Case law

Commonwealth v. Donovan

170 Mass. 228 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 11, 1898

Donovan never accepted the office to which he had been appointed, never qualified therefor, and never assumed to act therein. … It clearly was not necessary for the government to show that Lang in accepting the gift made any promise as to his future action or vote. See Commonwealth v. Murray, 135 Mass. 530 . Nor was it a defence that James C.

St. Germain v. Pfeifer

418 Mass. 511 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 3, 1994

These physician [’s] assistants clearly did not know what the ambulation plan was. Had Dr. … Freidberg, the plaintiff had to establish that a doctor-patient relationship existed between Dr. Freidberg and himself. The plaintiffs offer of proof did not do this. Immediately after the operation, Dr.

Macioci v. Commissioner of Revenue

398 Mass. 591 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 24, 1986

Clearly, our discussion was in response to the basic question presented by the case: whether Fitchburg’s imposition of differential taxes based on use classification in fiscal 1981 and 1982 was valid. … To conclude otherwise would be to deny the plaintiffs any recovery for an established wrong. *603 3. Conclusion. The judgment is vacated.

In the Matter of G.P.

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 5, 2015

Clearly the degree of risk that the third prong requires to be proved is greater than that required by the first or second prong: by definition, a "very substantial" risk is not the same as a "substantial" risk, and … The evidence of such a may qualify under this prong, but presumably any person who meets § 35's definition of an alcoholic or substance abuser presents a significant risk of overdosing.

Truck Renting & Leasing Ass'n v. Commissioner of Revenue

433 Mass. 733 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 17, 2001

or other facilities in Massachusetts; employed personnel in Massachusetts; solicited business in Massachusetts; owned real property in Massachusetts; domiciled trucks or other personal property in Massachusetts; or was qualified … If Adams itself operated its vehicles within Massachusetts, the income it earned from this activity clearly could be the subject of a corporate excise tax.

Cleary v. Cardullo's, Inc.

347 Mass. 337 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 16, 1964

Section 16C cannot be *346 interpreted as giving such pre-1956 licensees (whose premises were originally within 500 feet of a church or school) any broader immunity, not enjoyed by others, from the prohibition in § 16C. … The legislative purpose would have been expressed more clearly if there had been included in § 15 a reference to § 12 comparable to the reference to § 15 found in § 12 and if § 17 had been more broadly expressed.

Commonwealth v. Gomes

483 Mass. 123 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 13, 2019

Here, the defendant's actions of holding Jane by the waist and forcing her to move her body such that her "butt" came into repeated contact with his genitals clearly met the standard of "indecent." … L. c. 119, § 21, a provision that enumerates qualifying professions, for a definition of the term "[m]andated reporter." A "police officer" is included in that list. Because G.

Pacific Wool Growers v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation

305 Mass. 197 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 3, 1940

The words "the amount of its capital stock” in said section are immediately qualified by the words "authorized and issued.” … The important consideration was the purpose for which such foreign corporation, association or organization was established, organized or chartered and not the precise form or manner in which it had been so established.

Casagrande v. Town Clerk of Harvard

377 Mass. 703 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 3, 1979

(a) of § 81L, twelfth par., would be limited to public ways or ways maintained and used as public ways so that the standards of § 81M would be met by most tracts of land qualifying under cl. (a). … Town ways are established for the use of the town and must be maintained at public expense. See G. L. c. 82, § 21; G. L. c. 84, § 1.

Eaton v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n

462 Mass. 569 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 22, 2012

The mortgage is separate from, but by its terms clearly connected to, the promissory note. … This trust is an equitable device that may qualify as a resulting trust, see Young v.

Cornell v. Board of Appeals

453 Mass. 888 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 22, 2009

L. c. 40A, § 10, third par., and that delays clearly attributable to others have hampered the holder’s efforts to obtain a building permit. Cf. Belfer v. … He has also failed to establish that the delays in obtaining the approvals necessary for a building permit were not reasonably avoidable.

Cass v. Boston & Lowell Railroad

96 Mass. 448 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 15, 1867

This will more clearly appear by an analysis of the contract for breach of which the plaintiff brings this action. … It converted a qualified and conditional contract into an absolute and unconditional one.

Arnold v. Arnold

34 Mass. 4 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 15, 1835

He must go to trial upon his writ of right, with the disadvantages arising from the former verdicts against him, and he must establish his right of property in the writ of right, (which he was not called upon to establish … He is allowed to try it again by a jury drawn from the same box, who cannot be supposed to be better qualified to find out the truth than the first jury was.

Commonwealth v. Gonsalves

445 Mass. 1 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 29, 2005

App. 2005) (when police question crime victim, “that officer clearly has ‘an eye toward trial’ ”); Wall v. State, 143 S.W.3d 846, 851 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004). … Applying the definition announced today, the call would inescapably qualify as “testimonial.”

Commonwealth v. Porro

458 Mass. 526 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 14, 2010

established by the evidence or acquitting, even though the defendant is guilty of some offense.” … defense attorney did not mention it in closing argument. 11 This stipulation provided the prosecution’s proof that the alleged assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon caused “serious bodily injury” and therefore qualified

Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue

438 Mass. 71 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 31, 2002

Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), the seminal case establishing the sham transaction doctrine. … The second principle is that a transaction “does not lose its [tax] immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one chooses, evade, taxation.” Helvering v. Gregory, supra at 810.

Town of Lexington v. Town of Bedford

378 Mass. 562 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 31, 1979

As noted in the memorandum of decision, § 6C provides that in "all actions based on con *568 tractual obligation” the judgment shall include interest from "the date of the breach or demand,” if established, and, if not, from … Section 59A clearly contemplates that performance should occur without the aid of the courts. It therefore requires that notice be given and that the response be prompt.

Sarrouf v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc.

397 Mass. 542 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 14, 1986

. *547 The plaintiffs urge us to uphold the trial judge’s decision, except for his denial of recovery to certain plaintiffs. 7 The plaintiffs claim that we should overturn that denial because the proper requirement to qualify … Rahal clearly indicated their intention to seek their appraisal remedy in a handwritten note on the proxy card returned to the corporation. John A.

Commonwealth v. Harris

468 Mass. 429 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 18, 2014

Gilbert, 423 Mass. 863, 869-870 (1996) (motive evidence supported conclusion that Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to establish malice for murder in first degree). … physicians or one or more qualified psychologists.

Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, P.C. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College

436 Mass. 347 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 19, 2002

Second, by demonstrating that we intend narrowly to interpret the qualifying factor, i.e., what matters are within the scope of an individual’s employment, for purposes of this rule and the common-law rule of evidence announced … Those employees clearly had a measure of supervisory responsibility over Stanford, whose job performance was to be a central issue in her discrimination litigation.