Case law

Composite Co. v. American International Group, Inc.

988 F. Supp. 2d 61 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 16, 2013

See Dolan, 630 F.Supp. at 308 (“Breach of contract claims clearly do not lie within the expertise of the Commissioner of Insurance.”); see also Liability Investigative Fund Effort v. … Despite plaintiffs contentions, that language clearly confines the use of the manuals to the computation of rates for the 2005-2006 policy.

Interex Corp. v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.

874 F. Supp. 1406 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 2, 1995

Moreover, the phrase “including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions” is qualified by the words immediately following which may be read as qualifying the word “accident” as well, but plainly qualify the phrase “continuous … Apparent authority, however, cannot be established by the purported agent’s own words or conduct.

Brison v. Smith

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 14, 2023

Even after the surgical treatment of Brison’s hand, the extent of his hand fracture, and his later infection to the injury site, qualify as serious. … an unreasonable professional judgment exercised—even though it does not rest on any established sinister motive or “purpose” to do harm.

Moore v. Marty Gilman, Inc.

965 F. Supp. 203 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 15, 1997

I have been trying to get it produced, and I have had very poor luck, basically, getting the qualified product that I’d like. … The framework for analysis is well-established.

Smoak v. United States

12 F. Supp. 3d 254 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 9, 2014

As established below, Smoak’s claims are such that a hearing on his petition is not necessary. 1. … Smoak has four pri- or state convictions that would qualify him as a career offender under the § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual.

Duggan v. Martorello

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 30, 2022

They also establish that Big Picture Loans’ and Ascension’s contacts with Massachusetts would be considered sufficient to subject those entities to specific personal jurisdiction in this forum. … The SJC has further acknowledged, in connection with its discussion of the Massachusetts anti-usury statute, that “[t]he public policy against usury is clearly a matter for grave legislative concern.”

Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n v. Dukakis

570 F. Supp. 628 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 9, 1983

Under these programs, hospitals and other providers of health care services were reimbursed for their costs of providing health care to the millions of patients who qualified for Medicare or Medicaid. … The statute was clearly designed to put pressure on hospitals to cut costs and increase efficiency by decreasing the rate at which hospitals can increase their revenues.

Arocho v. Chicopee Housing Authority

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 27, 2025

immunity.” … Defendants’ motion to dismiss does not raise a qualified immunity defense. These factors suggest that the plaintiffs have sued Blazic exclusively in her official capacity.

United States v. Ferrara

771 F. Supp. 1266 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 15, 1991

Katz clearly established, however, that a warrant was required for a wiretap, even in the absence of a trespass because, as the Court then held, “the Fourth Amendment protects people not places.” 389 U.S. at 351 , 88 S.Ct … Accordingly, by 1968, Olmstead had been clearly overruled; the Supreme Court had established that the Fourth' Amendment applied to the interception of wire and oral communications; and it was clear that judicial warrants

Miller v. New America High Income Fund

755 F. Supp. 1099 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 9, 1991

Applying the appropriate standard of scrutiny for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a set of facts establishing the underwriter defendants as “sellers” is clearly plausible, although the plaintiffs must later produce ' facts to prove … Whether the directors qualify as “sellers” within the meaning of § 12(2) is not so evident. In Pinter v.

Widener v. Cowen

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 25, 2019

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) federal courts may review petitions for habeas petitions that have resulted in either a decision that was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly … established Federal law” or “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

United States v. Aegerion Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

280 F. Supp. 3d 217 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 20, 2017

L.Rev. 1255, 1272-74 (2005) (“The recent accelerated decline in the number of trials is ... part of a much broader turn from law, a turn away from the definitive establishment of public accountability in adjudication .... … When they nevertheless advertise themselves as pro-consumer, their overweening sophistry may well qualify as an unfair and deceptive practice.

Ogidi-Gbegbaje v. Magarian

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 22, 2020

In the alternative, he argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. … In order to establish a claim under Section 1983, Ogidi must establish that a person acting under the color of law denied him a right secured by the constitution or by federal law.

New England Maritime Co. v. United States

55 F.2d 674 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 14, 1932

I think the Childs was clearly in fault for not keeping clear of the schooner. … Justice Brown, in speaking for the Circuit Court, said: “Where fault on the part of one vessel is established by uncontradieted testimony, and such fault is, of itself, sufficient to account for the disaster, it is not enough

Kane v. Winn

319 F. Supp. 2d 162 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 27, 2004

See generally Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 Case W. Res. … He clearly has access to the medical records and the scientific and legal materials he needs to make his case.

Espinosa Sr. v. Andrew C. Metcalf

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 1, 2021

The amended complaint therefore also establishes a reasonable inference that Export is liable for violating Section 7.07(8) as to Junior. … Nothing in the amended complaint, however, indicates that Metcalf is a “[c]onstable” entitled to immunity. See generally D. 13.

Encompass Insurance Co. of Massachusetts v. Giampa

522 F. Supp. 2d 300 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 27, 2007

Moreover, the absolute litigation privilege immunizes the maker of the statements from any civil liability arising from those statements. Doe, 41 Mass.App.Ct. at 140 , 668 N.E.2d at 1333 . … The defendants allege, in the Giampa Counterclaim, that the press release “clearly implies that the ‘six month investigation’ conducted by Encompass produced evidence that Joseph D. Giampa, Frederick T.

Doe v. Massachusetts Department of Correction

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 14, 2018

This burden “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the of sovereign immunity would have likely barred her state-law claims for injunctive relief in a federal court. … Remaining Elements of Doe’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims Finding for present purposes that Doe has established a prima facie claim to being a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, the court

Partners Healthcare System, Inc. v. Sullivan

497 F. Supp. 2d 29 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 25, 2007

In this way, such application of ch. 151B would govern the payment of benefits, and would clearly have a connection with, and directly relate to an ERISA plan. … At the same time, M.G.L. ch. 151B § 4 is clearly not preempted when applied to a non-ERISA benefit.

Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. v. Stewart

22 F. Supp. 68 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 24, 1938

Stewart, the insured, his letter of March 24, 1927, inclosing an application for the establishment of an “Interest Income Trust,” and stating his desire that knowledge of the transaction should be limited to the home office … The court said: “The insured at all times prior to his death had complete domination and *72 control o'f the policies by reason of his reserved right at any time to change the beneficiary. * * * The insured clearly might