Case law

Bush v. Fantasia

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 12, 2022

the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” … Because the complaint fails to allege any viable constitutional claims, the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. C.

Connelly v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.

96 F.R.D. 339 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 29, 1982

The last three of the requisites for the privilege clearly have been established in connection with the first questionnaire. It is undisputed that the Customers’ Representative was a lawyer. … Even if a document satisfies the work-product criteria, however, it may still be discoverable upon a showing of sufficient need for the document to overcome the qualified protection.

Zeghibe v. Conocophillips Co.

793 F. Supp. 2d 478 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 21, 2011

That limitations period is not per se dispositive, but rather courts rely upon it to establish burdens of proof and presumptions of timeliness and untimeliness. … Corp., 925 F.2d 1 , 2 n. 2 (1st Cir.1991) (“A three-year limitations period is thus clearly applicable to the Jones Act and maritime unseaworthiness tort counts.”); Butler v. Am.

Welsh v. Quabbin Timber Inc.

943 F. Supp. 98 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 22, 1996

Thus, we adopt a common-law test for determining who qualifies as an “employee” under ERISA. … No Proof of Discrimination Notwithstanding the fact that Chase was clearly a fiduciary, he did not discriminate against Plaintiff in violation of the protections afforded by ERISA.

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Ouimet Corp.

470 F. Supp. 945 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 22, 1979

The prime purpose of that Act is to insure that workers receive the benefits to which they are entitled under private pension plans established for them by their employers. … It is well established that “legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations.” Usery v.

Lopez v. United States

349 F. Supp. 2d 179 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 20, 2004

United States, 95 F.Supp.2d 37, 47 (D.Mass.2000) (plaintiff complied with notice requirements of Sec *188 tion 2675 when, on her SF-95, she “clearly stated the nature of the claims [and] the date on which the allegedly tortious … Lopez’ amended complaint must therefore establish: 1) the ultimate disposition of the October 2000 claim; 2) facts to establish the sufficiency of the claim to satisfy the notice-of-claim requirements; 3) facts that establish

United States v. Shaw

106 F. Supp. 2d 103 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 19, 2000

The 1999 final-rule action allowed for credits and coupons to qualify for safe-harbor protection, as long as they meet certain criteria, and also provided that in certain circumstances discounts on multiple items would qualify … (b) “properly disclosed and appropriately reflected ” (i) The Parties’ Arguments Any “discount or other reduction in price” must be “properly disclosed and appropriately reflected” in order to qualify for immunity from criminal

Conrad v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance

292 F. Supp. 2d 233 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 31, 2003

In subparagraph (1), the Plan establishes that a person who becomes partially disabled after the Elimination Period qualifies as totally disabled. … This clearly indicates that the patient felt capable of continuing to work from a cognitive point of view.

Vermont Mutual Insurance v. Petit

613 F. Supp. 2d 154 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 11, 2009

In addition, the Petits’ history of late or otherwise imperfect rent collection spans a period of only two full years, failing to establish a predictive pattern. … The language of the Policy clearly applies to expenses that “do not continue,” 36 not “new” expenses. The preFire auto and travel expenses, therefore, qualify as discontinuing expenses. 2.

Reynolds v. Dukakis

441 F. Supp. 646 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 9, 1977

On September 26, 1973, despite qualifying for federal benefits, Mr. Reynolds received a letter from Robert E. … The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.' . . .

Shervin v. Partners Healthcare System, Inc.

2 F. Supp. 3d 50 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 7, 2014

Partners also argues that it qualifies for charitable immunity for the interference claim pursuant to Mass. Gen. L. c. 231, § 85K. D. 150 at 19. … The Court finds, however, that Partners qualifies for charitable immunity under Mass. Gen. L. c. 231, § 85K as to this claim. D. 150 at 19.

Dzanku v. Brennan

270 F. Supp. 3d 376 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 6, 2017

However, the receipt which was returned to Dzanku clearly shows that the U.S. Marshal Service never served the pleading on the U.S. Postal Service because he had failed to provide an address for the agency. … the facility where' Dzanku worked and records establishing that Dzanku received EEOC training.

United States v. Kelly

519 F. Supp. 1029 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 9, 1981

Whatever or whoever may have motivated Wilson’s column, the F.B.I. report demonstrates clearly that his assertions are contrary to fact. … Billy Masiello was the immunized key witness against Kelly in the current proceeding.

St. Arnaud v. Chapdelaine Truck Center, Inc.

836 F. Supp. 41 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 8, 1993

Secondly, employers may be held liable where the method of termination violates a clearly established public policy. Id. Plaintiff, Armand St. … Furthermore, and in the alternative, even if the Employee succeeded in qualifying for one of the exceptions to the at-will termination rule, his wrongful termination claim is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security

Hallgring v. Callahan

975 F. Supp. 84 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 14, 1997

Nor does the record establish the basis on which Dr. … The acronym "CFIDS" stands for chronic fatigue and immune dysfunction syndrome.

Wesson v. Town of Salisbury

13 F. Supp. 3d 171 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 18, 2014

The statute established a new category of firearm, the “large capacity weapon,” comprised of all semiautomatic weapons equipped with (or readily adapted to) a “large capacity feeding device” (or magazine), all weapons with … who is over eighteen years of age (or a qualified minor between ages fifteen and eighteen who has the written permission of his or her parent or guardian).

Deane v. Colvin

247 F. Supp. 3d 152 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 29, 2017

Acceptable medical sources are licensed physicians, licensed or certified psychologists, licensed optometrists (for purposes of establishing visual disorders), licensed podiatrists (for purposes of establishing impairments … of the foot or foot and ankle), and qualified speech-language pathologists (for purposes of establishing speech or language impairments). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513 (a).

Salcedo v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance

38 F. Supp. 2d 37 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 20, 1998

Defendant reads this provision as establishing a three-year limitations period, which would be lengthened in suits filed by residents of states that forbid contractually establishing a period this short. … Accordingly, an applicable Qualifying Disability Period must be at least six months long. Since Ms.

General Marine Construction Corp. v. United States

738 F. Supp. 586 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 31, 1990

The Corps had entered into a contract with Phillips Cartner, a Virginia corporation, on December 8, 1986, to furnish qualified inspectors to witness the disposal of dredge materials at sea and provide daily reports of disposal … That is not the procedure the drafters of Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(c) viewed as “clearly desirable." See 1966 Advisory Committee’s Note to Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(c). 6 .

Williams v. HealthAlliance Hospitals, Inc.

135 F. Supp. 2d 106 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 27, 2001

The Split Dollar Plan also qualifies as a welfare benefit plan under the test set forth therefor by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. … Williams’ claim for breach of contract is clearly preempted because he would have to prove the existence of an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA (i.e. the Split Dollar Plan) to support his claim that benefits owed to