Case law

Action Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Atlanticare Health Services, Inc.

815 F. Supp. 33 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 5, 1993

As Action notes, the state anti-fraud statute clearly fits this description. See Memorandum of Plaintiff at 11-13. … Action is correct that all of the defendants’ allegedly unlawful activity is not immunized by the fact that their petitioning of the City is protected; however, that principle does not prevent the immunization of the petitioning

United States v. Tsarnaev

53 F. Supp. 3d 443 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 17, 2014

After returned questionnaires are reviewed, the names of jurors who appear to be qualified for service are placed in sequence based on their assigned number in a “qualified jury wheel” from which jurors are drawn in numerical … Under that method, the 2.06% absolute disparity between the proportion of African-Americans in the jury-eligible population and the proportion in the qualified jury wheel is insufficient to establish a prima facie violation

Massachusetts v. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.

698 F. Supp. 2d 234 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 8, 2010

for federal funding, the Secretary of HHS must approve a "State plan" describing the nature and scope of the MassHealth program. [80] Qualifying plans must meet several statutory requirements. [81] For example, qualifying … Indeed, this rubric was once explicitly disavowed by the Supreme Court in the governmental immunity context in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.

Xuncax v. Gramajo

886 F. Supp. 162 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 12, 1995

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 8 “a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign state,” unless certain exceptions not relevant here apply … Without deciding whether the scope of FSIA immunity should be thus extended, I conclude, as has the Ninth Circuit, that such immunity would in any event be unavailable in suits against an official arising from acts that were

Jon N. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts

684 F. Supp. 2d 190 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 16, 2010

Introduction This action challenges a denial of health insurance benefits under an employee welfare benefits plan, established pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 1 (“ERISA”). … covered by this contract”; (3) “[a]s cost effective as any established alternatives”; and (4) “[f]urnished in the least intensive type of medical care setting required.”

Lazarre v. Turco

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 17, 2020

To determine whether the DOC Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must decide whether their conduct violated a “clearly established constitutional right.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. … “Clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity means that the contours of the right are “sufficiently clear” that “every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”

Flynn v. Church of Scientology International

116 F.R.D. 1 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 28, 1986

The party seeking discovery of the lawyer’s “work-product” must establish adequate reasons to justify such production. … “It is well established that the government has a qualified privilege to prevent public disclosure of investigative files and related material prepared in the course of an ongoing criminal investigation.” Jabara v.

Shabazz v. Cole

69 F. Supp. 2d 210 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 24, 1999

This court dismissed the first cause of action, which alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983”), against Matesanz due to the absence of supervisory liability but denied Cole qualified immunity. … With respect to the third cause of action, this court found that Matesanz was not liable under section 1983 due to the absence of supervisory liability and entitled to qualified immunity on the MCRA claim.

Coyne v. Metabolix, Inc.

943 F. Supp. 2d 259 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 20, 2013

Of course, this does not mean that defendants are necessarily immune to liability for unfounded predictions. … It is also well established that scienter allegations based solely on a defendant’s high-ranking position in the company are not sufficient.

Barresi v. Maloney

273 F. Supp. 2d 144 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 24, 2003

While Supreme Court holdings that were clearly established at the time of the state court proceedings form the primary basis for determining whether a decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal … Accordingly, the trial court’s decision in the instant case cannot be said to be “contrary to” clearly established' law.

Lemieux v. City of Holyoke

259 F.R.D. 13 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 14, 2009

The First Circuit found that the section 7(k) exemption did not apply because the Town of Agawam had not shown that it had in fact established a “qualifying work period.” Id. at 291. … In any event, as Plaintiffs argue, the FLSA and the regulations interpreting it clearly state that a section 7(k) work period is based on days, not hours. See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (k)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 553.224 .

Dyer v. City of Boston

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 27, 2018

Dyer Has Stated a Claim against Officers Crossen and Lai a) Qualified Immunity City Defendants argue that Crossen and Lai are insulated from liability by qualified immunity … was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the defendant’s alleged violation.”

Freeman v. Town of Hudson

849 F. Supp. 2d 138 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 15, 2012

Because the Freemans have failed to establish a constitutional violation, the Court does not need to address the Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Ruiz-Casillas v. … Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 , 129 S.Ct. 808 , 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (where qualified immunity is raised, "the judges of the district courts and courts of appeals are in the best position to determine the order of decision

Fredericks v. Vartanian

529 F. Supp. 264 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 16, 1981

four years and until their successors are duly elected or qualified, [emphasis supplied]). … In the absence of such rules or understandings, a protectable property interest has not been established.

Syrjala v. Town of Grafton

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 24, 2020

Qualified Immunity Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s federal and state civil rights claims. … The doctrine of qualified immunity protects public employees “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

Ventura v. Hanitchak

719 F. Supp. 2d 132 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 18, 2010

First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. … The evidence clearly demonstrates that Ventura was replaced as a result of her failure to report to work when promised, not her alleged disability.

United States Securities & Exchange Commission v. Tambone

417 F. Supp. 2d 127 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 27, 2006

The cases cited by the SEC all involved some device that was clearly illegal. See SEC v. … The SEC’s allegations in this case clearly do not.

Polak v. Riverside Marine Construction, Inc.

22 F. Supp. 3d 109 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 28, 2014

“The LHWCA establishes a comprehensive federal worker’s compensation scheme which holds employers liable, irrespective of fault, for securing the payment of the prescribed compensation to qualified maritime employees injured … See Morehead, 97 F.3d at 605 (“In its capacity as [plaintiffs] employer, [defendant] is immune from tort actions brought by covered employees like [plaintiff].

Campiti v. Walonis

453 F. Supp. 819 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 30, 1978

Defendants have raised the affirmative defenses of (1) qualified immunity; and (2) certain federal and state statutory exemptions. *821 During the one-day non-jury trial held on March 7, 1978, the parties stipulated to the … Defendants have not carried their burden of establishing that either Campiti or Pioggia consented to the call so as to bring its monitoring within subsection (2)(c) of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511 , which provides in relevant part:

Sigros v. Walt Disney World Co.

129 F. Supp. 2d 56 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 8, 2001

Disney is a Florida corporation qualified to do business in Florida and California and has its principal place of business in Florida. … Rather, that advertising was clearly intended to entice Massachusetts residents to visit the Walt Disney World Resort.