Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
1,873 results
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475 Mass. 692 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 14, 2016
The court answered that § 3 (e) was clearly intended, "at some time, to empower judges with discretion to impose a sentence below a mandatory minimum sentence established by statute." Id. at 322. … The defendant's criminal record, before the sentencing judge in connection with the Commonwealth's motion to reconsider the sentence, clearly qualifies the defendant as a subsequent offender.
Cited 4 timesPublishedGodfrey v. Massachusetts Medical Service
359 Mass. 610 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 11, 1971
Section 4 clearly grants to the defendant the discretion to enter into contracts with podiatrists. See Answer of the Justices, 346 Mass. 787, 790 . … It is well established that legislation will be upheld “[ujnless . . . [it] cannot be supported upon any rational basis of fact that reasonably can be conceived to sustain it.” Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v.
Cited 7 timesPublished475 Mass. 178 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 17, 2016
An immigration judge will preside over the removal proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012), at which the noncitizen has the burden of establishing that he or she “is clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted … The Federal statute governing the inadmissibility of noncitizens, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2), does not identify the crimes that qualify as “involving moral turpitude.”
Cited 6 timesPublishedAmerican Trucking Ass'n v. Secretary of Administration
415 Mass. 337 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 25, 1993
Revenue from fuel license fees is placed in the “Highway Fund,” established by G. … In establishing these fees, the Legislature clearly intended that interstate truckers pay only their fair share of the costs incurred by the Commonwealth.
Cited 21 timesPublishedBrookline v. COMMR. OF DEPT. OF ENVTL. QUALITY ENG'G
398 Mass. 404 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 8, 1986
Whether this theory is correct, it has been established for carcinogens, generally, that, as the exposure increases, the risk increases. … DEQE clearly has not erred in drawing the line between reasonable and unreasonable risks.
Cited 19 timesPublishedHoffman v. Houghton Chemical Corp.
434 Mass. 624 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 19, 2001
We explained that, in such circumstances: “[T]he manufacturer’s immunity from liability if the consumer does not receive the warning is explicable on the grounds that the intermediary’s failure to warn is a *633 superseding … We conclude that, in all respects but one, tire instruction clearly, adequately, and correctly explained the applicable law to the jury. See Torre v. Harris-Seybold Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 678-679 (1980).
Cited 38 timesPublished400 Mass. 786 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 18, 1987
As that privilege is commonly applied, it clearly affords protection to the defendants against one of the plaintiff s claims. … The reporting and broadcast of the plaintiffs arrest is therefore clearly privileged. The newscaster’s statement that the plaintiff had been charged with murder is not so clearly protected.
Cited 93 timesPublished419 Mass. 163 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 14, 1994
Clearly, the affidavit in this case was not a model of its kind. … The affidavit was silent on the procedures employed which qualified the informant’s purchase of narcotics as a “controlled buy.”
Cited 42 timesPublishedJohn Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Board
369 Mass. 206 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 15, 1975
In the present case, the specific question is whether the local regulations are “inconsistent with principles clearly established by comprehensive State legislation or by authorized regulations.” … Urban residents are not immune to ugliness. As noted by the New Jersey Superior Court in Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Westfield, 129 N.J.
Cited 54 timesPublishedKelleher v. Personnel Administrator of the Department of Personnel Administration
421 Mass. 382 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 16, 1995
L. c. 31, § 15, may provide a route for appointing authorities to bypass better qualified, short list candidates, we must honor the clear legislative intent to allow such a procedure for provisional promotions. … Whatever interpretive authority the administrator may enjoy, it is clearly subordinate to that of the commission. G. L. c. 31, § 2 (b).
Cited 16 timesPublished222 Mass. 487 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 7, 1916
C. 443, at page 448, “The words ‘by accident’ are . . . introduced parenthetically as it were to qualify the word ‘injury,’ confining it to a certain class of injuries, and excluding other classes, as, for instance, injuries … Greene, 2 Gray, 361 , 364, they cannot control a plain rule of positive law established by clear language in a legislative mandate.
Cited 201 timesPublished367 Mass. 540 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 30, 1975
As the opinion clearly states (655-657), it did not invalidate that portion of the by-law change allowing new access ways by special permit from the board of appeals. … the defendants . . . have continuously engaged in a conspiracy with various officials of the town of Braintree and others to deprive the plaintiffs, who are citizens of the United States, of their rights, privileges and immunities
Cited 50 timesPublished430 Mass. 169 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 18, 1999
The art. 12 confrontation issue was clearly identified by the time the defendant’s appeal from her convictions was heard, but it was not argued, and thus it was waived. Id. at 643-644 . … The defendant’s allegedly new evidence lacks the characteristics necessary to qualify as newly discovered evidence that could warrant granting a new trial. Contrast Commonwealth v. Meggs, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 111 (1991).
Cited 136 timesPublishedRate Setting Commission v. Baystate Medical Center
422 Mass. 744 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 23, 1996
Although the phrase has been applied in one other decision, Faulkner Hosp., supra at 705, this court did not explain the phrase beyond stating that “clearly on the facts before us, the hospitals had no control over the availability … Weiner, 569 F.2d 1156, 1157-1159 (1st Cir. 1978) (“the Medicaid rate . . . was established by dividing its base year costs for all inpatients ....
Cited 2 timesPublishedAgricultural National Bank v. Schwartz
325 Mass. 443 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 8, 1950
The words next of kin had acquired a well established meaning at the time the will was executed. There is no reference to any statute governing the succession to intestate property. … In these trust provisions the testator clearly distinguished the income from the principal of the trust and made a different disposition of each.
Cited 9 timesPublished94 Mass. 223 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 15, 1866
The intent of the legislature to exercise their sovereign right of appropriating private property is clearly indicated. … Such is not the natural or reasonable interpretation of the clause, standing as it does in relation to this class or species of taxation, without other words to qualify or restrict its meaning.
Cited 4 timesPublished366 Mass. 810 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 11, 1975
Two qualified psychiatrists testified for the defendant. The first was Dr. Leonard R. Friedman, who saw him at the Billerica house of correction the day after the shooting. … The evidence heard by them and the law given to them clearly played little part in their final verdict despite the length of their deliberations and the judge’s delivery of the Tuey 11 charge.
Cited 106 timesPublished464 Mass. 807 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 11, 2013
victim attends even if the juvenile and the victim had been attending the same school, it is unlikely that the Legislature intended to mandate such an exclusion for all juvenile probationers adjudicated delinquent for a qualifying … Co., 381 Mass. 432, 438 (1980) (statute not to be interpreted as effecting material change in common law unless intent to do so is clearly expressed).
Cited 21 timesPublishedReep v. COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPT. OF EMP. & TRAINING
412 Mass. 845 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 11, 1992
But this argument, however appealing, cannot override what seems to us to be the clearly expressed legislative intent. … If the Legislature were to have favored that kind of onerous and harsh result, it is fair to assume that it would have said so in G.L.c. 151, § 25 ( e ), loudly and clearly. *860 I would reverse the judgment below and would
Cited 0 timesPublished442 Mass. 826 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 19, 2004
The judge had an adequate basis for implicitly qualifying McDevitt as an expert. See id. at 183 . … Particularly, the prosecutor’s remarks were based on Polanco’s inconsistent statements as established through his grand jury testimony. See id. at 60-61 . 3. Jury instructions.
Cited 54 timesPublished
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