Case law

Chase v. Pevear

383 Mass. 350 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 9, 1981

Such an opinion is suggestive, but falls short of establishing that the judge’s finding was clearly erroneous. c. Standard of review of the master’s findings. … Those findings are not clearly erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Apalakis

396 Mass. 292 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 9, 1985

L. c. 267, § 1, establishes four alternate bases of liability and indicates that false making and forgery are not synonymous. … This language clearly is dictum, and does not bind us.

Commonwealth v. Patterson

445 Mass. 626 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 27, 2005

Where general acceptance is not established by the party offering the expert testimony, a full Daubert analysis provides an alternate method of establishing reliability. … Ct. 932 (1990), accepted evidence of simultaneous impressions, that case is clearly distinguishable.

Commonwealth v. Clemmey

447 Mass. 121 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 30, 2006

failed to inform the jurors that (1) the Act contained an exemption from its provisions for the “normal maintenance or improvement of land in agricultural use”; (2) Clemmey had expressed his belief that the trust property qualified … They also argued that the Commonwealth had exacerbated its failure by (1) introducing evidence that Clemmey was well versed in the governing statutes and regulations, leaving the impression that the land clearly fell within

Associated Industries of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue

378 Mass. 657 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 3, 1979

But the record does not clearly show whether implementation of the Classification Act would increase or decrease either Blauvelt’s share or his tax burden in absolute terms. 8 Section 40 reads: "This act shall take effect … As so interpreted, art. 10, like art. 4, must be regarded as qualified by art. 112, as amended. 24 See Weinstock v.

Commonwealth v. Ramos

406 Mass. 397 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 9, 1990

“In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation … opined, were inconsistent with having been made by someone carrying a bleeding body. 8 General Laws c. 234A, § 3 (1988 ed.), provides: “Juror service in the participating counties shall be a duty which every person who qualifies

Forsyth School for Dental Hygienists v. Board of Registration in Dentistry

404 Mass. 211 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 2, 1989

According to Lobene’s affidavit, California now requires that all dental hygienists be trained in the administration of local anesthesia and of nitrous oxide analgesia before they can qualify to sit for the registration examination … The regulations clearly have a rational relation to the promotion of safety and health, and the school does not challenge their general validity.

North Adams National Bank v. Curtiss

278 Mass. 471 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1932

The finding that the trustee did not act imprudently or negligently in delaying the transfer of the trust estate to the trustees under the will of Sophia Curtiss cannot be said to be clearly wrong. … In that case the trustee was not acting within the scope of his powers, and the immunity clause was held to be no protection. The case of Knox v. Mackinnon, 13 App.

Doe, SORB No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Board

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 17, 2019

In a criminal case, where guilt must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, we require that each element of the offense be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. … Second, even where the findings are not explicit, the underlying facts of the case may so clearly dictate the appropriate classification level that a reviewing court may determine that a remand for explicit findings is not

Campbell v. Boston Housing Authority

443 Mass. 574 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 4, 2005

L. c. 258, which were enacted in 1994 (the 1994 amendments), rendered it immune *580 from suit on the plaintiff’s claims. … The plaintiff also established that she was a third-party beneficiary with respect to the Section 23 program AC contract. See Ayala v. Boston Hous. Auth., supra at 700-701.

Crease v. Babcock

40 Mass. 334 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 15, 1839

but which were inconsistent with, if not subversive of the ends for which the corporation was established. … This qualified prolongation of the existence of the corporate body, is in the nature of an administration of its estate. All rights under the defunct corporation were fixed at its dissolution.

Levy v. Acting Governor

436 Mass. 736 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 7, 2002

Mihos and Levy point out that the annual report qualified the statements it contained. … That qualifying language, however, does not support their position that reliance should not have been placed on the Authority’s increasing tolls in January, 2002.

Chambers v. RDI Logistics, Inc.

476 Mass. 95 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 16, 2016

Congress's overarching goal in establishing such expansive preemption was twofold. … If the FAAAA preempted any regulation that could result in an effect on motor carriers, the defendants would be exempt from all State regulation, a result that the FAAAA clearly does not countenance.16 See Dan's City

Petition of the New England Home for Little Wanderers

367 Mass. 631 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 5, 1975

The mother perceives the two criteria or tests as separate and distinct, with each to be applied in certain clearly defined circumstances. … To the factors “ability, capacity and fitness” was added “readiness ... to assume parental responsibility,” and a “presumption” was established that “the best interests of the child” would be served by dispensing with the

Commonwealth v. Conefrey

410 Mass. 1 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 6, 1991

This language clearly imports constitutional protection for the right of cross-examination asserted by the defendant. … This, the Commonwealth asserts, establishes that the defendant did not unequivocally elect to proceed pro se. 8The record does not support the Commonwealth’s claim.

Baird v. Attorney General

371 Mass. 741 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 25, 1977

However, in all of these cases, parental consent was obtained, and, in some cases, judicial approval of the operation was granted where the minor *753 donor clearly was not one capable of granting an informed consent to the … What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to apply when considering whether or not to grant consent? “a) Is the parent to consider ‘exclusively. .. what will serve the child’s best interest’?

Stornanti v. Commonwealth

389 Mass. 518 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 20, 1983

Finally, he argued that, in the absence of a grant of immunity, compliance with the subpoena would violate his rights under both Federal and State Constitutions. 4 On appeal, Stornanti claims that he could not have been required … Our ruling in Hughes is clearly inapplicable to this case. Unlike the defendant in Hughes , Stornanti has voluntarily agreed to enter the Medicaid program.

Commonwealth v. Hearns

467 Mass. 707 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 8, 2014

He argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the shooting of the victims was a “designated offense” occurring in “connection with organized crime” as defined in G. … As the motion judge found, the police immediately understood that statement as the defendant “clearly and unequivocally asserting] his rights.”

Licata v. GGNSC Malden Dexter LLC

466 Mass. 793 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 13, 2014

In so doing, we review questions of law de novo and defer to the motion judge’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. See Sheriff of Suffolk County v. … be unreasonable to recognize a wider scope of authority for a responsible party, not appointed by the principal, than exists for a health care agent, designated by the principal. 5 Thus, even assuming that Salvatore *801 qualified

Bournewood Hospital, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination

371 Mass. 303 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 4, 1976

The hospital further points out that when the Legislature believes that attorney’s fees should be awarded in a given case it clearly says so, citing as an example G. … This woman, although qualified to perform the job, had no previous experience at a psychiatric hospital, and was not required to serve any trial period before receiving the weekly salary just mentioned.