Case law

Salcedo v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance

38 F. Supp. 2d 37 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 20, 1998

Defendant reads this provision as establishing a three-year limitations period, which would be lengthened in suits filed by residents of states that forbid contractually establishing a period this short. … Accordingly, an applicable Qualifying Disability Period must be at least six months long. Since Ms.

Thornton v. Harvard University

2 F. Supp. 2d 89 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 26, 1998

This action concerns a Harvard Law School (“Harvard”) financial aid program by which Harvard helps qualifying graduates repay their educational loans. … The Notes themselves clearly and unambiguously inform Thornton of their payment terms.

Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin

582 F. Supp. 1220 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 4, 1984

While a failure to maintain contemporaneous records clearly increases petitioners’ evidentiary burden, see Ramos v. … He is a qualified and respected lawyer, although he does not now have the unique reputation enjoyed by his colleague Professor Tribe.

United States ex rel. Estate of Cunningham v. Millennium Laboratories

841 F. Supp. 2d 523 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 30, 2012

If Relator is correct, the California suit would not qualify as a prior, public disclosure. … If they are, then the court only has jurisdiction over the suit if the relator qualifies as an original source under the fourth element of the test.

Baetge-Hall v. American Overseas Marine Corp.

624 F. Supp. 2d 148 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 11, 2009

Nevertheless, Báetge-Hall avers that Captain Pigott certified that she was “fully qualified.” Id. at ¶ 5 . … There is a clearly defined public policy protecting whistle-blowing and Baetge-Hall alleges that she was terminated for engaging in this protected activity.

Bonney v. Washington Mutual Bank

596 F. Supp. 2d 173 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 9, 2009

There are no facts pled, however, which would establish the omitted transaction date as a matter of law; at best, the complaint asserts that Plaintiffs’ mortgage loan was obtained “[o]n or about” May 13, 2005. … Abrams, 833 F.Supp. 253 , 263 n. 16 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (“qualified immunity is measured by a standard of objective reasonableness, and therefore cannot ordinarily support dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)”) (citing Liffiton

In re Fresenius Granuflo/Naturalyte Dialysate Products Liability Litigation

76 F. Supp. 3d 321 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 2, 2015

[Fre-senius USA] is qualified to do business in California and has a research and manufacturing facility in Walnut Creek, California.” … Kadisha, 78 Cal.App.4th 1368, 1379 , 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 (Cal.App.2000) (“Corporate director or officer status neither immunizes a person from personal liability for tortious conduct nor subjects him or her to vicarious liability

Comfort v. Lynn School Committee

150 F. Supp. 2d 285 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 29, 2001

Agnew was told that a waiting list had been established for enrollment to the newly opened school. … The implementation of the Lynn Plan qualifies the Lynn Public Schools for certain additional educational aid from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 2 .

Resolution Trust Corp. v. City of Boston

150 F.R.D. 449 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 18, 1993

Thus, the Commonwealth and the City share the same “ultimate goal” in the context of this suit: to establish that FIRREA does not preempt the Boston rent control Ordinance. … The City does not formally represent most Commonwealth citizens and is not motivated to defeat RTC’s claim of immunity from the Ordinance in order to assure that similar current or future rent control ordinances throughout

Stone v. Caswell

963 F. Supp. 2d 32 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 17, 2013

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 , 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (finding suit against state officials in official capacity is against state itself and barred by sovereign immunity). … That claim is clearly incorrect. Plaintiff relies upon Longval v.

Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Altshuler

361 F. Supp. 1293 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 31, 1973

Perez is clearly looking to Hines as a controlling case which establishes the “controlling principles” and points out the “primary functions of the Court in Supremacy cases.” … It is clearly stated in Order No. 11246 that the policy of the federal government is to provide equal job oppoi'tunity in all federal employment or federally funded projects, for all qualified persons, and to prohibit discrimination

Allco Renewable Energy Ltd. v. Massachusetts Electric Co.

208 F. Supp. 3d 390 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 23, 2016

The FERC rules give each QF two options for how to provide energy to utilities: Each qualifying facility shall have the option either: (1) To provide energy as the qualifying facility determines such energy to be available … The plain language of the FERC regulations clearly state otherwise.

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College

261 F. Supp. 3d 99 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 2, 2017

Consequently, a large number of otherwise highly-qualified Asian-American applicants are allegedly denied admission to Harvard on the basis of their race or ethnicity. … Here, in contrast, SFFA seeks to represent individuals who are clearly members as defined by its Bylaws.

Manego v. Orleans Board of Trade

598 F. Supp. 231 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 27, 1984

Therefore, absent evidence that the Board of Trade conspired with the Bank as to this allegedly “sham” suit, it is irrelevant to the issue of the Board’s immunity under Noerr-Pennington. … It is clearly established that conduct genuinely intended to influence governmental action is immune from the sweep of antitrust law and that whether the effort is genuine or a sham is an issue of fact. Id. at 1253.

Wittkowski v. Spencer

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 8, 2019

Application Defendants argue that, because they are the functional equivalent of public officials, they are entitled to qualified immunity and thus … While the Court agrees that the doctrine of qualified immunity applies to defendants, see Husband v. Fair, Civ. A. No. 86-2865-Z, 1993 WL 343669, at *6 (D. Mass.

Shepard v. Egan

767 F. Supp. 1158 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 13, 1990

Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 , 80 S.Ct. 519, 523 , 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960) (“[A] litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities....”); Anaya Serbia v. … Agencies of the Commonwealth are likewise immune from suit in federal court due to the broad reading of the eleventh amendment by the Supreme Court.

Fleet National Bank v. H & D Entertainment, Inc.

926 F. Supp. 226 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 9, 1996

For all those reasons, the Receiver’s determination that the Spring bid was the highest was clearly reasonable. … In this case, notice clearly was adequate, in each of the three rounds of bidding.

Litif v. United States

682 F. Supp. 2d 60 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 29, 2010

Second, as a waiver of sovereign immunity, the FTCA should return the action, as near as statutorily warranted, to what it would have been had the immunity not been present in the first instance. … Sovereign immunity bars that lawsuit from going forward. Fine.

Regan v. United States

421 F. Supp. 2d 319 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 14, 2006

The Sixth Circuit concluded that the statute did not clearly addresses a situation where employers consolidate. Id. … In the instant case, the employment status of the sheriffs and the sheriffs' employees is matter of law, as the status was statutorily established. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 34B, §§ 12-14; 1996 Mass. Legis.

Shadduck v. Rodolakis

221 B.R. 573 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 12, 1998

At the time of the filing of Shadduck’s bankruptcy petition, this property was an ERISA-qualified plan and, therefore, excluded. … Id. 17 This Court must defer to this finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. A factual finding is clearly erroneous if the record lacks substantial evidence to support it.