Case law

S. S. White Dental Manufacturing Co. v. Commonwealth

212 Mass. 35 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 24, 1912

Under this condition of the law, foreign corporations engaged in ordinary trade enjoyed distinct immunities over domestic corporations. Boston Investment Co. v. Boston, 158 Mass. 461 . … These cases seem clearly distinguishable from, the case at bar. They *47 each relate to a railroad corporation which, as said in the opinion in Southern Railway v.

Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc.

469 Mass. 752 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 10, 2014

Glovsky’s complaint alleges that he felt “intimidated” by this delivery of Roche Bros.’ policy and “threatened by the inherent consequences he understood could result if he acted against such a clearly stated prohibition. … Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910 (1979) (distinguishing “modest retail establishment”).

Commonwealth v. Lodge

431 Mass. 461 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 12, 2000

Had Detective Barnicle been qualified based on his experience, it would have been within the judge’s discretion to admit this evidence. See State v. … The motion to suppress lists six grounds, five of which clearly do not address the issue. One ground is that the actions of the police “unlawfully exceeded the bounds of permissible inquiry.”

Commonwealth v. Palermo

482 Mass. 620 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 11, 2019

A contrary position would seem clearly to violate the right of confrontation." With respect to the hearsay rule, art. 12 is coextensive with the Sixth Amendment. See Commonwealth v. … and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial -- they are not testimonial."

Drapkin v. Commissioner of Revenue

420 Mass. 333 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 16, 1995

The interest earned by the taxpayer in the instant case does not qualify for the exemption for savings deposits or the exemption for pawnbrokers. … We find support also in the fact that the source of interest income is clearly distinguishable from the source of ordinary business income. See Barnes v. State Tax Comm’n, supra; Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation v.

Beeler v. Downey

387 Mass. 609 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 12, 1982

The first paragraph outlines the screening functions of the tribunal and establishes the standard by which its determination is to be made. … Thus, this question is not a “clearly independent issue raised here for the first time.” Royal Indem. Co. v. Blakely, supra at 88 .

Commonwealth v. Smith

92 Mass. 448 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 15, 1865

The franchise to be a corporation clearly cannot be fi'ansferred by any corporate body, of its own will. Such a franchise is not, in its own nature, transmissible. … Having once established its road, if that and its franchise of managing, using and taking tolls or fares upon the same are alienated, its whole power to perform its most important functions is at an end.

81 Spooner Road, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brookline

461 Mass. 692 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 20, 2012

The judge stated that it was unclear from the record whether George’s property satisfied the 300-feet requirement, but, in any event, it was irrelevant whether he qualified as a party in interest. … L. c. 40A to establish standing to challenge a zoning decision. See Cohen v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Plymouth, 35 Mass. App.

United Church of Religious Science v. Board of Assessors

372 Mass. 280 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 1, 1977

We have previously stated “the principle that the burden is upon a taxpayer to show clearly and unequivocally that its property is exempt from the tax____” Workmen’s Circle Educ. Center of Springfield, Inc. v. … The church argues that, “under established principles of trust law,... if the income is used for religious purposes, the principal used to generate such income is also used for such purposes ...

Fernandes v. UNION BOOKBINDING CO. IONICS, INC.

400 Mass. 27 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 14, 1987

Without question, Union qualifies as a sophisticated maker of the spacers which it manufactured for Ionics. … He established that the “clutch . . . *32 worked very well” and “functioned properly” when he put sufficient compressed air into the system.

Nugent v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co.

238 Mass. 221 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 18, 1921

was bound thereafter to use due care in maintenance not only under the conditions of travel existing when the conduit was built but coming into existence afterwards, whether by resurfacing or paving of the street, or the establishment … It is a question of reasonable care,” accurately and clearly stated the law. The jury doubtless could find that in the construction of the conduit there were deviations from the plan as approved.

Powers v. Secretary of Administration

412 Mass. 119 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 4, 1992

“special laws” which apply to only one particular city or town, “clearly evidenc[es] a concern that no city or town be singled out for special treatment.” Doris v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 374 Mass. 443, 446 (1978). … For example, the receiver is granted the authority: (1) “to formulate and establish for each fiscal year during his term, the annual budget of the city and the school committee, including the establishment of appropriations

Veazie v. Somerby

87 Mass. 280 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 15, 1862

The language clearly indicates the purpose to cover the whole of the personal chattels attached to the Ocean House, or situated about the same. It was competent thus to describe the property. Harding v. … As already remarked, if the plaintiff fails to establish his title by reason of his omission to record the mortgage to him, then the instructions would be correct as given.

Doe v. Harbor Schools, Inc.

446 Mass. 245 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 14, 2006

Freeman apparently had some contact with Doe through the fall of 1994, and at some point in 1994 wrote a note to Joseph claiming, among other things, that Doe had acquired immune deficiency disease and that he had reported … In a footnote in their brief, the defendants urge us to ignore an affidavit of *254 Heyman, Doe’s therapist, because it conflicts with Doe’s deposition testimony and because Doe has failed to qualify Heyman as an expert.

Commonwealth v. Matranga

455 Mass. 45 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 28, 2009

CPCS was established in 1983 by G. … Plaud, was retained as an expert witness, rather than as a qualified examiner pursuant to G. L. c. 123 A, §§ 1 and 13.

Commonwealth v. Phillips

452 Mass. 617 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 24, 2008

The instruction clearly and correctly conveyed the applicable law. See Commonwealth v. Owens, 414 Mass. 595, 607 (1993). … The judge was not required to qualify Gom as an expert before the jury. See Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527 , 530 n.4 (2001).

Reynolds Bros., Inc. v. Commonwealth

412 Mass. 1 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 24, 1992

No one contests, and therefore we assume, the appropriateness of those documents to establish the facts of the case for summary judgment purposes. … Completion of the award process [including execution and completion of the contract document] is clearly implied.” The Common *7 wealth does not make this argument.

Macy's East, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue

441 Mass. 797 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 27, 2004

Blinder, 336 Mass. 698, 703 (1958) (“an exemption [is] . . . to be recognized only where the property falls clearly and unmistakably within the express words of a legislative command”). … c. 63, § 30 (4) and § 30 (5), and that the regulation’s “denial of the deductions at issue is consistent with the complete body of Massachusetts tax law, namely the statutes and cases interpreting those statutes, which establishes

Matsushita Electric Corp. of America v. Sonus Corp.

362 Mass. 246 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 28, 1972

This difference was described quite clearly in Moss v. … The judge found that the witness was “unquestionably well qualified technically,” and “extremely well qualified academically,” but he did not permit the witness to express any opinion on the sales prospects of the Sonuswitch

Oakes v. Munroe

8 Mass. 282 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1851

When it is used in a statute, it is to be taken and understood in its legal and technical sense, with all the qualities and incidents which the law regards as essential to it, unless it is qualified by express enactment. … Among the indispensable requisites at common law of a notice to quit, it is clearly established, that it must indicate to the tenant, with sufficient certainty, that he is to quit the premises at a certain fixed period, and