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 16, 2001

Utils., 416 Mass. 668, 673 (1993) (“the requirement of ‘reasoned consistency’ . . . means that any change from an established pattern of conduct must be explained . . . … The department stated that “[t]he record clearly demonstrates that if the [plant] were treated as a capital lease on the [c]ompany’s books, [the company’s] debt would no longer meet the indenture requirements, thereby resulting