Case law

American Automobile Manufacturers Ass'n v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection

998 F. Supp. 10 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 15, 1997

the enforcement procedure enforces is one within a state’s power to “adopt or attempt to enforce” under § 209(a) and § 177. 3 As the Court in the New York case noted, [wjhile § 177 clearly sets forth that individual States … Congress specifically delegated to the EPA the task of determining whether California’s emission standards qualify for a waiver of federal preemption under § 209(b). CAA § 209(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (b).

United States v. Ferrara

771 F. Supp. 1266 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 15, 1991

Katz clearly established, however, that a warrant was required for a wiretap, even in the absence of a trespass because, as the Court then held, “the Fourth Amendment protects people not places.” 389 U.S. at 351 , 88 S.Ct … Accordingly, by 1968, Olmstead had been clearly overruled; the Supreme Court had established that the Fourth' Amendment applied to the interception of wire and oral communications; and it was clear that judicial warrants

Spilman v. Mosby-Yearbook, Inc.

115 F. Supp. 2d 148 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 26, 2000

To qualify as derivative works, Spilman must have made original contributions that in some way distinguish his publications from the underlying work. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. … While the contract clearly places the final decision as to promoting the publications in Mosb/s hands, this does not absolve it of the duty to act in a commercially reasonable fashion.

In Re Lernout & Hauspie Securities Litigation

236 F. Supp. 2d 161 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 13, 2003

Novel or atypical methods should not provide immunity from the securities laws. 404 U.S. 6 , 11 n. 7, 92 S.Ct. 165 , 30 L.Ed.2d 128 (1971) (quoting A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2nd Cir. 1967)). … Plaintiffs argue that a scheme or course of business under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) can include misleading financial statements that might also qualify as predicates for Rule 10b-5(b). Cf. Peil v.

Kane v. Winn

319 F. Supp. 2d 162 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 27, 2004

See generally Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 Case W. Res. … He clearly has access to the medical records and the scientific and legal materials he needs to make his case.

Grafton and Upton R. Co. v. Town of Milford

417 F. Supp. 2d 171 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 14, 2006

Palm Beach, 110 F.Supp.2d 1367 , 1378 n. 5 (S.D.Fla.2000) (“[A]s the agency with authority delegated from Congress to implement the *175 provisions of the ICCTA, the STB is uniquely qualified to determine whether state law … Grafton contends that the facts of Florida East Coast Railway distinguish it clearly from the facts in the present case and, therefore, the STB should not have relied on that holding.

Vargas v. Spirit Delivery & Distribution Services, Inc.

245 F. Supp. 3d 268 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 24, 2017

With respect to Prong 3, there are clearly material issues of fact as to whether during the course of his business relationship with Spirit Civil was capable of performing delivery services for non-Spirit customers. … I am also satisfied that Civil’s counsel has demonstrated that they are qualified, experienced and are also fully prepared to represent the class to the best of their abilities.

Elliott v. Segal

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 15, 2019

That same day, Plaintiff’s daughter reported the door incident to the family’s attorney, expressed discomfort with being “implicated . . . as the culprits,” and stated that she and Plaintiff “[were] clearly targets of a … It is well-established in the First Circuit that the Ninth Amendment “does not create substantive rights beyond those conferred by governing law.” Martinez-Rivera v.

Snell v. Neville

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 11, 2019

The term “qualified handicapped individual” is not defined, but Mass. Gen. L. c. 93, § 103 cross-references the definition of “handicap” in Mass. Gen. … immunity.

Rothschild v. Cree, Inc.

711 F. Supp. 2d 173 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 13, 2010

The caveat is that any special definition given to a word must be clearly defined in the specification.”) (citation omitted). … As discussed, there is not enough evidence here to establish mischaracterizations of the articles, let alone blatant mischaracterizations to establish deceptive intent.

MacHado v. Leavitt

542 F. Supp. 2d 185 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 9, 2008

While, as will be seen, an uncorrected error if sufficiently egregious may conceivably constitute a due process violation, it cannot qualify as a wrongful “transfer or assignment” of Social Security benefits in violation … At the same time, delay without justification clearly falls outside of constitutional bounds. See Kraebel v. N.Y.

Greenwald v. Olsen

583 F. Supp. 1002 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 5, 1984

It qualifies as an “improved property” under the Cape Cod National Seashore Act (“the Act”). See 16 U.S.C. § 459b-3(d) (1974). … As one court has noted, a critical test of whether a rule is a general statement of policy is its practical effect in a subsequent administrative proceeding: a general statement of policy ... does not establish a binding

Nevada v. American Home Products Corp.

321 F. Supp. 2d 187 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 10, 2004

The Supreme Court has established three primary lines of doctrine on the question of the presumption against preemption. … No Actual Conflict Because the presumption against preemption applies, Defendants must show that there manifestly and clearly is an “actual conflict” between the state claims and the federal statute, Concannon, 249 F.3d at

Clements v. Clarke

635 F. Supp. 2d 26 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 2009

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States ...” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State … The SJC’s discussion was focused entirely on the state law claim that the grand jury testimony did not qualify for admission under Daye’s admissibility requirements (availability for cross-examination, lack of coercion, and

Pierre v. United States

741 F. Supp. 306 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 11, 1990

Clearly, M.G.L. c. Ill, § 197 places the duty to remove the lead paint upon the new owner, not the vendor. … The rules and regulations clearly outline the situations in which lead-based paint must be removed. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 35.50 -.56.

Coby v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc.

76 F. Supp. 3d 279 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 2, 2015

Indeed, although departure from a standard of care within the medical profession is not required to establish negligent design, some showing of negligence is clearly required. Cf . … A plaintiffs failure to establish any one of the essential elements of fraud is fatal to recovery.” Renaissance Leasing, LLC v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 322 S.W.3d 112, 131-32 (Mo.2010).

Anderson v. Stringham

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 30, 2025

Anderson filed a complaint in Land Court against Gemme to establish his right to access the Property via the Lane. [Id. ¶ 118]. … to qualified immunity.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Harman International Industries Inc.

530 F. Supp. 2d 369 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 26, 2007

Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 940 (Fed.Cir.1990) (no inequitable conduct where applicant did not disclose a device which would not qualify as prior art: the device was therefore “not material to patentability” and “[ajbsent … As detailed above, the facts relating to these dates are clearly disputed.

Gill v. JetBlue Airways Corp.

836 F. Supp. 2d 33 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 14, 2011

The holdings of these cases, however, are clearly limited to claims arising from the kinds of in-flight hazards subject to FAA safety regulations. … ACAA regulations establish no specific requirements as to the manner in which such services must be provided.

McGrath v. Tavares

889 F. Supp. 2d 157 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 4, 2012

Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s … immunity defense, since it has been determined that the use of force was objectively reasonable.