Case law

LaFrenier v. Kinirey

478 F. Supp. 2d 126 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 20, 2007

For the reasons stated above, defendants clearly had probable cause to arrest plaintiff. … Defendants Kinirey and Morrison contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity even assuming that plaintiff could make out a violation of § 1983.

Varad v. Barshak

261 F. Supp. 2d 47 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 15, 2003

Rather, Rule 56(c): mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the … On April 7, 2002, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari that had been granted in the Ninth Circuit case addressing the sovereign immunity issue. See Medical Board of California v.

Green v. Cosby

160 F. Supp. 3d 431 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 11, 2016

Laws ch. 233, § 20 , Second (emphasis added); see In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 849 N.E.2d at 800-01 (holding that the term “trial” qualifies the phrase “other criminal proceeding” and thus the privilege does not apply to grand … June 15, 2007) (“[Witnesses who appear before a court or for some other judicial proceeding — such as a deposition — are immune from service of process _”) (quoting James Wm.

Pomeroy v. United States

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 27, 2018

The Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (“FSHCAA”) establishes a sovereign immunity waiver, setting suits against the United States under the FTCA as the exclusive remedy “for damage for personal injury, including … In Mendez, the First Circuit held that the FSHCAA did not establish immunity for an individual doctor who allegedly engaged in acts of race and sex discrimination in the peer review process, explaining that the statute

Booten v. United States

95 F. Supp. 2d 37 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 3, 2000

The plaintiff has clearly satisfied the jurisdictional notice requirements of Section 2675. … These documents, by themselves, were sufficient to establish the plaintiffs authority to pursue her claims.

United States v. Gorski

36 F. Supp. 3d 256 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 1, 2014

The government has filed a motion for reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s decision, contending that it was clearly erroneous and contrary to law. … Instead, a defendant has a burden of production to establish a prima facie defense of advice of counsel. See United States v.

Craft Beer Stellar, LLC v. Glassdoor, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 17, 2018

Because Congress has clearly dictated that the DTSA should not be construed to be a law “pertaining to intellectual property” for the purposes of any other Act of Congress, the DTSA is clearly not such a law for the purposes … Ch. 93, §§ 2 & 11); that Glassdoor aided and abetted John Does 1-20; and that Glassdoor civilly conspired with John Does 1-20—are clearly not claims “pertaining to intellectual property” and thus are subject to § 230 immunity

Munroe v. Boston Medical Center

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 16, 2024

She created humans with, amongst other things, innate senses, minds to think, and immune systems to protect. … I had Covid very recently and the immune system that Mother Nature provided me with got me through it. According to many studies I have better immunity than that which is provided by the vaccine.

Brown v. Hearst Corp.

862 F. Supp. 622 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 21, 1994

The first requirement is met here because the divorce trial clearly qualifies as an official proceeding. … Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 , 84 S.Ct. 710, 720 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) ("libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations”). 8 .

Hullum v. Mici

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 30, 2024

Of course, “a motion to dismiss may be granted on the ground of failure to exhaust only where the facts establishing the defense are clear on the face of the plaintiff's pleadings … The remaining undecided issues in the motion to dismiss (i.e. qualified immunity and merits claims) are held in abeyance pending the resolution of the exhaustion issue.

Hood v. City of Boston

891 F. Supp. 51 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 28, 1995

Thus, the municipality’s immunity applies as well to suits against each of the defendant officers in his official capacity. B. … immunity, discretionary function, and exclusivity of remedy provisions of state law.

MacRae v. Mattos

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 25, 2023

Qualified immunity shields “government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional … Santini, 652 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 2011) (recognizing that liability under the “fact-intensive balancing test” required by Pickering “can rarely be considered ‘clearly established’ for qualified immunity”) (internal citation

Noonan v. Colour Library Books, Ltd.

947 F. Supp. 564 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 6, 1996

Clearly the minimal contacts that suffice to establish specific jurisdiction will not satisfy a plaintiff’s burden or else the two distinct theories of jurisdiction become conflated into one. … When a plaintiff is clearly unable to establish jurisdiction under state law, it is the better practice to end the inquiry without addressing constitutional concerns. See Ticketmaster —New York, Inc. v.

Partners Healthcare System, Inc. v. Sullivan

497 F. Supp. 2d 42 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 31, 2007

But, domestic partners of different genders would not qualify, regardless of their sexual orientation. Plaintiff disputes that the definition of domestic partner contained in its Plan is so broad. … The EEOC reversed a grant of summary judgment, reasoning that the harassment was based on the co-worker’s gender, and not just her sexual orientation. 5 There, the association was a clearly apparent workplace friendship.

Craft Beer Stellar, LLC v. Glassdoor, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 17, 2018

Because Congress has clearly dictated that the DTSA should not be construed to be a law “pertaining to intellectual property” for the purposes of any other Act of Congress, the DTSA is clearly not such a law for the purposes … Ch. 93, §§ 2 & 11); that Glassdoor aided and abetted John Does 1-20; and that Glassdoor civilly conspired with John Does 1-20—are clearly not claims “pertaining to intellectual property” and thus are subject to § 230 immunity

Ex parte Pettine

259 F. 733 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 3, 1919

taken that, by treaty between the government of the United States and Italy, Italians stand on a level with native-born citizens, who, it is said, under the right of freedom of speech, may teach anarchistic theories with immunity … Congress, through the act approved October 16, 1918, having clearly declared against all aliens who are anarchists, the declaration must be accepted as meaning that Congress was of opinion that the presence of alien anarchists

Zarrilli v. Weld

875 F. Supp. 68 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 9, 1995

State Agencies — The Massachusetts state agencies have moved to dismiss all claims against them on the ground they are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. 1 See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. … More *71 over, the language of the NEPA does not express any Congressional intent to establish constructive waiver. See Welch v.

Harrington ex rel. Harrington v. City of Attleboro

172 F. Supp. 3d 337 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 16, 2016

opportunities or benefits- ... (3) [the funding recipient] knew of the harassment, (4) in its programs or activities and (5) it was deliberately indifferent to the harassment such that its response (or lack thereof) is clearly … As discussed by the First Circuit, a Title IX claim that “the school system could or should have done more is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference.” Id.

Interface Group, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority

631 F. Supp. 483 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 1986

Midcal Aluminum, Inc., a case in which a private party claimed state action exemption, the Supreme Court said that cases decided since Parker had established a two-pronged test for antitrust immunity: “[fjirst, the challenged … In Town of Hallie, the Supreme Court considered how clearly a state policy in favor of regulation must be articulated for a muncipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive activity constitutes state action.

DMP v. Fay School ex rel. Board of Trustees

933 F. Supp. 2d 214 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 18, 2013

However, because I find that he failed to request a reasonable accommodation and was not otherwise qualified to matriculate at Fay, he has failed to establish a claim for violation of the ADA. ■ Cheating and lying are behaviors … Therefore, in order to prevail, DMP must either establish that Fay breached a contractual right, or clearly abused its discretion in enforcing its policies and regulations.