Case law

Boston & Maine Corp. v. United Transportation Union Sheetmetal Workers International Ass'n

110 F.R.D. 322 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 5, 1986

It is clearly established that: [A] party need not assert a counterclaim that has not matured at the time he serves his pleading. … On May 2, 1986, this representation was qualified by an affidavit indicating that the strike had closed several paper mills in Maine.

Boston Alliance of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Youth (BAGLY) v. United States Department of Health and Human Services

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 18, 2021

sufficiently imminent to qualify as a valid injury-in- fact. … Plaintiffs have not established any future discrimination that would be sufficiently imminent to qualify as a valid injury- in-fact. See Whitman-Walker Clinic, 485 F.

United States v. 59.88 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Eastham

734 F. Supp. 555 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 4, 1990

Furthermore, in light of the fact that petitioners did nothing for six years, the illness and death of Attorney Henson does not qualify as a reason justifying relief from judgment for these petitioners. … Meservey clearly had notice of the proceedings and of final judgment because she appeared in the action on February 4, 1976, less than one year after entry of judgment.

Cowern v. Prudential Insurance

130 F. Supp. 3d 443 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 14, 2015

He opined that “[b]ased on the limitations established in the objective record, Ms. … Cowern’s chronic abdominal pain, stating: The records fail to clarify clearly a pattern thát' would define the symptom with respect to time.

Rooney v. Town of Groton

577 F. Supp. 2d 513 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 23, 2008

As the First Circuit noted, “supervision of other employees is clearly a management duty.” Donovan v. Burger King Corp., 672 F.2d 221, 226 (1st Cir.1982) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.102 (b)). … However, such a perspective would undermine the Department of Labor’s specifically stated intent not to depart from established case law.

United States Internal Revenue Service v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Industrial Commercial Electrical, Inc. (In Re Industrial Commercial Electrical, Inc.)

319 B.R. 35 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 4, 2005

First, it contained a conclusion about the proper framework for allocating the burden of proof, and the extent to which the debtors qualified for the benefits of 26 U.S.C. § 7491 . … No. 105-206, § 3001 (c), 112 Stat. at 727 (establishing the effective date of Section 7491 both for cases that involve examinations and cases that do not).

Wigfall v. Duval

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 12, 2024

Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. … Wigfall has not established she is the sole beneficiary of her father’s estate.

Flaherty v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 9, 2018

Finally, Entergy argues that paragraph 105 concerns medical information as to which Flaherty is not qualified to opine. … Supp. 2d 261, 270 n.8 (W.D Pa. 2008) (“Chronic fatigue syndrome, also known as immune dysfunction syndrome, is a condition of prolonged and severe fatigue which is not relieved by rest and is not directly caused by other

A. B. & M. Liquidation Corp. v. Pelham Hall Co.

28 F. Supp. 350 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 11, 1939

is to obtain a judicial determination respecting the parity of bonds and coupons held by the plaintiff, and to establish the rights of the plaintiff to participate in the distribution of voting trust certificates, representing … All of the shares of this new corporation, with the exception of three qualifying shares held by directors, were issued to C. C. Moore and still stand in his name on the books of that corporation. Mr.

Hearts on Fire Company, LLC v. Blue Nile, Inc.

603 F. Supp. 2d 274 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 27, 2009

To establish liability, the Plaintiff must ultimately prove that (1) it owns and uses the “Hearts on Fire” trademark; (2) the Defendant used the trademark without the Plaintiffs permission; and (3) the Defendant’s use was … They have applied that same reasoning to keyword cases, holding that a company’s purchase of a competitor’s trademark to trigger sponsored links does not qualify as a “use.”

Little v. Murphy

62 F. Supp. 2d 262 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 13, 1999

So it is up to you to determine and evaluate the evidence that has been introduced tending to establish this alibi. … Where the witness had already denied seeing the truck at 11:30 and testified that it could have been as early as 11:45, it was clearly a matter of trial tactics not to belabor the point, and counsel was not clearly wrong

Hickey v. Thompkins

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 8, 2021

The objective prong requires the plaintiff establish that his medical need is or was “sufficiently serious,” Burrell v. … Hickey has failed to establish the subjective prong of his claim as to the temporary denial of Suboxone.

United States v. President and Fellows of Harvard College

323 F. Supp. 2d 151 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 28, 2004

The Requests for Funds clearly qualify as requests for money or property. And the FCTRs and the FSRs are also claims. … The Principal Investigator handbook clearly establishes this obligation: The terms “principal investigator,” PI, and “project director” are used to designate that individual who shall have responsibility for seeing that a

Stokes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

37 F. Supp. 3d 525 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 12, 2014

The representative told her she did not qualify for a repayment plan. (Id. ¶ 16). Wells Fargo subsequently sent Stokes a loan-modification application packet. (Id. ¶ 18). … The right-to-cure notice clearly gave her adequate notice of her right to cure her default in 2009 because she exercised that right. Any technical deficiency in the notice was inconsequential.

Rodrigues v. Members Mortgage Co.

226 F.R.D. 147 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 3, 2005

Co., 224 F.R.D. 304, 307 (D.Mass. 2004) (“Other courts in this district have noted that a 40 person class is ‘generally found to establish numerosity.’”) (citations omitted); see also McCuin v. … Cf. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17 (a)(1) (“The creditor shall make the disclosures required by this subpart clearly and conspicuously in writing, in a form that the consumer may keep.”).

Heller v. Cap Gemini Ernst & Young Welfare Plan

396 F. Supp. 2d 10 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 24, 2005

According to Heller, it has not been established that his wife was not covered under the policy at the time of her death. … Although the court held that the insurer had waived its second justification by failing to assert it earlier, the court heavily qualified its recognition of waiver principles. Id. at 381-82 .

Ortiz v. Commissioner of Social Security

81 F. Supp. 3d 118 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 26, 2015

Discussion Standard for Entitlement to Disability Insurance Benefits To qualify for disability insurance benefits, a claimant must demonstrate that s/he is disabled within the meaning of the Act. … The ALJ also found that her right shoulder issues had not been established for twelve continuous months. {Id., p. 21).

Cellilli v. Cellilli

939 F. Supp. 72 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 22, 1996

Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 733 , 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2385 , 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985) (ERISA preemption “substantially qualified by” insurance savings clause). … The plan at issue here, is clearly not self-funded.

Parzenn Partners LLC v. Baran

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 19, 2019

Cal. 2017) (“The threat of being driven out of business is sufficient to establish irreparable harm.”); W. Ala. Women’s Ctr. v. Miller, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1334 (M.D. … Ala. 2016) (“Business closure clearly qualifies as irreparable harm.”).

Pegasus Management Co., Inc. v. Lyssa, Inc.

995 F. Supp. 29 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 6, 1998

exceeded $25,000 (the “Single Occurrence Threshold”) or, if there is more than one claim, unless the claim exceeded $100,000 (the “Aggregate Occurrence Threshold”) when there were no such thresholds in the original Agreement clearly … Pataska is not qualified to testify to the opinions that he gives. Indeed, based upon his curriculum vitae appended to his affidavit, Mr. Pataska is qualified as-an expert to render the opinions he has proffered. 10 .