Case law

United States v. Levasseur

699 F. Supp. 965 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 18, 1988

Likewise, since letter immunity is lawful in this Circuit, United States v. … New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971) are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.

Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc.

865 F. Supp. 37 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 23, 1994

The conclusion that there is not a fraud on the FDA exception to the scope of the MDA’s preemptive effect is not qualified in a case in which the FDA has recalled a device or, indeed, already established that a manufacturer … say so clearly.

Rosado v. Allen

482 F. Supp. 2d 94 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 30, 2007

“A state court decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established federal law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases.’ ” James v. … The state court has performed an “unreasonable application” of clearly established law if that court “ ‘identifies the correct governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts’

Hipsaver Co., Inc. v. JT Posey Co.

497 F. Supp. 2d 96 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 19, 2007

Posey argues that the Garwood advertisements do not qualify as comparative advertisements because they do not specifically identify HipSaver or its products. … (See 6/11/07 Tr. 56:23-25; 57:1-2) (“My representation, your Honor, as clearly as I can state it and unequivocally, the representation we are making is solely and exclusively based on data that was provided to the other side

Strahan v. Linnon

967 F. Supp. 581 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 20, 1997

A discovery and briefing schedule was established. … This is clearly the language of discretion.

Diomed, Inc. v. AngioDynamics, Inc.

450 F. Supp. 2d 130 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 30, 2006

Navarro’s opinion qualifies as a sufficient substitute for an expert report. Whether Dr. Navarro was “retained” as an expert witness by Diomed is debatable. … Navarro’s services under that agreement do not, in themselves, establish him as a retained expert, there is a sustainable argument that Dr. Navarro qualifies as a retained expert under the circumstances of this case.

In Re Relafen Antitrust Litigation

286 F. Supp. 2d 56 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 1, 2003

As Smithkline correctly points out, matters that are “stipulated, admitted without controversy, or determined by default leading to the entry of judgment” do not qualify for preclusive effect. … Clearly, Judge Lindsay determined that Smithkline had engaged in inequitable conduct to render the patent unenforceable, but the Federal Circuit did not reach that issue on appeal.

Boston's Children First v. City of Boston

62 F. Supp. 2d 247 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 10, 1999

[is] clearly a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of education.”) … Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343-44 , 81 S.Ct. 125 , 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960), the court noted that “it is imperative that generalizations, based on and qualified by the concrete situations that gave rise to them, must not be applied

Riley v. Metropolitan Life Insurance

971 F. Supp. 2d 186 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 11, 2013

As relevant here, the court concluded that an underpayment can qualify as a repudiation because a plan’s determination that a beneficiary receive less than his full entitlement is effectively a partial denial of benefits. … To justify tolling, Riley must “establish that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control prevented a timely filing.” Ortega Candelaria v.

Global NAPS, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc.

447 F. Supp. 2d 39 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 18, 2006

However, even assuming that § 5.7.2.3 is ambiguous rather than clear, the DTE’s interpretation is not clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious. … After the parties asked this court to establish a briefing schedule, this court issued an order explaining why, in view of the complexity of this case, it felt obliged to retain it after remand.

United States v. Luisi

568 F. Supp. 2d 106 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 25, 2008

Because of the principle established in The William , citizens across the country can walk into a federal district court, claim their right to a jury trial, regardless of whether they claim a right to recovery on some clearly … established legal theory.

Tuckerbrook Alternative Investments, LP v. Banerjee

754 F. Supp. 2d 177 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 30, 2010

This Court will refer to the guidelines established by the Coon court, outlined above, to determine whether relief under Rule 60(b) is proper. … It would undermine this purpose to allow judges to determine the proper method of service of process on a case by case basis, rather than according to clearly enacted rules. See Lyman Steel Corp., 747 F.Supp. at 400 .

Arballo v. Fresenius USA, Inc.

111 F. Supp. 3d 79 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 30, 2015

Arballo does not dispute that an outpatient dialysis clinic qualifies as a health care provider under California law. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1200 . … The submissions concerning discovery fail to establish that she could not have discovered the injury earlier.

Skerry v. Massachusetts Higher Education Assistance Corp.

73 F. Supp. 2d 47 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 5, 1999

Once met, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” … Participating lending institutions, such as [State Street Bank] use their own funds to make loans to qualified borrowers attending eligible postsecondaiy schools.

Brown v. Corsini

657 F. Supp. 2d 296 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 29, 2009

The hearing officer determined that Shabazz clearly refused a direct order to install window screens and was guilty. Id. … Court "shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint” if the complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

Haney v. Town of Mashpee

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 17, 2025

Because Plaintiff’s claims survive under Penn Central, the Court need not decide whether they would qualify for categorical protection under Lucas. … See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8 (clarifying that 95% diminution would not qualify for categorical protection); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.

Com. of Mass. v. Bowen

679 F. Supp. 137 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 3, 1988

This clearly is not the case. … This clearly runs counter to congressional policy favoring coordination and integration of health care programs. It will be enjoined, d.

Comdisco Disaster Recovery Services, Inc. v. Money Management Systems, Inc.

789 F. Supp. 48 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 28, 1992

The above paragraph clearly forewarns both parties that each will have access to the proprietary and confidential data of the other during the performance of the contract. … Money Management’s purported realization in 1990 that the CDRS contract would no longer provide adequate disaster recovery backup does not qualify as a frustrating event, because such a contingency was anticipated by the

Lazarre v. Turco

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 9, 2019

federal courts to dismiss a complaint sua sponte if the claims therein lack an arguable basis in law or in fact, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune … Plaintiff alleges that the “DMH director [at OCCC] is not qualified to treat [Plaintiff].” Id. Plaintiff seems to allege that he had attempted “suicide [himself] several times.” Id. at p. 20.

Fenoglio v. Augat, Inc.

50 F. Supp. 2d 46 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 20, 1999

The letter stated quite clearly and unconditionally it was the written notice of termination of the employment agreement. 3 A determination that the August 6, 1996, letter serves as the written notice of termination only … Stock options qualify as “securities” for purposes of the 1934 Act. See Collins v.