Case law

Kilburn v. Maloney

383 F. Supp. 2d 247 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 1, 2005

This court finds that the SJC’s decision was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. … Since the SJC “applied the correct standard by articulating the standard as set forth in Jackson,” the state court decision is not “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. at 15 .

Alopexx, Inc. v. Xenothera

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 28, 2023

The text of the contract does not clearly support defendant’s interpretation. … Here, the private factors do not clearly weigh in favor of the French forum.

In Re. Brown

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 22, 2022

The Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court 28 U.S.C. § 1334 “establishes two main categories of bankruptcy matters over which the district courts have jurisdiction.” Gupta v. Quincy Med. … In other words, some matters that qualify for “related to” jurisdiction pre-confirmation might no longer qualify post-confirmation, but the authority for “related to” jurisdiction never disappears. Id.

Wollman v. Massachusetts General Hospital Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 3, 2020

Utah 2020) (declining to apply peer review privilege in the context of discovery sought in a FCA case where peer review documents might help the Relator establish scienter); In re Admin. … The HCQIA promotes physician engagement in the peer review process by extending qualified immunity to those conducting peer reviews. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101(5), 11111 (a)(2) (1986).

United States v. Bell

818 F. Supp. 444 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 7, 1993

Rather, this case features special considerations that weigh heavily in the equitable balance and that substantially qualify the character of the defendant’s “enrichment” by the IRS. … Magniac and Knight provide support for the proposition that equity cannot provide a plaintiff with a remedy where such a remedy is clearly precluded by law.

Manning v. Whole Foods Market Group Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 21, 2022

With regard to state action, while the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s claims are inadequately pled and ultimately must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), Defendants do not clearly explain how their argument that Plaintiff … He also asserts that Defendants were not qualified to give him a temperature check as part of a health screening before allowing him to enter the store. [Id. ¶¶ 23–25].

Aiello v. Signature Commercial Solutions, LLC

District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 16, 2025

Aiello, 2024 WL 1258620, at *5. 3 Citations to the PSOF refer to the facts as admitted or qualified by Aiello. … It would be strange if a party could remove its otherwise clearly commercial acts from the ambit of 93A simply by sending a barred employee.

Altshuler v. Animal Hospitals, Ltd.

901 F. Supp. 2d 269 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 31, 2012

Meehl’s termination letter clearly states that she was terminated for complaining about the untimely Simple IRA deposits. … Usiak's argument that a claim for damages may not be considered on summary judgment before liability has been established has no basis in law. .

New Bedford Defense Products Division of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Local No. 1113 of International Union

160 F. Supp. 103 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 27, 1958

Despite the language of the contract, the Division clearly was not, and, (not being a voluntary association or a legal personality) could not be, a party. As to the Local the question is more doubtful. … “(e) Matters involving the general wage scale or differentials in the maximum hourly rates which are established at the effective date of this Agreement shall not be a subject for arbitration.”

Milford Power Ltd. Partnership v. New England Power Co.

918 F. Supp. 471 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 14, 1996

NEP further alleges that neither Kinder nor Gar-nett qualified or disavowed that they represented Enron and Jones Capital. Hachey Aff., ¶ 17. … The privilege cannot, however, be “exploited” as an opportunity to defame with immunity, and can be lost by “unnecessary or unreasonable publication to one for whom the occasion is not privileged.” Sullivan v.

Rigby v. Damant

486 F. Supp. 2d 222 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 15, 2007

The Supreme Court has been willing to imply authorization under the Anti-Injunction Act absent the express authorization demanded by the statute. 15 In broadening the exception, however, the Court provided that “to qualify … Additionally, the third exception clearly does not apply as, at this point, there is no determination of the merits or judgment to protect.

House of Clean, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Inc.

775 F. Supp. 2d 302 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 27, 2011

That conduct clearly constitutes a breach of the duty to defend. See Peabody Essex Museum, Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. … The duty to indemnify “arises only after the insured’s liability has been established”. Wilkinson, 856 N.E.2d at 836.

Stein v. Smith

270 F. Supp. 2d 157 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 3, 2003

. § 1102 (a)(1) (requiring every plan qualified under ERISA to have at least one “named fiduciary”); 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (21)(A) (enumerating activities resulting in what has been described as “functional fiduciary” status). … ERISA fiduciaries also have a duty to diversify the investments of the plan in question “so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so,” and to manage the plan

Motta v. District Director, Immigration & Naturalization Service

869 F. Supp. 80 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 29, 1994

Some 53 months thereafter the Board of Immigration Appeals, in a one-page decision, denied the appeal as “clearly untimely.” … arbitraiy, capricious, and [an] abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law,” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A), and contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity

Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 29, 2019

Atlantic’s third argument, that statements and conduct of attorneys are immune from Chapter 93A liability, fares no better. … It is unlikely that the immunity Massachusetts provides attorneys extends to immunize Atlantic, but the issue is fact-specific and need not be definitively resolved at this stage.5

Green v. Kenneway

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 15, 2019

A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it “contradicts the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court’s cases or confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable … It should defer to that reasoning, even if the habeas court “concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously

Bay State Savings Bank v. Baystate Financial Services, LLC

484 F. Supp. 2d 205 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 23, 2007

The products and services were sold in plaintiffs branches by “mutual employees” of both Infinex and plaintiff, although Infinex was clearly identified as the broker/dealer. 9 The lease agreement between plaintiff and Infinex … Only a select number of marks, however, may qualify as “famous,” and Congress intended the courts to be “discriminating and selective in categorizing a mark as famous.” I.P. Lund Trading v.

Ricci v. Okin

537 F. Supp. 817 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 21, 1982

These views established beyond dispute that “a constitutional level of care [had] not been attained” 6 at these institutions and that conditions there were intolerable. … The considerations raised in Carey are clearly distinguishable from those involved here.

M. C. I. Concord Advisory Board v. Hall

447 F. Supp. 398 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 21, 1978

Even a lifetime of study in prison administration and several advanced degrees in the field would not qualify us as a federal court to command state officials to shun a policy that they have decided is suitable because to … The record before this Court does not establish that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment includes all doublecelling at M.C.I. Concord.

United States v. Volungus

599 F. Supp. 2d 68 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 27, 2009

Here, as in those cases, the first two categories of permissible regulation under the Commerce Clause are clearly inapplicable. … Substituting a therapeutic commitment for a punitive one is a policy choice that is clearly within Congress’s power to make.