Case law

Commonwealth v. Parker

56 Mass. 212 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1848

A brief reference to a few leading authorities will clearly show, that this rule, if it ever existed, has been much qualified. The rule, as stated by Parker, C. J., in the case of The Queen v. … , by independent evidence, strong corroborating circumstances, of such a character as clearly to turn the scale and overcome the *224 oath of the defendant and the legal presumption of his innocence.

Commonwealth v. Sherman

294 Mass. 379 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 25, 1936

Cero, and other cases, an established practice to find out what the *382 personnel, make-up of the prospective jurors were,” and denied the motion, and the defendant excepted. … Indeed the motion recites that they “had been duly qualified pursuant to the provisions of General Laws, Chapter 234, section 4, Tercentenary Edition.”

Marcy v. Marcy

91 Mass. 8 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1864

It is admitted that the agreement would then have clearly come within *9 the express words of the statute. But in the case at bar the contract was fully executed by one of the parties. … In the absence of any explanatory or qualifying words, it must be interpreted according to the common and approved usage of the language, unless it has some peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law.

New England Merchants National Bank v. Frost

357 Mass. 158 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 3, 1970

Sometimes in this way it will clearly appear that the testator intended something that he has not expressly stated.” … The quoted words do not introduce a bequest to Clarence which is later qualified by terms of a trust (cf. the Dansereau case at page 364).

LaClair v. Silberline Manufacturing Co., Inc.

379 Mass. 21 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 21, 1979

That Lewis’s failure to obtain workmen’s compensation coverage occurred while he was performing corporate business would not, of course, immunize him personally from liability to the plaintiff. Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. … Massachusetts § 348 (2d ed. 1966). 13 Although Roy was prepared to offer the opinion that the explosion was caused by the ignition of a cloud of *33 aluminum powder suspended between the decedent and the floor, Roy himself clearly

Commonwealth v. Vargas

475 Mass. 338 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 30, 2016

We find no error with the instruction, which tracked the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 55-56 (1999), and clearly and correctly conveyed the applicable law. … The defendant has not met his burden of establishing that the proposed testimony is newly available.

Commonwealth v. Aponte

391 Mass. 494 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 19, 1984

Michael Malee, was qualified in statistical analysis in the social sciences. Although *499 Dr. … The judge found that a key man system was also utilized in Lawrence, Peabody, and Gloucester. 18 *506 Evidence of selection procedures in Lawrence, Peabody, and Gloucester, together with Saugus and Lynnfield, clearly established

Chandler v. County Commissioners

437 Mass. 430 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 7, 2002

In so doing, we need not decide whether land taken in order to connect an existing public way to the ocean may qualify as a taking under G. … The plaintiffs claim, *434 and the commissioners do not dispute, that roughly one-third to one-half of the total area of the land taken is laid out on beach sand seaward of a clearly delineated coastal bank, subject to the

Proprietors of Mount Hope Cemetery v. City of Boston

158 Mass. 509 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 3, 1893

This exemption was not limited to tombs and rights of burial in private soil, but clearly included rights possessed by individuals in the public or common burying grounds. … It clearly was not so. It was said to be subject to the police power, like other cemetery corporations. Commonwealth v. Fahey, 5 Cush. 408 .

Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York, Inc. v. Board of Appeal

454 Mass. 374 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 24, 2009

General Laws c. 40A, § 15, states that a board “shall” make “a detailed record of its proceedings” setting forth “clearly the reason for its decision and of its official actions.” … As the judge also noted, the board’s decisions, set out in full in notes 13 and 15, supra, do not qualify as “reasons” within the meaning of G.

Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto

475 Mass. 429 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 8, 2016

We added that the Commonwealth also might seek to challenge whether the DNA evidence qualified as newly discovered evidence. … Storella had been granted immunity from prosecution, including prosecution for murder, in exchange for his "truthful" testimony against the other three. DiBenedetto III, supra.

Attorney General v. Haverhill Gas Light Co.

215 Mass. 394 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 26, 1913

The power to exist as a corporation with the special privileges and immunities personal to the particular organization is a franchise. This in its nature is not transmissible. … The Legislature clearly has granted no consent to the transfer but has prohibited it. The surrender of the charter is not a separate matter, but an incident of the plan to circumvent the plain intent of the statute.

Alvord v. Collin

37 Mass. 418 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 20, 1838

The tenants, to establish their title, must show that all the taxes were legally assessed, and that the land was sold for the payment thereof according to law. … And the general principle is well established, that, so far as the rights of third persons, or of the public, are concerned, his acts are valid.

Morse v. Kraft

466 Mass. 92 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 29, 2013

The plaintiff believes the transfer of assets to the new subtrusts to be in the best interests of the 1982 Trust beneficiaries from a management perspective: each of the Kraft sons is now in his forties, and is well qualified … it termed “[t]he general rule [of trust construction] . . . that the power vested in a trustee to [make distributions] in fee includes the power to create or appoint [trust property in] less than a fee unless the donor clearly

Clymer v. Mayo

393 Mass. 754 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 28, 1985

The judge terminated Trust A upon finding that its purpose — to qualify the trust for an estate tax marital deduction — became impossible to achieve after the Mayos’ divorce. Mayo appeals this ruling. … L. c. 191, § 9, Mayo has no beneficial interest in the trust — clearly disposes of Mayo’s claim to Trust A. 5. Mayo’s Interest in Trust B.

Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang

458 Mass. 827 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 15, 2011

The phrase “reasonable degree of scientific certainty” should also be avoided because it suggests that forensic ballistics is a science, where it is clearly as much an art as a science. … However, the Supreme Court noted in the Crawford case that the confrontation clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford v.

Hall v. Priest

72 Mass. 18 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1856

The words, “ dying without issue,” unless explained or qualified by other expressions, have acquired a distinct and well understood meaning, by a uniform series of decisions both in this country and in England. … This proviso cuts down the fee, and clearly creates an estate tail in each of his eight children in one ninth of his real estate, with cross remainders over in fee to the brothers and sisters, on the determination of the

Cluff v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance

99 Mass. 317 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1868

The papers were clearly inadmissible upon the principal issue. … As thus qualified, and applied to the case *329 then presented upon the exceptions, this court did affirm the instruction.

477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC

477 Mass. 162 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 23, 2017

It may first establish "by a preponderance of the evidence that the [special movant] lacked  11 any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis … As with the similar doctrine of qualified immunity for government officials, the special motion inquiry is "separate from the merits of the underlying action . . . even though a reviewing court must consider the [nonmoving

Commonwealth v. McHoul

352 Mass. 544 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 16, 1967

To establish a defense upon the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of the committing of the act the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know … “I cannot say clearly.”